Some remarks concerning the general theory of human social praxis and its relation to ethical theory by Abugattas, Juan A.
SOME REMARKS CONCERNING THE GENERAL THEORY OF 




Ba,:hillera to, 11 ' Uni versidad Nacionc:l Mayor 
de San Ma~cos, 1972 
Ma:;ter of Arts, University of Kansas, 1973 
Licenciatura, Universid~d Nacional Mayor 
de San Marcos, _1976 
Submitted to the Department of Philbscphy 
1nd the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
the University cf Ka:1sas in partial fulfill-
ment of the requirements for the degree of 




,,,"a i rp 0 r son \.JJ..l ...L ...... 
Redacted Signature 
- ....... ---,-n--~.;.;.;.e-..;.:::;__~: 
Redacted Signature -u-u· ----
To 
Joanna, my parents 
and Uriel 
Sozialismus ist das, was man unter dem Namen 
Moral so lange vergebens gesucht hat. 
E. Bloch 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PTef ace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
CHAPTER I. MORALITY AND THE GENERAL THEORY 
OF HUMAN SOCIAL PRAXIS . . . . . . . 








Antecedents of the GTHSP 
The Purpose of the GTHSP 
Norms and Social Functions .. 
The Concept of Person 
Human Relations, Social Space and 
Ins ti tut ions . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The Theory of Needs and the Deduction 




On the Needs and the Characteris-
tics of Human Nature ..... . 
The Nature of the Deduction of 
the Conditions of Possibility of 
Human Social Life. . . . . . . . 
The Deduction of the Conditions 
of Possibility of Human Social 
Live 
CHAPTER II. THE BASIC SOCIAL FUNCTION OF 
MORALITY 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
a. Morality and Law .. 
b. The Passage from Is to Ought .. 
2. The Deduction of the Fundamental 





Preliminary Remarks . 
The Fundamental Social 
of Pro<luctiou .... 
The Fundamental Social 
of Defense ..... . 



























e. The Fundamental Social Function 
of Instruction and Training 
f. The Fundamental Social Function 
of Reproduction ....... . 
g. The Fundamental Social Function 
of Morality or Conductivization 
3. Norms and Virtues 
Notes . 
CHAPTER III. THE STRUCTURE OF REAL MORAL CODES .. 
1. Statement of the Questions . 
2. The Relation between Fundamental, 
Contingently Fundamental and Non-
Fundamental Moral Norms 
3. The Conditions of Morality. 
a. Geography and Morality. 
b. Morality and Technology .... 
c. Morality and Socio-economL: Factors 
d. Cultural, Psychological, Biological 






















One of the air.1~ of philosophical inquiry at all times 
and in all places has been the discovery of a principle of 
unity behind the multiplicity of phenomena. The science of 
morals is no exception in this respect. For it, too, the 
main problem is to find a method that would empower it to 
discriminate between the accidental or relative and the neces-
sary or universal features of human action. Such method, of 
course, ought to be able not only to identify universals but 
to show that those things identified as such are indeed what 
they appear to be. Essentially, this is what this disserta-
tion is supposed to have accomplished. 
The main thesis defended in the pages that you are 
about to read is that the distinctions mentioned above can 
be made only by examining the =andition3 of existence of human 
beings. Many times in the past philosophers have attempted 
to formulate this same distinctions by appealing to the 
characteristics of human nature. This I regard as a funda-
me11tally correct move. It is the strategy of the Epicureans 
and that of some of the Stoics, for example. By differentiat-
ing between those things that have to be done and those that 
can be avoided or dispensed with, they hoped to encounter a 
iirm basis for their notion of the moral good. In the process 
they introduced the notion of 'freedom' er 'liberty' that has 
i 
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been so widely discussed throughout the history of Western 
moral philosophy. Actually, Aristotle, it seems to me, fol-
lows basically the same strategy in h~s inquiries into the 
nature of the moral good. His system is superior to th~t of 
the Stoics and Epicureans mostly because, contrary to what 
they do, he does not consider the needs of humans insofar 
as they are or are capable of being isolated individuals, 
but rather insofar as they are members of a community. In 
isolation men, Aristotle thinks, cannot live the good life. 
The subject matter of moral philosophy is, then, man as he 
exists in society. And this is precisely the starting point 
that I have chosen for this brief dissertation on the nature 
of morality. 
Now, as is the case in Aristotie, the claim here is 
not the rather mild one that because as a matter of fact we 
do not know any men living in isolation, we cannot study 
morality by taking such a fiction as our starting point. The 
claim is the strong one that there are no such things as men, 
in the fullest sense of the word, that live or can live in 
isolation. If this is accepted, the first serious problem 
that moral philosophy has to face is the determination of 
the nature of humans living in society, since, ex hypothesis, 
they cannot be merely or purely biological entites. What 
humans are essentially, that is, in addition to their bio-
logical nature, constitutes the topic of study of the Gen-
eral Theory of Human Social Behavior. No aspect of human 
nature, nor a single one of the things related to human 
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existence can be understood independently of such a general 
theory. Obviously, I do not even pretend to develop that 
theory in this paper. All I have tried to do, and this con-
stitutes the bulk of the first chapter, is outline its skele-
ton and present some of its basic elements. All this: only 
to the extent necessary to provide the adequate framework for 
a not less preliminary discussion of the nature of morality 
and of the processes of generation of real moral codes. 
Morality, I claim, is the single most important constitutive 
element of human social existence. It is on the basis of this 
assumption that I have tried to solve some of the traditional 
problems of moral philosophy. 
But, lest I am dangerously misunderstood and accused 
of being excessively ambitious, let me exercise some prudence 
and state what I have not done in this paper. I hope that 
stating the limitations of my ambition in this Preface will 
help the reader see the limitations and the real scope of the 
discussions that follow. 
The word 'morality' can assume numerous meanings in 
daily and philosophical speech, but four of these meanings 
ara the most important. First, 'morality' is often used as 
synonymous of: 'propriety' particularly in order to qualify 
the sexual habits of people. This sense is, clearly, derived 
and cannot constitute the only subject matter of moral philo-
sophy. Secondly, 'morality' is used to refer to the set of 
rules and norms generally approved of by society, but not 
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necessarily codified. This is the way the word is used by 
many a philosopher, especially by those willing to distinguish 
sharply between law and morality. In a third, more interest-
ing sense, 'moral' are those things that ought to be done 
because there is an overwhelming reason to do them. Such 
reason is normally taken to be overriding, that is, second 
to none. Furthermore, it is assumed that the moral duty, so 
understood, is so intimately related to the meaning or purpose 
of a person's life that failure to fulfill it results in com-
plete loss of dignity and direction. When people speak of 
moral conflicts, this is the sense in which they are using 
the word 'moral.' In the past, when moral philosophy was a 
more serious enterprise, there existed among philosophers the 
widespread conviction that the touch-stone to measure the 
adequacy of an ethical system was its ability or inability 
to tell people what to do, when confronted with moral dilem-
mas. But in this time of scientific renunciation, a distinc-
tion is made between morals in this sense and ethics. Ethics 
is a theoretical discipline, the purpose of which is the 
antiseptic explication of the phenomenon of morality, i.e., 
of the nature of moral dilemmas, their causes and their logic 
or lack of it. Morality, conceived as ethics is not 'norma-
tive,' but 'descriptive' in character. 
Also in this respect, this dissertation is not atypical 
and, to a considerable extent, it shares the sins and the 
weaknesses of the time. It too pretends to be a work in 
ethics, a description of the phenomenon of morality. It is, 
V 
nonetheless, different from other works in one important 
respect: it does not stem from the conviction that the line 
between the third and the fourth sens~s of 'morality' can be 
neatly drawn. In fact, one of the conclusions that can be 
derived from the speculations that follow is that, once an 
accurate account of morality has been produced, nothing is 
easier than indicating to people the general direction in which 
they ought to orient their action. But, what cannot immedi-
ately be deduced from our ethical theory is a piece of advice 
that could be useful to a person who finds himself in a par-
ticular predicament. In this regard, the task that has been 
undertaken here remains substantially unfinished, since no 
serious theory of morals is such, until it provides a means 
of guiding concrete human beings through the maze of dilemmas 
they have to meet in their daily lives. It is not only and 
not even mainly lack of time that has stopped me from trying 
to advance in this direction. The reason is simply that, at 
the present time, I do not have the faintest idea of how to 
go about looking for such criteria. Certainly, this is the 
major disappointment that I have experienced while working on 
this paper. I was sure at the beginning that it was enough 
to comprehend the nature of morality to be able to develop 
justifications, arguments and criteria which would help me 
pursue the good life. My expectations turned out to be 
unfounded. Concrete moral choices demand from us more knowl-
edge than can be derived from our understanding of the nature 
of morality. In most cases, in order to know what to do here 
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and now in regard to a person, I have to perceive that per-
son not merely as a person in general, but as a concrete indi-
vidual to whom I am tied in a variety of manners. 
The same is partly true when doctrines are the sub-
jects of my moral dilemmas. Although, for the sake of honesty, 
I have to confess that I think that some support for certain 
traditional Anarchist ~heses can be derived from the GTHSP. 
In fact, more than once have I felt tempted to include as a 
subtitle of this dissertation a paraphrase of a title of one 
of Gorgias' works. Leaving Helen aside, this essay could be 
made to sound as a 'defense' and 'encomium' (encoomion) of 
Anarchism for, at the very least, it proves that its claims 
concerning the artificial character of most rules, norms and 
laws are basically correct. But only when the most crucial 
moral question is answered in a definitive manner, the final 
argument in favor of Anarchism will have been produced. The 
GTHSP, as I have developed it here, does not provide that 
answer since, again, it simply presents the qualities of 
persons in general, without providing any ground to jump 
directly to the conclusion that all human beings should be 
regarded as persons. I am convinced, though, that this 
deficiency is due to a limitation of my faculties, and not to 
a major fault of the GTHSP. 
Certain other problems, all less important than the 
one just mentioned, have not been dealt with either. Among 
them is the question regarding the nature of moral reasoning. 
There is a brief reference to it in the section on moral 
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obligation, but it is not at all exhaustive. By the problem 
of the nature of moral reasoning I mean not merely the psy-
chological question of how it is that people learn to apply 
reason to the solution of moral dilemmas, but also the logi-
cal questions concerning such issues as the character of the 
nexus of moral judgements with one another, the nature of 
moral contradictions and the idea of coherent moral reasoning, 
etc. Although not essential, these questions are undoubtedly 
important enough to deserve a separate and extensive treatment. 
More interesting are the issues involved in the dis-
cussion of the relation between moYal virtues and emotions. 
St. Thomas concluded a long time ago that because man's moral 
activity must be performed with the help of the body, it must 
involve passions. God and the angels are alone capable of 
being passionless and good at the same time. No account of 
human morality is complete, which does not explicate the role 
of passion in human behavior. And in this respect too my 
account remains fundamentally incomplete, although some per-
tinent remarks, enough I hope for the purposes of this paper 1 
can be found in the second chapter. 
Finally, anyone reading the third chapter will quickly 
notice that it could profit from a more detailed treatment of 
the topics with "hich it is concerned. The study of the pro-
cass of generation of real moral codes is clearly a must for 
all those attempting to understand human social behavior. 
it is therefore especially surprising that it has been 
neglected for so long. Presently, the only people somewhat 
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concerned with this type of study are some rather simplistic 
and narrowminded natural scientists who call themselves 'socio-
biologists.' In the past anthropologists and other social 
scientists have occasionally given some thought to the problem. 
But philosophers have for the most part ignored it. I have 
felt obliged to include here a preliminary discussion of it, 
for it is only against the background of the elements and 
forces capable of determining moral ideas that controversies 
such as those surTounding the concepts of freedom, determinism, 
relativism, ideology, etc., can be put in an adequate perspec-
tive. 
Apart from these more or less voluntary omissions there 
are, I am sure, many other involuntary ones. Those are the 
product of either ignorance, hurry or misunderstandings. But, 
to say it again, if in spite of all this there is something 
at least marginally valuable in the pages that you are going 
to read, it is the attempt to study morality in its natural 
setting, i.e., in the framework of human social life. The 
completion of that study requires considerable time, knowledge 
and ability. But I am absolutely convinced that any other 
road will inevitably lead to the same old speculative laby-
rinths, to the fruitless paradoxes and confusions that plague· 
most of the contemporary reflection on morality. 
I do not want to close these initial remarks without 
expressing my gratitude to the many persons to whom I owe what 
little I know. First of all I would like to thank my profes-
sors and fellow students in the Department of Philosophy of the 
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University of Kansas. Their unusual friendliness and con-
geniality have made my stay in Kansas a very pleasant and 
fruitful one. I am particularly indebted to Professor Richard 
Cole, whose writings, lectures and informal conversations 
have given me a rare opportunity to appreciate the operation 
of an original philosophical mind, and whose advice has always 
been enlightening and pertinent. I am no less indebted to 
Professors John Bricke and Richard DeGeorge, the other two 
members of my dissertation committee. Their advice and comments 
have allowed me to turn this paper into a much better product 
than it would otherwise have been. Professors Anthony Genova 
and Michael Young generously invested some of their valuable 
time in the different duties connected with the defense of 
a dissertation. And Joe Vanzandt and my wife, Joanna, know 
how much I appreciate their patience, their admonishments and 
their love. Last but not least, I would also like to thank 
Sue Schumock who kindly agreed to type this paper. 
CHAPTER I 
MORALITY AND THE GENERAL THEORY 
OF HUMAN SOCIAL PRAXIS 
l. Antecedents and Aim of the General Theory of 
Human Social Praxis (GTHS 
a. Antecedents of the GTHSP 
Respectful of the venerable philosophical tradition 
that has earned Aristotle the title of the first historian of 
philosophy, albeit the first biased historian of philosophy, 
I would like to start this preliminary part of the essay by 
engaging in a brief discussion of some of the philosophical 
doctrines concerning human nature and human social behavior 
that have helped shape the view of man characteristic of our 
time. Obviously, I have had to do some selecting. But this 
is not the main way in which my discussion imitates the Aris-
totelian pattern. Hopefully without excessive oversimplifi-
cations and distortions, I will be able to show that the 
history of modern Western thought reveals a dialectical striv-
ing towards something like the General Theory of Human Social 
Praxis which is sketched in later parts of this paper. The 
discussion, then, will have three purposes: a) presenting the 
state of the issue and the series of transitions that have 
led Western thought to where it is now, b) exhibiting the 
difficulti~s and limitations of each of the theories considered 
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and c) stating the problems confronting the GTHSP, most of 
which have been proposed or perceived, but not solved by current 
theories. 
Although the attempt to understand man and human 
action has been an essential feature of Western Philosophy 
ever since its appearance, it is only in the Modern Age that we 
encounter questions that fundamentally resemble those we ask 
today. Since the Renaissance our concern is not only and not 
even mainly directed toward understanding the good qualities 
of humans, but also to the explication of their vilest passions. 
Nowadays, when we ask ourselves about human nature, it is 
mostly because we want to account for human baseness; we want 
to know why man can be a wolf to his fellow men~ But we want 
to know also, how human societies can develop and endure in 
spite of all this baseness and idiocy. As has been seen for 
several centuries now, the purpose of law is, precisely, the 
establishment of principles that make communal living possible 
for creatures that are neither angels nor 'political animals' 
by nature. In the words of Vico: 
Legislation considers man as he is, in order to turn 
him to good uses in human society; out of ferocity, avarice, 
and ambition, the three vices which run throughout the 
human race, it creates the military, merchant and governing 
classes, and thus the strength, riches, and wisdom of com-
monwealths. Out of these three great vices, which could 
certainly destroy all mankind on the face of the earth, 
it makes civil happiness.1 
Capitalism has taught the observers of the Modern Age 
not only that humans are basically isolated individuals, but 
also that the prosperity of their societies depends upon their 
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vices, and that the wise organization of these vices, as of 
their virtues, of course, is theirs exclusively. Indeed, 
this is, together with the conviction that knowledge can lead 
to the control of nature, the one thing that best characterizes 
the Modern Age. Again, Vice has something to say in this 
respect: 
But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the 
earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines 
the eternal and never failing light beyond all question: 
that the world of civil society has certainly been made 
by men, and that its principles are there~ore to be found 
within the modifications of our own mind. 
As we shall see later, this is the same conviction that 
provides the basis for what Marx calls 'historical materialism.' 
But the problem is not only how, but also why beings that are 
not by nature social creatures, 'decide, 1 at a certain point, 
to constitute a society. Now it is easy to understand why 
the doctrine of the social contract is, so to say, the logical 
consequence of this particular way of conceiving the problem. 
There are only two ways of bringing together rational beings 
that are not united by nature: force or consent. Force, 
Rousseau says, cannot generate legitimacy, but only tyranny 
and slavery, only consent generates legitimacy and justice. 
Actually, the whole point of the "philosophical fiction 
of the state of nature,'' as Hume wants to call it, is to show 
that men have to make an effort tc become social or political 
beings, that is to say, social life is not simply given to them. 
In a way, of course, the same could be said to be true for 
Aristotle. The 'polis,' a£ter all, is the result of a historical 
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process of sorts. But there is a major difference between 
Aristotle and the moderns. For the former a man is not such 
until he lives in a 'polis,' it is only as part of it that he 
actualizes his real nature. An isolated individual is a defec-
tive being. This is not the case of the moderns. The isolated 
individual is fully a human being even if he remains all his 
life in a glorious isolation. In a sense, it is only by acci-
dent that social life is important to him. 
It is no wonder, therefore, to find in the early 
modern writers an urge to justify social life. Man, endowed 
with free will, could have chosen not to constitute a society, 
and thus remain in the 'state of nature.' But he is not 
only free; he is also rational and 'reason' shows him that soc-
ial life is the best means for the satisfaction of his needs. 
In other words, the individual perceives some 'usefulness' or 
'advantage' in the acceptance of the limitations imposed on him 
by social life. It is only once he has decided to live socially 
that the individual becomes aware of his own physical and 
emotional defectiveness. Note, though, that these lackings 
or defects are such not intrinsically, but only from the point 
of view of what is needed to live in society. So Hume, for 
example, attaches great importance to what he calls 'limited 
benevolence.' The fact that he claims some degree of 'benevo-
lence' to be 'natural' or inherent to human nature is to be 
seen as an attemot to demonstrate that life in societv is not 
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totally alien to men. If it were, nothing but a Hobbesian 
account of the origin of society would be co~rect. A similar 
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argument has been explicitly formulated by some modern authors. 
Most conspicuous is the case of G. J. Warnock: 
If one of those things towards the amelioration of the 
human predicament which can be done are to be done in fact, 
then not only must people sometimes be made to do things 
which they are not just naturally disposed to do anyway; 
they must also sometimes voluntarily, without coercion, 
act otherwise than people are just naturally disposed to do. 
It is necessary that people should acquire what may be 
called 'good dispositions'--that is, some readiness on 
occasion voluntarily to do desirable things which not all 
human beings are just naturally disp~sed to do anyway, and 
similarly not to do damaging things. 
So, man can rationally manipulate things so as to 
constitute a civil society, and this demands to a certain extent 
the transformation of his own nature. Society is, strictly 
speaking, an 'artifact,' the result of an act of 'engineering,' 
4 to use the word that P. Berger has used in this connection~ 
It is important to notice here that this 'instrumental reason,' 
as it has also been called5 operates very much restricted by 
the materials to which it applies its skills. Human reason, 
and for that matter human will, as human imagination can put 
together only those things that are given and that are not 
infinitely flexible. So the aim is not to eliminate evil, 
but to divert it and set it on a beneficial course. Not even 
God wants to annihilate it. His wisdom consists in the appro-
priate utilization of both moral and physical evil. The demythi-
cizing force of capitalism is so strong that not even theologians, 
and much less social scientists can pretend to deny the perva-
sive presence of evil at all levels of reality. It is prscisely 
the existence of immense obstacles that demands the achievement 
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of a high degree of technological excellence from the Demiurgs 
of civil society. 
Whether we buy or not the ideological cover in which 
this conception 0£ man appeared historically, it is undoubtedly 
the one that better conforms to the world view of our age. The 
greatest dangers that confront us nowadays, as well as the most 
beautiful ideals, spring from it. But, most important for the· 
purposes of this essay is the fact that this conception has 
been historically the key that opened the door for an attempt 
to achieve a systematic understanding of human nature and 
human social behavior. A science concerning a set of facts is 
possible only when all these facts are admitted, together with 
the forces that determine their behavior, into the realm of 
'reality.' A science of society was incompatible with a 
theology that denied the 'substantiality' of evil forces and 
that postulated God as the ultimate cause of human social 
behavior. By 'reality' we have to understand in this particu-
lar context the realm of being postulated as directly accessible 
to human understanding, whether it be by reason or through the 
external or internal senses. 
This assimilation has often taken the form of an 
extreme reductionism, partly to be accounted for in ter~s of the 
impact on the Western mind of the development of natural science. 
There are, of course, certain ideological elements involved in 
these reductionistic attempts, especially in the ~ost recent ones. 
The condensation of all psychical processes into physiological 
ones or the en~hasis on behavio~istical approaches are not only 
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the result of innocent scientific speculations. They imply a 
denial of the specificity of human affairs and thus their 
reification in the strictest sense of the word. Turned into 
things, in this narrow sense, human affairs can be dealt with 
without remorse or qualms and the engineering mentality can give 
way to the mentality of the technobureaucrat. Social engineer-
ing can turn into mindless manipulation. 
Here we are dealing with the main epistemological prob-
lem of social science. Once human affairs have been integrated 
into reality, the specificity of the human phenomenon needs 
to be determined. Such a task is previous to any discussion of 
method. It is the point of the Meno, our efforts to know 
must be preceded by a certain knowledge of the object towards 
which they are aimed. Traditionally, some property like 
rationality, or the faculty of speech has been singied out by 
philosophers as the essence of the human phenomenon. Marx was 
right in denouncing such an approach as counterproductive and 
. ff. . 6 insu 1c1ent. Feuerbach had postulated7 'consciousness' as 
the essence of the human phenomenon and had utilized this 
postulate as the basis for his 'anthropology.' Religion was 
desacralized by considering it the result of a perverted act 
of self-consciousness. The mysteries of the divinity are 
uncovered by dissecting human consciousness. But this dissec-
tion does not go far enough for Marx, the most important step 
is missing: Feuerbach had accepted as given the ruptures he 
encountered in human consciousness, Consciousness having been 
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postulated as primary, it was impossible for him to go far-
ther. 
My guess is that any such attempt to abstract a quality 
and pronounce it the essence of the human is liable to the same 
type of criticism. The specificity of human affairs has nothing 
to do with their 'spiritual' character. The 1 Geisteswissen-
schaften' should aim not only to the understanding of the 
conscious activity of humans, but to the understanding of the 
totality of the human enterprise. Certainly, the insistence on 
this fact has been the major contribution of Marx to the devel-
opment of a science of man. The determination of the essence 
of the human by abstraction can lead only to a partial under-
standing of its true nature. This is why human science requires 
a 'holistic' approach. What is specific is the whole of the 
human phenomenon, not just one of its manifestations. The 
problem, once this has been realized, is to find a perspective 
from whicl1 the entirety of this phenomenon is visible. The 
perspective of 'traditional materialism' is inadequate for 
Marx precisely insofar as it persists in recognizing conscious-
ness as the only source ot specifically human action. This 
step is, of course, necessary for it implies the temporaliza-
tion of one of the basic components of human activity, the one 
most needed for the development of science. After all, science 
is not possible unless the scientist has control over the instru-
ments of knowledge. The proper perspective regards as part of 
a single whole the instruments of knowledge, those things that 
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support them and the object they are to capture. This per-
spective is reached when human a~tivity is perceived as 
'praxis,' as "sinnlich menschliche Tlltigkeit. 118 
But before proceeding to explain Marx's notion of 
'praxis,' let us consider the notion of 'holism' in more 
detailed a fashion. Recent discussions stemming mostly from 
K. Popper's attacks on the notion9 have failed to make some 
very basic distinctions. Popper's arguments can be seen as 
operating at two levels. On the one hand, there is the 
epistemological claim concerning the impossibility of 'grasp-
ing' the whole of social life with one single glance. This 
thesis has to be understood from the perspective of Popper's 
theory of scientific explanation, which, among other things, 
postulates 'prediction' as one of its basic components. Given 
that predictions concerning the future course of behavior of the 
whole of society are impossible, mostly because such predictions 
* are subject to the "Oedipus Effect," it follows that there 
can be no 'holistic' science of society. The second level at 
which Popper's thesis operates can be termed 'political' and it 
is essentially condensed in his advocacy of "piecemeal social 
engineering." 
Popper assumes that there is a logical connection 
between these two levels. That is, given that it is impossible 
* By "Oedipus Effect" Popper means the fact that in some 
cases the prediction of an event can itself become part of the 
causal series of which the predicted event is a part. So, for 
instance, the mere prediction of a collapse of the market can 
itself precipitate that collapse. 
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to understand society as a whole, one should not try to change 
society as a whole either, since, ex hypothesis, it is impos-
sible to predict the outcome of such a process of change, once 
it has been set in motion. On the other hand, understanding 
well-defined, limited social units is possible and, hence, the 
change of such units is basically controllable. 
This view seems false to me in many respects. Here I 
will consider only one of these. As has been observed many 
times, Popper's thesis depends on the assumption that the 
different institutions of society are not 'organically' inter-
connected, i.e., that they are relatively independent from each 
other. This means that change will, so to say, pull each of them 
in different directions, according to their particular functions, 
since there is no one function that they all perform in common. 
This means also that there is not a 'privileged' institution, 
one that determines the course of all the others, that sets 
the pace for all the others. This non-organic view of society 
takes the division of labor too seriously and assumes that 
because different people do different things in different 
places, at the same time, there is no underlying pattern to their 
behavior. If this were the case, we would have either to 
deny all purpose to the institutional behavior of humans or to 
find an int~rnal and self-founded expla~ation for institutional 
behavior without ever going beyond the limits of any of the 
single institutions. In other words, we would never be able, 
unless we lie, to explain the functioning of one institution in 
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terms of some other institution or set of institutions. But 
this is clearly false, since most institutions justify them-
selves in terms of the needs imposed by the functioning of other 
institutions or at least in terms of the necessity to justify 
needs other than those generated by their o,m functioning. 
Obviously, no society that has nothing but Parkinsonian insti-
tutions, i.e., institutions that meet no demands other than 
those generated by themselves, can survive. At least some of 
the institutions of a society have to be non-parasitical. And 
this is all a holistic approach to the study of society needs 
to postulate, namely the existence of a 'core' of human needs 
the satisfaction of which is the ultimate function of all the 
institutions of society and, thus, that this function is what 
gives them unity and a common purpose or goal. The 'essence' 
of human nature is determined by this core of needs; its form 
is what Marx called 'praxis,' the real activity of man. The 
crucial challenge for him was to find a way of approaching the 
study of the activity of man in such a way that the process 
by which the attempt to satisfy the core of basic needs perme-
ates or informs all other activity in a society, imposing upon 
it a sort of basic unity, is illuminated. 
Now, one thing at least is known from the outset, i.e., 
that this activity is productive and not contemplative, that it 
involves the manipulation and transformation of nature and not 
only the contemplation of it. This is why Marx rejects Classi-
cal Materialis111, which is unable to overcome the dichotomy 
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subject/object in its crudest form and thus remains a prisoner 
of what Hegel called "sensible certainty." 
Feuerbach, the only materialist philosopher that Marx 
discusses at length, adopted this standpoint, as the French 
* Materialists and the British Empiricists had done before him: 
the knowing subject is separated by an abyss from the object, 
and the activity of the first in no way affects the substance 
of the second. The knowing subject is the isolated individual, 
and what he has essentially in common with other individuals, 
his essence, is a given and not something that results from his 
own activity, precisely because his activity is contemplative 
and not productive. 
The limitations of this conception become particularly 
visible when it comes to explaining social behavior. Civil 
society is a construct, it is true, but one of an abstract 
character insofar as it is the result of the activity of 
abstract entities, i.e., isolated individuals. The secret of 
the matter is that Marx wants to regard the process of homini-
zation and the construction of human society as identical. 
Marx does not want to allow for the existence of a 'human nature' 
other than the one resulting from the socialized activity of 
* It should be clear that the following criticism applies, 
mutatis mutandis, to Locke's political theory. For Locke too, the 
individual is the point of departure both in his epistemology 
and in his political theory. And, hence, he has no choice but 
to conceive the constitution of society as an act of the will, 
as a compromise. Such compromise does not aim at the alteration 
of the natural order of things, but at its preservation. Neither 
knowledge, nor proper political action must in any way al~er or 
affect the course of nature. 
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individuals in each case when such an activity occurs. This 
is the key to his materialism. Marx is bothered by the fact 
that consciousness is postulated as existing prior to social 
activity. Consciousness is the result of the process of sociali-
zation, and so is language. The 'theory of the social contract' 
and the whole notion of 'civil society' are, therefore, nothing 
but fictions. These concepts imply an inversion of a causal 
rel~tionship: it is 'praxis' that precedes consciousness and 
not the other way around. 
For Marx, 'praxis' is, strictly speaking, the socialized 
labor of a set of individuals that reproduces both their phy-
. 10 sical existence and a certain social order. Praxis is the 
mover of history, but, on the other hand, it is the physical 
existence of individual men that constitutes the natural 
starting point of any attempt to explain human history: 
The first condition for all human history is, of course~ 
the existe~ce of living human individuals. The first fact 
to be taken into account is, hence, the bodily organization 
of these individuals and their relationships to the rest of 
nature determined by it. Clearly, here we cannot discuss 
the physical composition of man, nor the conditions of 
nature that he finds, whether geological, orohydrographical, 
climatological, etc. All science of history must start 
from this natural basis and its modifications in the course 
of history by the action of man.11 
Thus the 'holistic' perspective conceives man as a 
living creature, with certain natural characterjstics other 
than just consciousness, capable of transforming nature and 
entering into relations with his fella~ men; relations that 
for Marx are basically productive. It is his ability tc 
produce socially, which provides man with those things he 
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needs to ensure his survival, and it is the form of this 
productive activity, itself determined by circumstances that 
for the most part escape his control, which determines human 
nature in each case: 
One can attempt to distinguish man from animal on the 
basis of consciousness, religion or whatever else one 
pleases. They (men) begin to differentiate themselves from 
animals as soon as they begin producing their means of life; 
something which is conditioned by their bodily organization. 
While men produce their means of life~ they indirectly 
produce their material life as such.l~ 
Social life, then, has its roots not in the will of 
individual men or in their benevolence, but rather it is, so 
to say, the natural place of humanity. The 'essence' of an 
individual human being is nothing besides that that appears 
through his socialized activity: "Wie die Individuen ihr leben 
aussern, so sind sie."13 
It seems that a helpful way of approaching the under-
standing of this position is by thinking of the similarities 
with some of the views of the modern Existentialists: man is 
what he makes himself to be. The being of man as man depends 
totally on his incessant activity. It is in this sense that 
man can be said to reproduce or recreate his existence. The 
material conditions for the human existence of man are not 
given in nature, they have to be generated, they have to be 
extorted from it. And this is what distinguishes man from the 
other animals, which have a proper and predetermined place in 
nature. To subsist man has to rely on his own activity, but 
his activity is reliable only insofar as it is 'physical' 
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activity, only insofar as it is productive, i.e., capable of 
transforming nature and forcing it to yield what is required 
for the satisfaction of his needs. 
With this, and for the first time, the ground was set 
for the development of a general theory of social praxis. But 
Marx did not draw all the consequences that it is possible 
to draw from his postulates. His main interest being the 
elucidation of the phenomenon of capitalism, he allowed his 
concept of production to shrink to the point that it became 
synomymous with the narrower notion of 'production' in the 
sense of economic production, of production of goods. 
It is most interesting to pay attention to a sentence 
that Marx wanted to eliminate from the manuscript of the 
"Genr.an Ideology" and that has been preserved in the edition we 
have been using: 
Those conditions (both the physical characteristics 
of man and the material conditions enumerated in the passage 
quoted above) determine not only the original, natural 
organization of man, namely the racial differences, but also 
their whole development or lack of development all the way 
to the present.14 
The exhibition of the reasons that Marx had to delete 
this sentence, should provide us also with an understanding 
of the limitations of 'Historical Materialism.' Because Marx 
chose to eliminate this sentence, Historical Materialism failed 
to become a 'general theory of human social behavior.' 
The elucidation of the structure of a society is impor-
tant for Marx only insofar as it can lead to the understanding 
of the operation of the forces capable of changing that society. 
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Human social action never flows into a dead-end, it never 
concludes in a stable set of relationships. On the contrary, 
it constantly renews its own support, it is by necessity 
revolutionary: This production app·ears first with the growth 
of the population. It imposes a new relationship among indi-
viduals. The form of this relationship is again conditioned 
by production. But, what about the 'original set of rela-
tionships' among the individuals? Is anything left of them 
after a few of these changes that succeed each other have taken 
place? This is the question that Marx was unable or unwilling 
to face. Abstracting the general form of a relationship from 
its actual, determinate manifestation was for him an illegiti-
mate epistemological move. Hence his criticism of the method 
adopted by the classical economists. For instance, speaking 
of 'production' in general, without taking into account its 
specific determination in a certain period of time, is in no 
way more scientific than describing the adventures of Robin-
son Crusoe. Such general categories are of very limited 
significance for economic science. Devoid of its detennina-
tions, they are empty totalities. The task of economic science 
is, precisely, the reconstruction of these categories starting 
from the simplest of its determinations. Thus, the study of 
capitalist production does not begin with a series of specula-
tions concerning the nature of production in general, but 
rather with the study of the category of "cornmodity. 1115 
Human nature, then, is not unique, it does not have 
one single way of manifesting itself. Human nature, like 
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production, is the set of its appearances throughout history. 
A science attempting to study it must assume the form of a 
phenomenology of human nature. Whatever human nature was at 
the beginning has been negated, assimilated and transformed 
beyond recognition. Capitalism, which in a sense embodies 
all previous forms of social organization, is to the set of 
original human relationships what· the Absolute Spirit is to 
'sensible certainty.' 
No wonder then that the sentence had to be eliminated. 
After history starts running, it is quite unimportant whether 
the 'bodily organization' of man has remained the same or not. 
Even if that is the case, nothing else is the same, the whole 
environment has been remodeled by human activity and the 
relationships that can be established must be completely dif-
ferent. Only in the most abstract sense, according to Marx, 
can one say that human needs are the same. Besides, mere 
physical subsistence, that is, the bare satisfaction of the 
most elementary of human needs, is far from being a sign of 
humanity. The understanding of this fact is one of the main 
pillars of the theory of Alienated Labor. 
Capitalism has trapped the worker in the unending 
circle of alienated labor. This is the main requirement for 
its subsistence as a system. The worker is deprived of his 
true humanity and reduced to the twofold condition of worker 
simpliciter and 'physical subject' simpliciter: The peek of 
this· servitude is reached when the worker can survive as worker 
18 
only qua physical subject, and when he can only remain a worker 
f h · h · 1 b' 16 At 11 cu ate inso ar as e 1s a p ys1ca su Ject. c ua y, an ac r 
way of describing this process is by calling it the process of 
'animalization' of the worker: 
It boils down to this, that.man (the worker) feels 
himself to be free only in the exercise of his animal func-
tions of eating, drinking, reproducing, ... and that he 
feels like an animal while engaged in his human functions. 
The animal becomes human, the human animal. 
Eating, drinking and reproducing, etc., are certainly 
also genuine human functions. In abstraction, though, 
separated from the rest of the circle of human action and 
turned into its last and only goal, they are anima1.17 
So, as an end in themselves, those activities that immediately 
follow from the peculiar bodily organization of man, are sub-
human. They are human only insofar as they are integrated 
with the whole of human activity as historically determined. 
Alienation is a regressive process that consists basically in 
the abstraction of the most elementary of human(?) functions 
from the totality of real human functions, and thus it would 
be improper to utilize them to characterize this totality. 
The deleted sentence implies the existence of a set 
of human characteristics that, basically unaffected by the 
course of history, exercise a permanent, unique influence on 
human social behavior. And that, as we have seen, is an 
assumption that directly contradicts the central postulates 
of Historical Materialism. 
But there is something else to be considered in this 
respect: the Marxian notion of reality. The conception of 
reality of Classical Materialism is an absurd abstraction, 
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according to Marx, precisely because it fits too well the 
Fichtean definition of Materialism as the attempt to account 
for reality excluding the principles that make reference to 
the influence of a spontaneous subject. The efforts to iso-
late the subject led Classical Materialism to the production of 
an abstract concept of consciousness that can only relate 
passively to the object. It is clear, though, why having 
accepted the Fichtean prejudices and thus having limited all 
really productive human activity to conscious activity, 
Classical Materialists had to opt for the exclusion of the 
subject as a productive force of reality. For Marx the problem 
can be solved only by reformulating it in a way that would soften 
the rigidity of the Fichtean dilemma. The clue to this is the 
definition of human activity as physically productive activity, 
that is, as an activity capable of transforming the physical 
world, By operating as an effective changing force on the 
given 'natural conditions' human praxis produces and alters 
not only the social world, but also the tnatural world': 
it is, as is fundamental productive and integrative force, the 
first principle for the explication of reality, given that only 
* it can allow the perception of all its determinations. 
* In this respect, I have to agree with such modern 
writers as G. Luka;s (see his Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein 
(Berlin, Luchterhand Verlag, 1g68). and K. Kosik (see n1s 
Dialectics of the Concrete) that emphasize the importance of 
the category of 'totality' for Marx. Both his theory of aliena-
tion and his theory of ideology are understandable only in the 
light of this notion and, specifically, with the help of the 
dichotomy totality/abstraction. Alienation is the result of 
abstraction in the realm of productive ac~ivity; ideology is 
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So, because even the initial natural conditions 
encountered by primitive man have been altered by human praxis, 
it would be a mistake to pretend, as was being done implicitly 
in the deleted sentence, that they could constitute the basis 
18 for a deduction of the universal properties of human nature. 
Marxism, taken to its ultimate consequences, leads to 
a subtle sort of relativism. At the end all one can say in 
general about human societies is that they are in constant 
change. It is not surprising at all that, when attempting to 
formulate the laws of dialectics, Engels ended up proposing 
three, notorious mostly for their unlimited generality and 
vagueness, as well as for their 'formal' character. No wonder 
either, that he though them applicable far beyond the realm 
of history, in the realms of nature and mathematics. Engel's 
laws of dialectics do not have anything to do with the speci-
ficity of the human phenomenon: therein lies their uselessness. 
But let us analyze briefly the consequences that, as 
I claimed before, Marx did not draw from his assumptions. He 
had established what he took to be the moving force of human 
history: the necessity that humans have to reproduce, socially, 
their own existence and the circumstances for it. It is because 
they need to produce, that humans establish among themselves 
the consequenc~ of a parcial or abstract perception of reality: 
it is abstraction in the realm of knowledge. Even the analytical/ 
synthetic method proposed by Marx for economic science makes 
sense only if understood as a means to achieve the intellectual 
reconstruction of a totality through the integration of all its 
determinations. 
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a series of relationships. It would seem then, that these 
relationships, directly derived from the demands of production, 
are primary. In a sense, this is indeed true, as we shall see. 
And certainly, if our task were simply to suggest a hypothesis 
concerning the 'origin' of society, the need to produce mater-
ial goods socially would be quite appropriate a candidate. 
But the task of a general theory of human social behavior 
goes beyond this type of speculation, for the most fundamental 
question it has to answer is not, nwhy do humans form a society?" 
but rather the question "how can humans form a society?" Insofar 
as Marx concerns himself with the first question, he remains 
in the theoretical framework of the philosophers of the social 
contract. Hume, Locke and Rousseau also wondered about the 
reasons that prompt men to form societies, only to offer, as 
we have seen, a utilitarian answer to their questions. Marx 
is clearly a step beyond that, since he adopts a holistic 
approach. But he is not far enough, since at the end he has 
only substituted individualist utilitarianism by social utili-
tarianism. 
It is this original sin, so to speak, that prevents 
him from recognizing the how-question as primary and, hence, 
condemns him to a relatively strict determinism. Having 
identified the production of material goods and services as the 
nucleus of social praxis, Marx wants to explain all behavior 
in function of that nucleus. Thus, he can no longer recogniLe 
any other element as an independent and parallel fundamental 
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determinant of behavior. Everything has to be explainable and 
explained in terms of the origin, of the first principle. 
This is why the referenc~ to demands generated by the 
bodily organization of man appeared dispensable to Marx. If 
at all, such reference has only a heuristical value. It serves 
to get things started, since it gives plausibility to the 
utilitarian claim that there is a need to produce. After all 
it is the bodily organization of man which posits the necessity 
to produce material goods. But what Marx failed to see was 
that this same bodily organization posits another, equally 
ineluctable necessity, namely the necessity to take its own 
capacities and limitations into account as the condition for 
any possible organization of men into a community. In other 
words, blinded by the way he approached the issue from the 
traditional perspective, Marx did not recognize the existence 
of two distinct levels in regard to the explanation of the 
formation of human societies. For if it is true that the 
organization of man has to be such that, in each case, it has 
to adapt to the particular circumstances imposed by nature, 
i.e., to sets cf external circumstances, it is equally true and, 
as a matter of fact, more important, that any organization of 
men has to meet the internal requirements posited by the nature 
of man qua physical entity. That is, it is indispensable to 
realize not only that nature has to be satisfied, but that 
certain of the properties that men have, and some of those 
that they lack, limit the kinds of relations they can establish 
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among themselves. The how-question seeks to uncover this con-
dition, and, in this sense, is primary and irreducible. 
Once this has been realized, the purpose of referring 
to the characteristics of human nature in the framework of the 
theory of human praxis becomes clear. Such reference is not 
intended to furnish explanations as to the 'reasons' for the 
development of human societies. In fact, nothing in the theory 
of human praxis will change if the 'pursuit of happiness' or 
some other such reason is proposed as an explanation for the 
establishment of societies, instead of the Marxist hypothesis. 
The examination of the relevant characters of human nature 
aims at the elucidation of the conditions that make the organiza-
tion of societies possible. 
Let us consider the following case in order to clarify 
this point. Assume that we have a set A of five individuals 
a, b, c, d, e. These individuals are to live together and, 
to do so, they have to establish among themselves certain 
kinds of relationships. Among other things, these relation-
ships should enable them to produce enough food so that all of 
them can satisfy their hunger. Let us assume, further, that 
the land they have chosen to live in is poor and can yield 
only the equivalent to seven indivisible food units a day, 
so that only two out of the five individuals can eat twice a 
day, providing, of course, that they feel that all have certain 
right to eat. Because of different circumstances, something 
like a class division develops and it turns out that a and b 
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are the ones that, in exchange for an equal amount of daily 
work, will get two food-units instead of one. This would be 
the 'concrete' form of organization adopted by our five indi-
viduals, a form of organization forced upon them by a combina-
tion of their physical characteristics (they all have to eat), 
the external conditions (only seven potatoes can be produced), 
and, to put it somehow, tradition (a and b get two food-units 
because they are 'older'). 
In a very important sense, this would be, for Marx, 
all there is to say concerning our imaginary society. But what 
is missing here is reference to the need to meet the require-
ments of the physical component of human beings mentioned 
above. To say that these five individuals have established 
some sort of social organization, no matter how it is, is to 
affirm implicitly that they are capable of doing so, that is, 
they they are such that they can relate to each other, that 
they can communicate, that they are, to a certain extent, 
flexible and, most importantly, that they can establish and 
adhere to norms that regulate their conduct. In other words, 
when Marx noticed correctly that what is characteristic of the 
human species is that its members have to produce and reproduce 
by themselves the conditions for their existence, including 
the organization that enables them to operate socially, he put the 
emphasis on the wrong term. What is basic is not so much the 
necessity to organize in order to produce, but, first of all, 
the necessity to organize simpliciter, i.e., to bring together 
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individuals with certain types of characteristics, which 
characteristics posit demands as absolute as those presented 
by the external environment. Meeting these demands requires 
the production or generation of norms, of principles of conduct 
capable of regulating the relations among individuals so as 
to ensure that they will be able to survive both as individuals 
and as members of a community. So, the norms are not a struc-
ture superimposed on the 'material basis,' but rather its pre-
condition. That human beings require to submit their behavior 
to norms in order to live. together, is their basic property. 
It derives from the fact that humans are relational entities 
of a certain sort and, hence, this property is preserved 
regardless of the form or structure of their actual relations. 
These, on the other hand, are primarily determined by their 
biological structure, a fact that, although Marx notices en 
passant, is not as trivial as he thought it was. Our five 
imaginary individuals can arrange to distribute their food-
units as they please, but there is one thing beyond their wishes: 
the fact that their survival as individuals demands some sort 
of distribution. To put it in a different way, their survival 
as physical entities is not simply a phenomenon that pertains 
to the domain of the subhuman; it is rather a precondition 
for human existence, for any and all varieties of it. And this 
is, it seems to me, where Marx erred by failing to see that the 
satisfaction of what he calls "the animal necessities" in a 
social setting, requires at least the partial hominization of 
man. Although he does not live just as or, even, in virtue of 
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being a physical entity, the bourgeo~s has to be a physical 
entity first, before he is anything else. Genet's image of the 
colonialist who stuffs himself with pillows to meet the require-
ments of his function, comes handy in this context. For~Marx, 
one can most properly predicate 'reality' of the form of 
satisfaction of a need, rather than of the need it~elf abstractly 
considered. Maybe this is correct. What is not correct, in 
any cas~, is to overlook the function of the abstract need as 
a primary and permanent determinant. or condition of'human 
action. In relating to the proletarian as a bourgeois, the 
capitalist relates to him also, at the same time, as a physical 
entity. It is quite significant that in most societies there 
is a conscious effort to hide this fact. Usually this is one 
of the main functions of ideology. No wonder, then, that for 
certain people the most insulting feiture of one of Genet's 
plays is the assertion that everybody has to defecate. After 
all, kings and popes are the ones that need privacy the most. 
So, when one seeks to explain the process of generation 
of human societies, one has to mention not only the need to 
transform nature and adapt to its demands, but also, and, per-
haps more importantly, the need to adapt to the basic properties 
of humans as physical entities, these properties being the most 
permanent features of human nature. Marx had set the study 
of man on the proper course hy establishing that the starting 
point of such a study must be his activity as a physical 
entity. But by overemphasizing the importance of the impact 
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of that activity on nature, he failed to estimate properly the 
conditions of that activity, i.e., its impact on other human 
beings, their needs and their capacities. 
The anthropological school known as 'Functionalism,' 
* at least as developed by B. Malinowski, can be said to go a 
step further than Marxism in this respect. For the science of 
man, according to the Polish scholar, must be grounded on a 
"theory of culture." Where 'culture' is defined as "the arti-
ficial environment" created by man to deal with the demands of 
his own nature and of nature as a whole. Such a theory finds 
its starting point in the living individual: 
In the first place, it is clear that the satisfaction of 
the organic or basic needs of man and of the race is a min-
imum set of conditions imposed on each culture. The problems 
set by man's nutritive, reproductive, and hygienic needs 
must be solved. They are solved by the construction of a 
new, secondary, or artificial environment. This environ-
ment, which is neither more nor less than culture itself, 19 has to be permanently reproduced, maintained, and managed. 
So, the first set of determinants of human culture are those 
biological qualities that humans share with other animal 
species. At the end, in Malinowski's view, everything depends 
on them. But a second set of determinants results from the 
necessity to 'reproduce' the artificial environment; among these 
are the acquisition and preservation of technical knowledge, 
its transmission from generation to generation, the development 
of rules, etc. 
* In order to avoid the discussion of the endless dis-
putes concerning the term 'Functionalism,' I will use it only 
to refer to Malinowski's theories. 
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Malinowski is well aware of the fact that the starting 
point he has chosen for the explanation of social life is 
basically the same chosen by Marx. But he tries to clarify 
what he takes to be substantial differences in their approaches. 
The burden of his explication rests on the key concepts of 
1 charter' and 'function.' By 'charter' is understood "the 
system of values for the pursuit of which human beings organize, 
. . 1 d . . "20 or enter organ1zat1ons area y existing. These organiza-
tions are called 'institutions.' An institution requires a 
'personnel,' that is a group of individuals that "stand in 
definite relation to one another and to a specific physical 
f h . . 1121 part o t e1r environment. It also requires a 'material 
apparatus' that has to be operated by the personnel and a set 
of rules or norms. All the institutions of a society have a 
function, that is, they pursue the '''satisfaction' of a human 
need, basic or derived." 
Now, in Malinowski's opinion, Marx, in trying to stress 
the importance of the 'system of production and property' as 
the main determinant of social organization, forgets: 
... first the concept of charter, by which we find that 
any system of production depends upon the knowledge, the 
standard of living defined by the whole range of cultural 
factors, and the system of law and political power; second, 
the concept of function, by which we see that distribution 
and consumption are as much dependent upon the total 
character of a culture as on the productive organization 
itself.22 · 
The first part of this criticism is certainly well taken, but 
it is rather difficult to see why Marx would disagree with the 
assertion that the patterns of distribution and consumption 
are "dependent upon the total character of a culture." 
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The patterns of distribution in a given society are 
set, primarily, by the relations of property. The rights of 
property over the means of prod~ction include the right to 
appropriate the totality of the goods produced by its operation. 
Now, what the owner of the means of production seeks is not the 
brute accumulation of goods or merchandise (this, Marx points 
out, is only the appearance, and it is the duty of science to 
go beyond the appearances), what the owner wants is the accu-
mulation of wealth, that is, of capital. His goods are a 
source of wealth only insofar as they have an exchange value. 
But they, on the other hand, have exchange value only if, at 
the same time, they have use value, either absolutely or in a 
given society. In other words, all contractual agreements 
for the exchange of goods entered upon by the individuals of a 
society are, in the end, determined by the use value of these 
goods, which use value comes from the quality a given good has 
to satisfy either a basic or a culturally determined human 
mind. It would seem then, that, according to Marx, one can 
properly affirm that the patterns of consumption are determined 
by the "total character of a culture." After all, as we have 
seen above, Marx hardly acknowledges the existence of anything 
but derived needs. 23 
The first of Malinowski's points seeks to stress the 
fact that social organization is simultaneously determined 
by a series of independent factors. The central notion here 
is, obviously, that of 'independence.' The biological charac-
teristics that define human nature and that operate as the 
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central determinants of culture, can be said to be independent 
in two senses. In the first place, they are independent from 
one another and the need to satisfy each of them imposes dif-
ferent kinds of constraints and demands on culture, so that, 
even if only one institution is generated to meet them, it would 
have to perform a plurality of functions. But it is the case 
that in all known societies there is more than one institution, 
although sometimes institutions overlap in relation to the 
roles they play. In the second place, biological characteris-
tics are independent from historical development. That is, 
they impose basically the same constraints to all cultures, 
., 4 
regardless of their degree of complexity or development.~ 
The permanent set of these properties defines 'Human Nature.' 
It would be a mistake, nevertheless, to accuse Malinowski of 
completely ignoring the effects of culture and social pheno-
mena in general on the biologically determined needs of human 
beings, as has often been done. As a matter of fact, the word 
'needs,' that he prefers to use instead of the word 1 motives,' 
more popular among psychologists, is supposed to stress pre-
. 1 h 0 • 25 · d" c1se y tis point by in 1cating that needs do never appear 
raw, but always within a distinct cultural setting. The point 
here is, simply, that the basic biological needs operate always 
as determinants of culture; they can be satisfied in different 
ways and to different degrees in various societies, but their 
satisfaction is an unavoidable imperative. 
A serious criticism of Malinowski must point at his 
inability to evaluate the real signifi~ance of the basic 
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biological needs for social life. As has correctly been sug-
gested by Radcliff-Brown, 26 and as he himself notes repeatedly, 
the kernel of his thesis is that all institutions in a society 
are ultimately determined by biological needs. The best image 
to illustrate this claim is, perhaps, an inverted pyramid, 
every part of it, no matter how remote from the vertex, is 
connected with it. This assumption is on the background of 
Malir1owski's rejection of 'diffusionism' and his denial of the 
existence of 'survivals' or 'borrowed' traits in any society. 
In this respect, Levi-Strauss' criticism is at least partly 
adequate: 
How to analyze modern habits without recognizing 
vestiges of former ones? To reason otherwise is denying 
oneself all means of making an essential distinction: that 
between primary function, responding to a present need of 
the human organism, and secondary function, that maintains 
itself only in virtue of the resistance of the group to 
give up a habit. For saying that a society functions is 
a truism; but saying that everything in a society functions 
is an absurdity.27 
But in one important respect Levi-Strauss' criticism misses 
the point. 
Here we are not interested in studying the existence 
of useless 'survivals' or 'remnants' in a given society. But 
even if it is the case that such entities exist, they cannot 
be said to constitute the set of 'secondary functions' of a 
society. The distinction between primary and secondary func-
tions is, indeed, essential, but Levi-Strauss is wrong in sug-
gesting that the basis for formulating it rests on the distinc-
tion between functionally required and useless traits. In the 
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first place, the notion of functionally necessary or required 
traits is extremely vague. The biologically determined traits 
of culture that intrigue Malinowski are necessary in a strong 
sense, that is, they are conceived as preconditions for the 
existence of any society deserving that name. But it is clear 
that certain cultural traits can be said to be necessary only 
in respect to a given society. The fact that they are neces-
sary in this weaker sense does not make them less functional 
nevertheless. As we will see, this dichotomy constitutes the 
basis for the distinction between primary and secondary func-
tions. 
Some writers have chosen the name 'functional pre-
requisites' to refer to those things that, like Malinowski's 
primary needs, demand the generation of functionally necessary 
institutions in a society: 
Functional prerequisites (of a society) refer broadly 
to the things that must get done in a society if it is to 
continue as a going concern, i.e., the generalized condi- 28 tions necessary for the maintenance of the system concerned. 
It is assumed, on this account, that if those prerequisites 
were not fulfilled, certain disorders would result that are 
incompatible with the existence of a social order. Only in 
part are these disorders directly related to the bio-psychological 
constitution of humans. Generalized 'apathy,' for instance, 
would be, according to the authors of the paper, a condition 
"capable of terminating the existence of society." 
This approach is one step ahead of Malinowski's in that 
it is not solely concerned with the conditions of social life 
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derived from the bio-psychological characteristics of man, 
but also with the conditions of society as such, that is, of 
human society as a sui generis and veritable system. T. Par-
sons29 has made of this point the basis for his criticism of 
Malinowski, claiming that he was unable to perceive man in his 
social setting as something more than a mere biological entity, 
that is, as possessor of a 'personality.' The perspective 
advocated by Parsons has been adopted by many psychologists 
. d . h h f . . 30 1ntereste 1n t et eory o motivation. 
The greatest merit of Parson's approach is that it 
attempts the study of human behavior at the different levels 
in which it occurs, trying to uncover the patterns of motiva-
tion of both individuals and institutions and the mechanisms 
of integration that give coherence to social action. This leads 
him not only to propose a set of 'prerequisites of social sys-
tems,' but, most importantly, to propose a classification of 
the types of institutions of human societies in terms of the 
functions they perform, and their role in the integration of 
the different kinds of interests, beliefs, goals and cultural 
patterns of a society. Although we cannot go into details at 
this point, I would like to stress one advantage of Parson's 
theory over that of Malinowski. By postulating that collec-
tivities as such are also 'actors' of social life, Parson 
avoids the extreme biological reductionism cf Malinowski's 
system, which does not permit the understanding of the complex 
personality of the individual as a social agent. For, insofar 
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as he is indeed a social agent, the individual's behavior is 
not exclusively determined by his biological needs, but, mostly 
by his needs as a person, conceived as a possessor of interests 
and values, and acting in the framework of a definite cultural 
tradition. 
It is because of this that I have chosen Parson's theory 
to close this brief review of the historical development of the 
* theory of social behavior. With Parsons this theory has 
encountered its real subject matter: the study of persons. 
In what follows, we will see that it is necessary to go one 
more step further in order to uncover the true nature of these 
entities and their process of constitution. 
Independently from the direction in which much of the 
psychological and sociological research on these issues has 
developed, it is clear that it is based on a valuable and pro-
found institution: a theory of human social behavior must 
not forget that the subjects it studies are, prima facie, per-
sons and not pure biological entities. As a matter of fact, 
it is only as a result of a process of abstraction that persons 
come to be perceived as biological entities. As persons, human 
beings are subjected to pressures resulting from the particular 
nature of the social body, such as the necessity to cooperate 
* If we wanted to make our review more complete, we would 
have to discuss the relevant works of P. Berger and A. Schutz. 
But although in these works we can find many interesting sug-
gestions concerning the relation between subject and object, and 
the processes of constitution of social objectivity in general, 
they do not propose a complete turn in perspective. Basically, 
the object of study of both authors is the same as that of Par-
son's: the social person. 
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in certain ways, or to establish a hierarchy of rules primarily 
determined by the division of labor, etc. So, not only the 
biological nature of man, but also, to use Durkheim's popular 
term, 'social solidarity' as such, can put demands and define 
patterns for the behavior of human beings. 
b. The Purpose of the General Theory of Human 
Social Prexis 
The fact that our brief history of social theory has 
almost exclusively made reference to the works of social 
scientists is no accident and, as I see it, reflects the rather 
pitiful state in which philosophical anthropology finds itself. 
Imprisoned in the realms of abstraction and ideology, most of 
the recent philosophical speculation concerning the nature of 
man has been unable to perceive it as a totality. As a result, 
philosophical theorizing concentrates on abstractions, and 
becomes more concerned about the movements of fingers, than 
about the behavior of persons; more preoccupied by the operations 
of the 'mind,' than by the actual thinking of socialized indi-
viduals. Such a tendency can only be harmful, especially when 
it comes to dealing with the major problems of morality and the 
philosophy of law. The attempts to remedy this have been many. 
In the first half of the century, several moral philosophers 
became aware of the need to take into account -and, when possible, 
make use of the discoveries of anthropological research. No 
doubt a laudable enterprise, for nothing is more alien to 
philosophy than artificial specialization. Psychoanalysis has 
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also been an important source for philosophical speculation. 
But there is one major fault shared by all these attempts, as 
well as by most research done in the social sciences themselves: 
they are not based on a general understanding of human social 
behavior or, to say it differently, they are not grounded on 
a general theory of social praxis. 
The aim of a general theory of human social praxis 
(GTHSP) must be to provide an understanding of the principal 
mechanisms underlying human social behavior, of the forces 
that determine it, and of the conditions that make it possible. 
Taking as its starting point the specificity of the human 
phenomenon, the GTHSP must provide a clear distinction between 
those things that are essential to human social behavior, and 
thus necessary, and those things that are accidental. No part 
or aspect of the human phenomenon can be understood independently 
from the GTHSP. The reason is simple: human existence, as 
we know it, appears exclusively in the framework of a social 
order, that is, the concreteness of the human phenomenon is 
perceived only in its socialized manifestation. The presump-
tion that this is an accident, is nothing more than a presump-
tion and has, at most, ideological significance, as will become 
clear as we proceed. Now, the claim here is not merely that 
as a matter of fact individual human beings establish social 
relations among themselves. The claim is much stronger: there 
can be no such things as human beings leading a non-socialized 
existence. There could be indeed biological entities 
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resembling human beings living in isolation, but their appear-
ance and their biological characteristics would not suffice 
to turn them into human beings, for, although the psycho-
biological constitution of humans is one of the main determi-
nants of their way of existence, it is not what defines human 
existence as such. No enumeration of psycho-biological proper-
ties can ever define human nature. Diogenes' plucked rooster 
is quite enough to take care of all attempts to do so. 
Equally useless are the innumerable definitions of human 
nature that single out one characteristic as its distinctive 
feature. In isolation, man is neither a political animal, 
nor a rational, speaking or producing animal. Although it is 
only fair to concede that the Aristotelian definition is the 
one that comes closest to the truth, in an important sense 
bees and ants can also be said to be social animals. As to 
the other definitions, the one respect in which all fail is in 
assuming the existence of certain properties independently of 
the substance of which they are the properties. So, claiming 
that man is a rational animal, presupposes the existence of 
something that can be called 'reason' prior to the socialized 
existence of any individual member of the species. The error 
is even worse when not reason, but language is taken to be the 
specific difference defining man) unless, of course, language 
is identified, as Wittgenstain can be thought of doing, with 
social behavior. But in this case, clearly, it is social 
behavior of a definite sort, i.e., social behavior involving 
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symbolic representation, which defines humaness, and this 
is precisely what we want to claim. No matter how many languages 
a monkey can master or how many equations he can solve, he would 
still remain a monkey and, for that matter, ~o would homo 
sapiens unless they were incorporated into a society. A think-
ing monkey is no more possible than a square-circle, for either 
he I1as been incorporated into a human society, and thus is a 
person and not a monkey or he remains in isolation and, hence, 
is no more a man than a plucked rooster. Only the determinate 
totality that confronts us when we observe a human society 
deserves the name of 'human.' The first elementary truth in 
this respect is, therefore, that everything human is social. 
But for the reasons that were pointed out before, it should be 
apparent that this is not enough. The specificity of the human 
phenomenon can be determined only by determining the specificity 
of hwnan social existence. 
Durkheim noticed that the one thing that enables us to 
locate and identify a social fact is the constraint it exer-
cises on the behavior of a group of individuals. It might be 
argued, not without some reason, that the positivist-minded 
French sociologi.st had some sort of vested interest in select-
ing this, an observable feature, as the criterion to identify 
social facts. But, whatever his motive might have been in doing 
what he did, Durkheim showed a profound understanding of the 
real nature of social facts: that they are juridical~ For 
all action that deserves the name of human is normed or regu-
lated and, hence, juridical. There simply is nothing social 
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that is not juridical, so that, in a very strict sense, one can 
say that the human phenomenon is juridical in nature and that 
all social science is jurisprudence. The actually regulated 
behavior of individuals exhausts all the ontological consistency 
of human facts. This is precisely why an isolated entity can 
never be termed human. 
The word 'juridical' is used here in the sense insinu-
ated above, to wit, to refer to the condition of human actors 
in a social setting. The behavior of such socialized humans 
is regulated by norms stemming or deriving from certain charac-
teristics of human nature, relevant to the establishment of 
relations of cooperation between humans. In this sense, the 
notion of 'juridical' can be contrasted with the notion of 
'organic.' The organs of an organism constitute an 1 organic' 
whole insofar as the structure of each of these organs and the 
functions generated and informed by them are, so to say, pre-
conceived or predetermined to hook to each other. The func-
tional harmony among all the organs of an organism is innate 
or natural, and does not need to be imposed by a legislative 
act of some sort. Insofar as the correspondence among organs 
is built in into each of them, so that it is valid to claim 
that they are programmed to do certain things in relation to 
each other, it makes no sense to say that their relations are 
'juridical.' A relation between two or more objects can 
meaningfully be said to be juridical only when there are 
alternatives to it, i.e., when the behavior of the entities 
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in question has been regulated or legislated to follow acer-
tain path at the expense of certain other possible paths. It 
is true that the biological constitution of humans puts some 
demands that have to be met in order to establish a society. 
But there is not a single function of the human body that, 
given the proper circumstances, cannot be performed in isola-
tion. Certain cynics have claimed that the penis is the clear-
est symbol of man's social nature, for it is obviously meant 
as a means to relate to other organisms. But even if we grant 
this claim, it does not follow from that that a social relation 
has to be established between two human individuals in order 
to put the penis to its proper use, since, from a purely bio-
logical standpoint, the indiscriminate rape of males and 
females would be more than enough to do the trick. Human social 
life is not a natural entity, but one that has to be created 
through juridical mechanisms, through regulation and legisla-
tion of the behavioral alternatives allowed by human nature. 
Those juridical mechanisms are what in the proper sense can be 
called 'norms.' 
But what is, seen in this light, the task of the 
GTHSP? Are all laws or norms to be considered part of its 
realm of studies? Certainly not. Pretending such a thing would 
be no less mistaken than taking the words 'law' or 'norm, 1 as 
used in this context, to mean 'positive law~' Insofar as it 
purports to be a 'general' theory, the GTHSP can concern itself 
only with those features of human social life that are common 
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to all societies without exception. Now, at this stage, an 
important distinction must be introduced. A property can be 
shared by different things either accidentally or necessarily. 
A property is said to be accidentally shared by a·group of 
things, when, in at least one case, it cannot be considered 
to be part of the set of properties that define the thing as 
what it is. A property is necessarily present in a group of 
things, on the other hand, if and only if, in each case none 
of the things could continue being what they are were the 
property removed. That is, the GTHSP is exclusively preoccupied 
with the study of those norms whose absence would make human 
social life impossible. In other words, the GTHSP is only 
interested in determining the collection of norms that set the 
conditions of possibility of human social life. 
Several things follow from what has been said so far. 
In the first place, if it is true that there are norms that 
regulate human social conduct so as to fulfill the conditions 
of possibility of social life, then these norms must be uni-
versal and necessary, and its discovery cannot be achieved by 
simple induction. That is to say, the GTHSP must possess a 
method similar to what Kant called transcendental deduction. 
That the conditions of possibility can and are in fact syste-
matically aprehended in a non-rhapsodic fashion is evident. 
The proof is the existence· of human societies. This does not 
mean, nevertheless, that the GTHSP has to apply the same 
method of aprehension, whatever it might be, available to all 
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human beings. The GTHSP must provide itself with a theoretical 
or contemplative method, as opposed to this other practical 
method. In fact, the precise description of the practical 
method is an empirical question that belongs to the realm of 
social-psychology. 
The fact that human societies do exist proves another 
important point, to wit, that no special sophistication is 
required for the apprehension of the conditions of possibility 
of social life and the human characteristics that determine 
them. To realize this is fairly significant, particularly 
nowadays that there is a tendency among certain philosophers 
and scientists to think that the development of a comprehensive 
scic11ce of man must be preceded by the extensive development 
of various specialized sciences such as biology, bio-chemistry, 
ecology, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. Claiming 
this is failing to understand what a GTHSP is supposed to be 
and what the proper role is that corresponds to it in the 
body of knowledge. There can be no human or social science 
that is not intrinsically and fundamentally defective without 
a GTHSP. It is not an accident that social scientists find 
it eventually necessary to speculate about human nature and 
human society in general. When they do so, it is because they 
are perceiving the limitations inherent to their disciplines. 
This does not mean that everything social scientists can say 
is false. Such a presumption would be plain stupid. What 
no isolated, specialized discipline can provide is a full, 
comprehensive understanding of the human phenon1enon. 
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Let us call basic or fundamental norms those norms that 
express the conditions of possibility of social life. About 
them there is one more thing that we know a priori, i.~., that 
they constitute a finite set. Inherent in the notion of 'con-
ditions of possibility' of factually existing entities is the 
quality of finitude. Those things that make the factual exis-
tence of some entity possible must themselves be susceptible of 
being materialized. In the case that concerns us this is 
* proven by the existence of numerous human societies. 
So, concerning the conditions of possibility of social 
life with whose study the GTHSP is commended, we know that they 
are immediately accessible, knowable, universal and necessary 
and numerically finite. 
But here it would be wise to pause and make explicit 
something that should be clear from the context. When we speak 
of conditions of possibility of social life, what we mean is 
conditions of possibility of human social life. Keeping in 
mind this restriction is quite important, particularly when it 
comes to evaluating the range of applicability of the basic 
* I am not convinced that the same is true of theoretical 
entities, for it would seem that there is no contradiction 
involved in the claim that there are theoretical entities that 
do not have factual existence precisely because they have an 
infinite number of conditions of possibility. It really is 
quite irrelevant whether we take the set of these conditions 
to be enumerable or non-enumerable. The claim, then, would be 
that conditions of possibility of factually existing objects 
are properties such that no object can have an infinite number 
of them; even those objects that have an infinite number of 
simple properties as, in a way, all objects do. 
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norms regulating the behavior of humans. They are of two kinds, 
to wit, those that express the conditions of possibility of soc-
ial life simpliciter, and those that express the conditions of 
possibility of human social life specifically. From the point of 
view of the GTHSP this distinction is not essential and has 
only a methodological significance, as we shall see. But its 
theoretical importance is undeniable and would play a major role 
if we were trying to develop an account of social life in its 
human and non-human manifestations. 
c. Norms and Social Functions 
We have just seen that the GTHSP is not concerned with 
the study of all norms but only with the study of those norms 
that express the conditions of possibility of human social life. 
But we still do not know what these conditions are, nor how 
they are instantiated in society. In this section I will try 
to suggest an answer to the latter problem. In order to do so, 
and for purely hermeneutical reasons, I will start the discus-
sion by examining the views of one of the most serious students 
of human societies, E. Durkheim, who, as it happens, did not 
believe that there is a unique set of universal norms equally 
valid for all human societies. Durkheim advanced his views in 
connection with his discussion of the phenomenon of crime. A 
very logical thing to do, since, after all, if there were uni-
versal norms, it would appear to be quite reasonable to expect 
a great degree of uniformity in the way violations of such norms 
are punished. 
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Now, after careful analysis of a great deal of anthro-
pological information, Durkheim elaborated some quite interest-
ing arguments both_ against any attempt to use an inductive-
enumerative method for the determination of the essential fea-
tures of the phenomenon of crime, and against any attempt to 
attribute an essential character to certain social phenomena 
by pointing out their necessity, which, in turn, can be deter-
mined by pointing out the "relations that they (the social phe-
nomena in question) sustain to some condition external to 
them." 31 Let us explain these two points. 
I take Durkheim's criticism of the inductive-enumerative 
method to be quite sound in its intention, though not complete. 
The most important criticism against any attempt to discover 
the necessary and universal features of society through the 
application of inductive procedures is that any such attempt 
constitutes a contradiction in terms. Once we recognize the 
universal features of social life to be its conditions of pos-
sibility, it follows that they can be discovered only by a 
transcendental deduction of sorts. 32 
Durkheim is also bothered by the fact that if one were 
to apply an enumerative method it would turn out, at the end, 
that the behaviors taken to be criminal in all human societies 
constitute an absolute minority, and, presumably, what is 
common to them is not necessarily shared by all criminal 
behavior. There is some truth to this argument, but there is 
also quite a bit of confusion in the way it is formulated. It 
is true that if the aim in mind is to define the essence of 
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crime simpiiciter, the enumeration of qualities common to a 
few instances of crime is not the proper way to accomplish this, 
especially if what these few crimes have in common is the prop-
erty of being viewed as such in all societies. No doubt that 
it would be a mistake to assert that what makes a certain behav-
ior a crime is that it is typically viewed as such in all human 
societies. Eating meat is a crime in some parts of India, not 
so in the USA. But this does not show as Durkheim thought, that 
the property of being common to all societies is in any way 
insignificant. 
Actually, this same conviction underlies his arguments 
against the alternative of defining crime by showing the rela-
tion that a certain behavior holds to something external to it. 
A characteristic example of this kind of reasoning would be to 
say that xis a crime, because xis contrary to the "great 
social interests" of a given community y. Two things are wrong 
with this move, Durkheim feels: 
Besides the fact that such a theory accords too large a 
part in the direction of social evolution to calculation 
and reflection, there are many acts that have been and still 
are regarded as criminal without themselves being harmful 
to society. What social danger is there in touching a 
tabooed object, an impure animal or man ... , etc., 
... Even when a criminal act is certainly harmful 
to society, it is not true that the amount of harm that it 
does is regularly related to the intensity of the repres-
sion which it calls forth.33 
This last statement can be properly illustrated, according to 
Durkheim, by comparing the reaction to murder, a crime that is 
strongly penalized and considered horrendous in all societies, 
with the reaction to an economic crisis that, although it has 
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catastrophic consequences for society, does not issue a 'repres-
sive' reaction from it. 
As is well known, Durkheim wants to account for all 
these cases by introducing the notion of 'collective or common 
conscience.' Hence, an action·isregarded as criminal in a 
given society, independently from its actual effect on the 
social body, in virtue of the 'sentiments' of revulsion that it 
can arouse in the collective conscience. I am not going to 
discuss the concept of collective conscience in this context, 
although I am convinced that a GTHSP must eventually concern 
itself with it. Most important for the purpose of this chapter 
is the detailed examination of Durkheim's arguments, for they 
touch the key issues relating to the discussion on the nature 
of crime and thus, social norms and their functions in society. 
Durkheim is puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between 
the immediate effects that certain crimes have on society and the 
ferocity with which they are punished. A fact that seems the 
more puzzling given that certain other actions, like speculat-
ing in the stock-market and triggering a crisis, are not con-
sidered as crimes at all or, if they are, they are not taken 
to be particularly grave. Durkheim would probably find all this 
less puzzling, were he to take into account one of his own 
suggestions, i.e., that murder, if allowed to go unpunished 
and thus, if generalized, would render social life impossible. 
This obviously is not the case if speculation in the stock-
market is practiced without limitations, for, if it is evident 
that the society where speculation of this sort is possible 
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would be destroyed, it is not true that social life as such 
would become an impossible enterprise. The whole secret of 
revolutionary processes depends on this one detail. 
So, a small role, at least, has to be accorded to 
'calculation and reflexion' when describing human social behav-
ior, to wit, the amount of reflexion necessary to make the 
distinction presented above. Later we will speak about this 
more extensively. But the important conclusion that can be 
drawn from all this is that there seem to be two distinct levels 
of perception of social reality reflected in the organization of 
the normative codes of a given society, a deep level, where 
crimes regarded as serious violations are assembled, and a sur-
face level comprised by all actions considered minor crimes. 
A very superficial revision of available anthropological 
information or, even, a quick reading of the penal codes of 
some modern societies, would suffice to show, beyond all doubt, 
that there is great discrepancy as to the kinds of things 
regarded as grave faults in different places. This is the point 
of the first part of Durkheim's argument. Like the fearful 
Relativists, he too wants to make a major case out of the fact 
that, for example, robbery is punished in a capitalist society 
(generally that is) with as much energy as murder, while in 
some other socjeties this might not be the case. 
At least two remarks are important in this respect. 
That there are actions viewed as criminal in some societies 
that are not criminal in others, is no more surprising than 
the fact that certain actions that can lead to the collapse 
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of a social order are not punished as criminal. Both facts 
can be accounted for with the argument sketched above, although 
in this second case a new detail has to be considered. Steal-
ing someone else's belongings iha capitalist society consti-
tutes a direct violation of the set of norms that characterizes 
that society as 'capitalist,' i.e., the norms that consecrate 
the right of individual property. Stealing is a case of ille-
gal appropriation, but this is, under normal circumstances, not 
the case when appropriation is the result of speculation. Spec-
ulating in the stock-market is a kind of activity perfectly in 
consonance with the principles of free-market economy. The 
activity itself, therefore, is not a crime, although positive 
law can determine its boundaries. So, a proposal for the intro-
duction of rules or laws limiting the prerogatives of stock-
brokers can be sustained only by utilitarian arguments, if the 
proponent does not wish to abandon the framework of capitalism. 
This leads us to the second remark. Given the set con-
stituted by all crimes listed as serious in a code of law, we 
should be able to distinguish those that are so absolutely from 
those that are so circumstantially. An absolutely serious 
crime is the violation of a necessary and universal norm of 
conduct; a circumstantially serious crime is a violation of a 
norm necessary in relation to the preservation of a given social 
order. The first task of the GTHSP is, precisely, furnishing 
the theoretical tools required to make this distinction. 
Now, in both cases the kind of necessity involved 
is what could be termed a functional or operational necessity. 
50 
That is, the connection between a norm and the facts of human 
nature that require it, is neither analytical nor causal in 
the Humean sense. To say that a norm is necessary means, 
simply, that it expresses a condition of possibility of human 
social life or of a particular social order. In the next 
chapter we will see that this concept of necessity is quite 
useful to deal with Hume's Guillotine. 
We have already seen that human social behavior is 
by necessity normed or regulated behavior. Let us call 
'social function' any regulated activity or set of regulated 
activities aimed at the materialization of a defined social 
goal. The production of material goods, for instance, is a 
social function in that it is a set of regulated activities 
aimed at the materialization of a specific social goal, 
i.e., the satisfaction of the demand for the goods being 
produced. Without assuming that ''everything in a society 
functions,'' we can nonetheless propose a provisional defi-
nition of society as an organic set of social functions. 
The word 'organic' is supposed to indicate the fact that 
there is a relation between the different social functions 
of a society, such that the malfunctioning of one can have 
some effect on all the others. 
There are two alternatives when one compares two 
societies: either one can establish a one-to-one corre-
spondence between their social functions or one cannot. 
That is, there is nothing inherent in the notion of social 
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function that implies that there is a precise number that 
all societies must have. It is obviously true, neverthe-
less, that although in theory there can be an infinite number 
of possible 'social functions,' in fact, each real society 
can consist only of a finite number of them at each given 
point in time. This last remark is necessary if one wants 
to allow the possibility of social change. The more 'social 
functions' a society has, the more complex it is. 
Now, from the assertion that two or more societies 
have the same number of social functions, it does not follow 
that the form of materialization of all these social func-
tions or of some of them is the same in all cases. Take, 
for example, the social function of production, where 'pro-
duction' is defined as the transformation of raw materials 
into consumer goods. It is quite clear that not only the 
production techniques, but also the social arrangements for 
the operation of the means of production can be extremely 
diverse in each of the societies considered. This observa-
tion has led many theoreticians to postulate various sorts 
of Relativism. The case of Wittgenstein, whose notion of 
'forms of life' is on the basis of the notion of social 
function being introduced here, is one of the most pathetic. 
As is well known, he allowed himself to be misled by the 
great variety of appearances to adopt a fairly sceptical 
stand. But in relation to social func·tions, as in relation 
to the norms through which they are materialized, it is 
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indispensable to distinguish the two levels of perception 
that were mentioned before. The perception of the social 
function of production in a superficial level would show 
us the arrangements peculiar to a given society (the 'char-
ters' of the institutions involved in production, as Malinow-
ski would call them). A deep level perception of the same 
function would show us only its skeleton, i.e., the social 
goal being fulfilled such as it is in general. The GTHSP 
operates primarily at this second level. 
There is one question that suggests itself naturally 
at this stage: is there any substantial difference between 
those 'social functions' materialized through absolutely 
necessary and circumstantially necessary norms? The answer 
must be yes. The difference, as a matter of fact, is cru-
cial. But let us start by calling those 'social functions' 
expressed by universal and necessary norms 'fundamental 
social functions.' From what has been said so far, it fol-
lows that all societies must have the same number of 'funda-
mental social functions,' and that these express the conditions 
of possibility of social life in general. 
Now, in our discussion of Durkheim we have seen that 
the hypothesis that there are some necessary and universal 
norms is not as wild as it seems at first. That not all 
norms regulating human social behavior can be arbitrary is 
the intuition undeTlying the doctrine of Natural Law. Even 
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the schools of thought that oppose it have been forced to 
. 1 . . h h ~ 1 34 deal extensive y wit t e pron em. It is really quite 
unimportant whether one adopts a theistic or a non-theistic 
version of the th~ory: the assumption is always th<? same: 
because man has a certain natural constitution, some rights 
of prerogatives have to be accorded to him when he is living 
in society, i.e., he has to be perceived in a certain 
manner by his peers. Basically, this is, as can be easily 
seen, a juridical counterpart of the central thesis of 
functionalism. Later in this chapter, I will attempt to 
propose a new formulation of this ancient intuition. Here 
some other issues have to be resolved. 
d. The Concept of Person 
That the problem of 'man' is the most eminent of 
philosophical problems is as evident as the fact that it is 
the most difficult. Here I will not even try to deal with 
it. All I really will attempt to do is discuss the notion 
of 'person' to the extent necessary to show its central role 
in the GTHSP. 
The study of 'person' and 'personality' has been the 
concern of philosophers, jurists, sociologists, psychologists, 
anthropologists, etc. It is only very recently, though, 
that isolated efforts have been made to approach this study 
from an 'interdisciplinary' perspective. In this case, too, 
the insufficiencies inherent to unilateral and partial 
inquiTies into the nature of human phenomena have been slow 
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to be noticed. There are, in general, very few interesting 
attempts to give a presentation of the evolution of the 
notion of 'person' through history. Brunschicg's volumi-
nous book35 ·is, still, the best single work on the subject. 
The jurists have done a little better in this respect. But 
it seems to me that M. Mauss' brief article 36 ·is, if nothing 
else, the most suggestive of the available studies on the 
issue. It should be clear that I do not regard the notion 
of 'person' as one of the essential categories of the human 
'spirit,' whatever that is, but I certainly consider it to 
be a main category of the GTHSP. The evidence that Mauss 
provides points in this direction, that is, it seems to indi-
cate that the concept of 'person,' in any one of its mani-
festations, constitutes the basis for the stratification of 
society and, thus, for the distribution of roles, preroga-
tives, duties, etc. 
But, in the framework of the GTHSP, the study of the 
category of person cannot be an empirical inquiry based on 
the data gathered by the social and juridical sciences. 
The point is that we are not dealing with an 'Aristotelian' 
category, discov~red more or less at random, but with a 
Kantian-like category, that resists a. purely empirical treat-
ment. But let us start by making some necessary distinctions. 
One of the major problems of modern jurisprudence is 
to distinguish the concept of 'man' from the concept of 
'legal person.' That there is an obvious difference was 
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pretty clear for the Romans: the juridical notion of 
'persona' applies not only to single 'physical' persons, 
but also to 'universitas,' to collections of persons. This 
distinction corresponds roughly to the modern one, incor-
porated in most existing civil codes, between 'natural' and 
'juristic' persons. Del Vecchio thinks that the difference 
is best illustrated by pointing out the fact that while man 
qua physical entity is subject to change, qua legal person 
he remains always the same. These kinds of considerations 
have led some jurists to claim that 'legal persons' are not 
real things, but mere 'fictions'; some others have tried to 
demonstrate that, strictly speaking, law has no need of 
subjects, etc. 37 The general problem here consists in 
determining the ontological status of legal or juridical 
objects~ given that it seems intuitively evident that physi-
cal and juridical existence are different. 
Kelsen, without dismissing any of them as fictitious, 
wants to settle the issue by affirming the radical character 
of this difference. For him, the legal person is, indeed, 
a creation of the jurists and, in this sense, artificial, 
although not fictitious. It appears to be so, according to 
Kelsen, only to those who take the relation between the 
legal person and the rights and duties ascribable to it, to 
be fundamentally analogous to the relation between ''substance 
and quality. 1 ' 38 It is not that a legal person is something 
other than a human being, and that this something other is 
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d · ' 3 9 t" b f t . . h d the' epository or ne earer o cer ain rig ts an 
duties; a legal person is nothing more than a human being 
part of whose behavior is regulated by law: 
The physical (natural) person as the subject of 
duties and rights is not the human being whose conduct 
is the content of these duties or the object of these 
rights, but the physical (natural) person is only the 
personification of these duties and rights. Formulated 
more exactly: the physical (natural) person is the 
personification of a set of legal norms which by con-
stituting duties and rights containing the conduct of 
on~ an~ 0the same human being regulate the conduct of this being. 
Hence, an individual whose conduct is not regulated by law 
is not, in any sensible way, a legal person though he still 
might be a man. This is undoubtedly a very important con-
clusion, in spite of the fact that Kelsen fails to see all 
its real implications. Stopping halfway, he claims that: 
... (a) legal norm determines only a particular 
action or forbearance of the individual A, not his whole 
existence. Even the total legal order never determines 
the whole existence of a human being subject to the 41 order, or affects all his mental and bodily functions. 
Of course, it is not difficult to see why a legal positivist 
would be committed to such a view, for, since all law is 
contingent, what determines the personhood of individuals 
living in different societies cannot be a fixed set of laws. 
The quality of being a person does not depend on any one 
particular law, but on the general fact of being subjected 
to law. 
There is still a deeper assumption underlying Kel-
sen's theory. He shares with the moderns the conviction that 
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individuals, as such, are endowed with a 'reality' totally 
independent of their social existence. Actually, it is therein 
that lies the tragedy of Legal Positivism in its classical 
variety42 and its most obvious and serious limitation: 
though convinced of the reality of the isolated individual, 
it does not regard it as a natural source of law. 
The available anthropological and historical informa-
tion leaves no doubt as to the historical origins of the 
notion of the independent individual in the midst of Chris-
tian thought. Actually, this Christian doctrine, as we have 
seen before, encountered its natural environment and attained 
its fullest development in the framework of capitalism. 
Suddenly, the individual could claim rights independently 
from the role it played in society. There were 'human 
rights' ascribable to the individual as such, and not qua 
player of a role. The 'human rights' had to be distinguished 
from the 'rights of the citizen.' The reality of the indi~ 
vidual transcends the reality of its society and the reality 
of the state. Robinson Crusoe, if nothing else, had 'natural 
rights' and, of course, an individual soul. 
I do not want to discuss here whether the causes 
for this abstract perception of man are the ones pointed 
out by Marx; 43 what seems clear is that, in this respect 
at least, the perspective of 'primitive man' was far more 
'totalizing': the individual and its role were perceived 
as constituting a unity and thus, perceiving an individual 
58 
involved the perception of the whole of the social order. 
Each person has its proper place in social space and there 
are no persons outside its borders: every thing alien is, 
in principle·, non-human. The history of America and the 
early discussions concerning the human or non-human character 
of the natives provide us with more than enough examples 
to illustrate this point. 
If the~e is something wrong with the traditional 
perspective it is not its totalizing character, but its 
provincialism, that is, the confusion of the contingent and 
the necessary elements of social life. Unaware of the arti-
ficial nature of society, of its man-made character, the 
arrangements of their own society appeared 'natural' to the 
primitives. A non-naive, enlightened totalizing perspective 
would differ from that of the primitives simply in the_ fact 
that it is aware of the existence of these two levels of 
perception. So it would see 'personhood' as the consequence 
of the subjection to law, of the ordering of conduct, not 
as a result of the application of any law, but rather as the 
result of the application of 'certain laws': those that 
express the conditions of possibility of human social life 
in general. This is precisely what Kelsen failed to see. 
If being subjected to law simpliciter were the 
defining element of personhood, any entity whatsoever, and 
not only those entities with the characteristics of human 
beings could in principle be persons. A well-trained dog, 
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for instance, which refrains from harming people and, even 
once in awhile helps them, could be considered a person. The 
reason why dogs and other such entities are not conceived as 
persons even if their behavior is 'lawful' in the sense just 
considered, is that they are unable to take an active part 
in all the activities demanded of a person, most of which, 
as it should become clear later, require not only the ability 
to passively conform to law, but also the ability to take the 
initiative and actively participate in the materialization of 
the fundamental social functions. On the other hand, were 
we to come in contact with entities of another planet which 
possessed all the characteristics and capacities of human 
beings, then there would be no a priori reason to assume that, 
given the proper circumstances, they could not become persons. 
The claim that a legal order does not determine ''the 
whole existence of a human being subject to the order" is, 
viewed from the perspective just described, meaningless> for 
there is no such thing as a human being that exists beyond the 
realm of society. This is not to say, of course, that there 
cannot be unsocialized biological entities with some of the 
characteristics (external characteristics, that is) of human 
beings existing in a pure state of nature, but calling such 
entities 'human beings' would be a serious misuse of language. 
There is another way of interpreting the statement, similar to 
the one indicated above and also quite germane to the positi-
vistic outlook, that is also a misunderstanding. For it is an 
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indisputable fact that in a given society there is no one-to-
one correspondence between all the 'mental and bodily' functions 
of an individual and the set of positive laws of that society. 
But, again, this is a fact that needs trouble only the posi-
tivists. 44 In a brief but quite suggestive essay, L. Armour 
gives a good account of this model, after having discussed the 
paradoxes he considers inherent to it: 
In the model, the situation is envisaged as one in 
which there are many complete and completely separate selves 
or persons and there is a law to which they stand in an 
external relation. The law is imposed on them, we think, 
and they are the same persons they would have been with or 
without the law. 
It is this conception of all law as an external imposition 
that has to be rejected. 
Now, if we accept the fact that there are certain funda-
mental social functions and that they are materialized through 
necessary norms, it follows that no entity incapable of allow-
ing its behavior to be regulated by these norms can live in 
society. Moreover, such entity must be perceived as funda-
mentally alien by those human beings that live in society, for 
it incarnates the negation of all the attributes that define 
their nature. For a socialized entity, any other animated 
unsocialized entity is a beast, especially if it turns out to 
be, for one reason or other, resistant to all attempts of 
socialization. What distinguishes a beast from a person is, 
mostly, the fact that the behavior of the former is basically 
unpredictable, while the behavior of the latter is taken to 
be predictable at least under certain circumstances and in 
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certain respects, namely in those relating to the compliance 
with necessary and universal norms. Hence, those norms are not 
something external to the different persons, but rather they 
are what defines them as such. This implies not only that part 
of the behavior of the entities that we call persons is sub-
jected to norms, but that what is regulated are the most funda-
mental or basic traits of their behavior, to wit, those traits 
that being indispensable for their survival as individuals are 
determinants of the kinds of relations they can establish with 
other entities of the same sort. In the most basic and proper 
sense, then, being a person means promoting, through the active 
compliance with all universal and necessary rules, the materi-
alization of the fundamental social functions. 
At this point we have to pause once more and distinguish 
between the proper sense of person, and the concrete meaning of 
the word in historical societies. It is fairly obvious that in 
a given society a 'person is not simply an entity that obeys 
universal laws. Living in a real society demands obedience to 
innumerable laws that are circumstantially necessary and even 
totally contingent. To be recognized·as a person in Spanish 
society of the XVI century, one had not only to abstain from 
indulging in the systematic assassination of fellow Spaniards, 
but it was at least equally necessary to acknowledge the Bible 
as the word of God. But, in considering Durkheim's examples, 
we have already seen that there seems to be a clear way cf per-
ceiving these differences and that this select~e apprehension 
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* is reflected in all codes of law. No -human society could 
exist, were this ability not a universal characteristic of 
all human beings: in the final analysis, it constitutes the 
kernel of what is known as 'human rationality.' Neither the 
principle of non-contradiction, nor the capacity for deductive 
reasoning constitute the essence of human rationality. What 
makes a man a rational being is the same act that enables him 
to become a person, i.e., the comprehension of the necessity 
to regulate his own behavior as the condition for his incor-
poration into society. In a very precise sense, then, one 
begins to think and to live as a person simultaneously. This 
is the intuition behind the classical doctrine that evil cannot 
be 'willed' or rationally pursued. If rationality is the aware-
ness or the conviction that certain actions or constraints 
are good in themselves because they make possible the existence 
of society and that, thus, the norms connected to them are 
necessary, any rejection of these norms, apart from being 
automatically immoral, must be either the result of ignorance 
** or of lack of rationality. 
* In Chapters II and especialiy III, we will see that 
this ability is what allows humans to distinguish between the 
different kinds of laws, to wit, fundamental, secondary and 
tertiary laws. 
** The sense in which the word 'immoral' is used here 
will become clearer later. Now we only need to notice that 
!e say that the rejection of universal norms is !immoral' 
insofar as morality is defined in terms of compliance with these 
norms. 
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Consider again the case of such domesticated animals 
as dogs, for instance. Apart from the causes listed above, 
a dog cannot be~ome a person because it cannot be trusted 
to always do the right things in relation to the commands of 
universal norms. And the reason why we do not fully trust 
dogs is that we do not think that they possess 'reason' 
in the sense humans do. We assume a person's behavior to be 
predictable, simply because we think that he is 'reasonable,' 
i.e., that he conforms to law not only out of fear of punish-
ment or because of habituation, but because he has an under-
standing of the necessity inherent in certain laws and, 
hence 1 is convinced of the necessity to obey these laws. It 
is because dogs, and lions, and chimpanzees do not possess 
'convictions' that we expect their good manners to disappear 
when confronted with extreme situations. That is, we expect 
their behavior to be 'civilized' only while they find them-
selves living under relatively comfortable and stable condi-
tions. In other words, we expect their behavior to be mainly 
determined by 'external' or 'environmental' circumstances, and 
not by 'internal' forces such as convictions and beliefs. 
And this is why we attribute virtues to them only by analogy. 
The claim that conditioning is sufficient to explain 
habitual submission to law by the vast majo-rity of human 
beings is proven false by the existence of moral arguments. 
That people feel the need to justify their actions is not an 
accidental and unimportant feature of human life, it is 
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rather the result of a clear apprehension of the fact that 
certain behaviors are required by 'human nature' and, thus, 
necessary. That is why all revolutionaries and dissenters 
begin by arguing that those laws that determine their status 
* are contingent and arbitrary and, therefore, unjustifiable. 
It is no accident either that equality was initially proclaimed 
as an ideal in the name of Reason. 
The argument has led us naturally to the notion of 
'human nature.' For a good many years in this century the view 
that there is no such thing as 'human nature' was quite popu-
lar among philosophers, who were convinced of the impossibility 
of reconciling this notion with the notion of 'liberty.' Most 
of these philosophers took human nature to mean 'essence' in 
the classical sense of the word. The Sartrean motto that 
"existence comes before essence" seems to be a good·summary 
of this position. The point was, simply, that man, being not 
a creation of God, but a product of some sort of cosmological 
accident, was not predetermined to go in any particular direc-
tion, was not destined to be or to become anything, so that 
the burden of choosing a trajectory for his existence rested 
completely on him. In the absence of any pre-established 
final goals there was neither an absolute hierarchy of values 
nor a set of necessary moral norms. 
* As a suggestive fact of the English language note the 
connection between the words 1 just,' 'justice 1 and 'unjusti-
fiable,' a connection that, by the way, is common to many 
languages both Inda-European and non-Inda-European. 
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The answer to this from the perspective of the GTHSP 
is pretty obvious. In the first.place, it is clearly not the 
same to deny that there is a distinct transcendental purpose 
in the existence of human beings, and to deny the existence 
of human nature as such. The questions whether man was cre-
ated by God or whether he is a freak of nature are irrelevant 
to the GTHSP, which is solely concerned with the processes and 
mechanisms that make human social life~ feasible enterprise. 
The existence of a juridical person, such as has been charac-
terized before, has no transcendental meaning whatsoever, 
although it is perfectly 'determined,' for as long as some-
thing is a person, its actions are immediately aimed at pre-
serving a certain social order. 
Since, to the extent that a person is a person, he 
follows both the fundamental laws that make society in general 
possible, and also the circumstantially necessary norms that 
make his own society possible, i.e., he realizes through his 
behavior the conditions of existence of social life. Of course, 
it could be argued that it is there where human liberty plays 
a role, for, conceivable, a juridical person could 'decide' 
to engage in the systematic violation of the universal norms 
that sustain society. But, in doing so, he would not be 
acting as a human being and thus it would make no sense to 
predicate 'liberty,' an attribute of human beings, of him. 
At most, we could say that the act of renouncement or repudia-
tion is itself an act of liberty, but, in general, it is 
evident, as Sartre himself says today, that whatever 'human 
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liberty' means, it has to mean something that presupposes a 
certain degree of regulated action. 
Besides, although it has been historically the case 
that most philosophers in the West have interpreted the notion 
of human nature in such a way that the affirmation of its 
existence implied the affirmation of the existence of a divin-
ity and of the fact that human nature was a divine creation, 
it does not follow from this that, in fact, this connection is 
necessary. The reason that human beings have to behave in 
certain ways has nothing to do with God's wishes, but rather 
with the manner- in which they are constituted; it is from the 
particular form of their being that the universal norms 
required for the materialization of the fundamental social 
functions are derived. The origins of this form of being are 
irrelevant. The GTHSP and, therefore, morality are beyond 
any question concerning the necessary or contingent character 
of the world and its elements, including the beings capable 
of becoming 'juridical persons.' 
Moreover, it follows from what has been said so far 
that the postulation of the existence of 'human nature' is an 
indispensable feature of social life. 'Human nature' is 
nothing more, and, more importantly, nothing less, than the 
set of properties that constitute the basis for the derivation 
of all necessary and universal norms_ In other words, there 
is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of fundamental 
social functions and the set of properties that determine 
'human nature.' The reason ~1y we do not normally expect 
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lions to behave like persons is, simply, that we do not per-
ceive lioris as being endowed with any or at least not all 
the qualities of the beings capable of becoming persons. 
At an earlier point, I committed myself to the view 
that no enumeration of biological properties could provide 
a definition of human nature, and it would seem that now I 
am falling into a contradiction. But note that the claim 
made in the preceding paragraphs is not simply that all men 
living in society perceive a set of properties, rather the 
claim is that they perceive these properties as being unavoid-
able 'reasons' for the regulation of behavior, so it is this 
operational or functional character of the notion of human 
nature that is really important. If we did not possess a 
distinct notion of 'human nature' and of its relevant proper-
ties, we would not distinguish between the different kinds of 
beings as to their qualifications to become persons, and, 
hence, we would be unable to determine the specificity of 
human social existence. It is because we possess a clear 
idea of human nature that we do not consider dogs as possible 
candidates for personhood, and it is because we know the 
qualities of human nature that we can, through an act of rea-
son, discern the basic rules or norms that make social life 
possible. Those that negate the existence of human nature 
commit themselves either to a view similar to that of Kelsen, 
who has to equate personhood with submission to law in general, 
and thus finds himself incapable of defining '~uman 
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personhood'; or they adhere to the view that humans have no 
inherent obligations qua humans. This is the thesis of Sartre. 
Its main deficiency is that it does not permit to .account for 
the notion of 'responsibility' as it operates in human socie-
* ties. 
Assuming that I have a good will and that I feel 
inclined toward benevolence, I may find myself facing the 
task of trying to select the entities toward which I will act 
with benevolence. At the end, this question can be settled 
only by referring to a set of properties or characteristics 
such that their possession by an entity indicates that it is 
sensible to behave benevolently toward it. Mind, though, that 
the whole observation of these qualities does not generate in 
me the feeling of benevolence. What it does is signal that a 
moral attitude of a definite sort, i.e., an attitude requiring 
my concern for the safety of this entity and, hence, the exer-
cise of some restraint on my part, would be appropriate. The 
generation of just these types of signals is the essential 
task of our notion of human nature. 
* At least in his earlier works, Sartre proposes a para-
doxical way out of this problem.· After having denied the 
existence of absolute values, he tries to reintroduce the 
~otions cf 'obligation' and 'responsibility' by claiming that, 
insofar as one's choices necessarily affect others, one chooses 
for ethers and, hence, presumably, one has a responsibility of 
sorts towards others. The problem with this view is that an 
utterly vicious person, who chrioses to harm others, is, to that 
extent that he exercises his freedom, no less human than St. 
Francis of Assisi. In othei words, on Sartre's account, it is 
not the quality of our actions, but their form alone, namely, 
th~ fact that they originate in the free exercise of our will, 
which determines th~ir moral character. At the end, all 'free' 
cats are gray, so to say. 
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The existence of inequalities in human societies is a 
further proof of the point that the perception of human nature 
is something more than the recognition of the fact that some 
entities share a common set of biological or other kinds of 
properties. In this respect, it is particularly interesting 
to consider the master/slave relationship. Obviously, the 
slave is not seen as a human being in the proper sense of the 
word, but it is not seen as an animal either. The discussion 
as to whether slaves were 'personae' in some sense, that for 
many years occupied the historians of Roman Law, is quite 
telling. By now it is generally agreed upon that slaves had 
certain rights, hardly a surprising fact, if one remembers 
that their Roman masters had to relate to them. It was pre-
cisely this need that forced or, if one prefers, led the 
Romans to recognize some of the qualities of human nature in 
their slaves: they were not simply beasts or non-persons in 
an absolute sense, they were semi-persons, deficient persons. 
This kind of perception is also neatly exemplified by the 
relationship between members of different societies that, for 
some reason or other, come into contact sporadically. Aris-
totle's point· that political relations are substantially dif-
ferent from, say 1 trading relations, leads in this same 
direction. He was aware of the fact that the establishment of 
trade relations does not require the· mutual recognition of 
their 'personhood' by the trading parties, although it cannot 
take place unless both parties perceive each other as at least 
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semi-persons, barbarians. That the Spanish travelers could 
come back from the outermost limits of Central-Europe pro-
claiming that all creatures living in those parts and beyond 
were nothing more than barking monsters indicates only that 
they had no need and no intention whatsoever to relate to them. 
When a human being is incorporated into a society, even as a 
slave (or should I say 'especially' as a slave?) he must 
participate in the materialization of the fundamental social 
functions, and thus, he becomes ipso facto a candidate for 
'personhood,' even if he is not fully recognized as such by 
the laws of the land. 
There is an interesting difference between two basic 
sorts of cases in which human beings are taken to be semi-
persons. The cases of slaves, women and colonized peoples are 
instances of the first sort. Children, real children and not 
* mere minors, that is, are good examples of the second sort. 
In the case of slaves or women there are no factual impedi-
ments, other than the culturally generated ones, for their 
being recognized as full persons. It is obvious that they 
are not irrational creatures, in the sense that we have given 
to the word, that is, inability to submit one's behavior to 
* The study of the historical transformation of the 
concept of childhood is one of the most promising and valuable 
tasks of social science. The first thing to distinguish in 
this respect would be the notions of 'real' and 'cultural' 
childhood. The research of Wallen, Piaget and their followers 
de~ls, primarily, with the first phenomenon. Books like P. 
A~ies', C~ntUries of Childhood (London, J. Cape, 1962), deal 
w~th the secona phenomenon. The GTHSP is mainly concerned 
with the first. 
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regulation. Real children are irrational in precisely this 
sense. The real _end of childhood comes, therefore, with the 
development of the ability to comprehend the necessity of 
following certain norms. The description of the .actual process 
of transition from childhood to personhood is one of the impor-
tant contributions that psychology can make to our knowledge 
of human nature. 
Let us now briefly summarize what has been said in this 
section. Certainly, many questions have remained either 
unasked or unanswered, but this is, partly at least, due to 
the introductory nature of this section. What I have attempted 
to do is merely present a general definition of the basic 
notion of person. Later on it will hopefully become clear 
how a person is constituted in the framework of social life. 
Meanwhile, we know that a person is a biological entity with 
certain specific characteristics, yet to be listed, which 
constitutes the ground or basis of its real or essential 
nature, i.e., its juridical bei~g. This juridical being is 
generated through behavior conducive to the materialization 
of certain norms which, in turn, materialize certain func-
tions that make possible the establishment of associative and 
cooperative relations among persons. We know also, at this 
point, that, in real societies, the behavior of a person is 
regulated both by universal and contingently universal norms. 
This is an important fact to keep in mind in order to under-
stand why the persons of one society can regard persons of 
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other societies as non-persons. For personhood, as we shall 
see in detail in later sections, can be lost either by violat-
ing the universal rules, in which case the loss is absolute, 
or by violating the contingently necessary rules of a given· 
* society, in which case the loss is relative to that society. 
But having established through analysis that the condition of 
humans living in society is juridical in nature, and having 
seen how, in general, this condition comes to be as a func-
tion of certain norms, it is now necessary to examine in 
detail the qualities and the circumstances inherent to the 
existence of humans as juridical entities. This section 
then has been important mostly because it showed that persons 
and their attributes are the real subject matter of all 
anthropology. 
e. Human Relations, Social Space and Institutions 
The first step towards the understanding of juridical 
persons must be the study of juridical relations. According 
to what we have been saying, the concept of person is 
* There is a third way in which one can be deprived of 
personhood, namely, by being sold into slavery or servitude. 
When Plato, a person in his society, is captured and sold as 
a slave, he does not necessarily lose personhood in Athens, 
though he certainly is a slave in some other society. This 
example exhibits both the juridical character of personhood 
and the limitative function of secondary or contingently nec-
cessary rules. Plato would lose his personhood absolutely, 
if there existed a law in Athens depriving of personhood all 
persons sold into slavery. In this case, Plato would be, 
strictly speaking, no-where a person. (For a more detailed 
treatment of these issues see Chapter III, S.) 
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essentially a relational concept, for persons come to be as 
the result of the lawful intercourse of two or more human 
beings with one another. To attribute personhood to acer-
tain entity is tantamount to predicating a certain.kind of 
relationship of it. But so far, and although we -have repeat-
edly talked about human relations, we have not examined in 
detail what they are, how they operate, what their nature is. 
In this section we will attempt to do just that, primarily 
in order to determine whether they constitute a particular 
type or class of relations and, if so, how they differ from 
other kinds of relations. 
It seems obvious that not all kinds of human relations 
require either direct physical contact or the spatial prox-
imity o-f the parties of whom it is predicated. Although, 
on the other hand, it is difficult to deny that, in some 
cases, a relationship can be perceived as somewhat deficient 
if some of those elements are missing. Consider, for instance, 
a marital relationship. Under extreme circumstances (or, 
perhaps, not so extreme, after all) we could think of such 
a relationship existing between two persons who have agreed 
to avoid any 'physical' contact whatsoever (Gandhi and his 
wife) and we would not be disturbed even if, having carried 
their neurosis one step further, the spouses decided to live 
as far apart as possible from each other. Our endurance would 
only meet its limit if the odd couple decided to procreate 
while honoring their previous agreements. For in most cases, 
procreation requires a minimum of physical contact. In other 
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words, under normal circumstances a married couple cannot add 
to its marital relationship the relationship of parenthood 
unless, at some point, they engage in coitus. But the impor-
tant thing to notice in this respect is that, although the 
coitus is a prerequisite for the generation of the relation-
* ship of 'parenthood,' we do not identify the two. Actually 
the point that we are trying to press here comes across more 
neatly if we think of the case of 'parenthood' generated 
through adoption. Even Gandhi and his wife can become parents 
in this way. What makes them that, then, is not any form 
* whatsoever of physical contact, but something else. Juridi-
cal 'parenthood,' strictu sensu, therefore, can be said to 
be something different from physical 'parenthood.' 
That spatial proximity is not always necessary for the 
establishment of a well-defined juridical relationship between 
persons, can be illustrated by the relationship of 'citizen-
ship.' Let us for a moment suppose that there is a nation of 
one square kilometer and one hundred citizens, so that, by 
any reasonable standards, we can say that all these indivi-
duals are, when living in the territory of their country, 
quite 'proximate' to one another. As a matter of fact, they 
could be holding hands all the time. Now, even in the case 
when one of these individuals goes for an evening walk and 
crosses the border into the neighboring country, he retains 
* For an account of this relationship, that is used 
· here only as an illustration, see Chapter II, 2, f. 
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his citizenship and thus, his relation to his countrymen 
remains basically the same. 
But let us ask now whether recognition is necessary 
for the establishment of human relations. Evidently rela-
tionships like parenthood demand a very straightforward kind 
of recognition; generally, that is, for the pitiful case of 
Oedipus shows that a relationship can subsist even in the 
absence of 'factual' recognition of one party by the other. 
The case of Oedipus is particularly interesting because it 
proves that juridical relationships are perceived as real 
even when they do not exercise any immediate constraints on 
the behavior of the parties directly involved. This, of course, 
seems to contradict the definition of juridical proposed above. 
But the appearance is dissolved once we realize that as soon 
as the relationship is recognized, it starts exercising a 
strong influence on the behavior of all the parties touched 
by it. 
The relative ambiguity of the words 'recognize' and 
'recognition' in the preceding paragraphs indicates the neces-
sity of distinguishing two kinds of phenomena: recognition and 
identification. My being a Chinese does not require that I 
identify each and everyone of the 800 million persons to which 
I am connected. All that is required of me as a Chinese is 
that I master the criteria, whatever they are, that will 
allow me to identify-one Chinese as my countryman, should 
that become necessary. So, it seems that recognition is more 
than enough for the subsistence of juridical relations~ But 
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to say that I recognize someone implies that I have at least 
some previous knowledge of that person. Ex hypothesis, this 
knowledge cannot come from my having identified that person 
in the past. If at all, I know this person in a general 
and vague manner. This knowledge is provided by the criteria 
just mentioned. Somehow or other, then, these criteria must 
be implicit in the structure of the juridical norms that fix 
the relationships between people. These criteria, where the 
universal moral norms are concerned, must be the qualities 
of human nature, and where the circumstantially necessary 
norms are concerned the criteria are provided by reference 
to those additional traits required of persons in each his-
torical society. 
But we still have not made explicit the connection 
between those few properties of human relations already 
discovered and the notion of 'person.' A first question could 
be, how do perso~s relate to other persons? Using their 
peculiar jargon, some contemporary philosophers interested 
in providing a phenomenological description of human rela-
* tions have repeatedly pointed out the fact that human beings 
necessarily encounter each other in their 'Lebensraum.' This 
necessity, we could add~ is inherent in their nature, insofar 
as they are persons. To be a person is, precisely, to be in 
certain kinds of relationships with other entities accepted as 
persons. 
* I have in mind especially tl~ works of Heidegger, 
Sartre and Schutz (cf. his C61lected P~pers. The Hague, Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 197e). 
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But let us examine this more carefully. If we were 
to claim that identification is a condition for human rela-
tions, we would be forced to admit that it is impossible to 
participate in the materialization of a social function with 
persons that have not been positively identified case by case. 
But this conclusion seems absurd. Take, for example, the 
social function of production. There is no doubt that insofar 
as I am participating in the production of material goods, 
I am in fact related to hundreds of persons whose existence 
as individuals I ignore. What I know and have to know is, 
simply, that there is a person or a set of persons to whom 
I am related; I have to recognize the relationship and thus, 
implicitly, the personhood of those touched by it. 
In a way, in recognizing that I am related to other 
persons, I am placing myself in the same realm, place or 
space with them. So to say, all persons related to each other 
occupy the same 'social space.' The next question, naturally, 
concerns this social space. Do all the people who occupy the 
same social space have to occupy the same territory? The 
examples we have considered above seem to indicate the con-
trary. Unless X has been deprived of his nationality he 
remains a citizen of A even when he steps outside A's borders. 
That is, the social space cannot be identified with a certain 
territory, its borders are not geographical, in spite of the 
undeniable fact that some kinds of relationships are terri-
torially or geographically bound. But all this means is that 
they have been defined in such a way that their materialization 
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requires a territory. As a foreigner, for instance, the 
positive law of a country does not touch me until I actually 
* enter the territory of this country. 
What is the 'social space'? If the social link of 
one person to other persons is established by and through 
their cooperation or participation in the materialization 
of social functions, the social space cannot be but the 
realm determined by the effective materialization of a set 
of social functions. As immediate expressions of the condi-
tions of possibility of social life, the fundamental social 
functions set the real limits of the social space. Another 
way of putting this would be to say that only juridical 
persons inhabit the social space. In its concrete form, the 
social space is delimited by the materialization of both 
fundamental and non~fundamental social functions. 
Now, at this point it seems quite relevant to clarify 
the notion of 'materialization.' The language I have been 
· utilizing so far could give the impression that I think of 
fundamental social functions as subsisting Meinogian objects, 
that are instantiated in real societies. But putting the 
problem in terms of the realist-nominalist controversy would 
be totally erroneous. The existence of juridical entities 
is substantially different from the existence of the objects 
that have traditionally been the concern of ontology. 
* For a discussion of the relation between the social 
and geographical spaces, see Chapter II, 2, a and b; and 
Chapter III, 3, a. 
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Juridical entities do not exist either as Meinogian objects, 
nor as concepts in a mind of some sort. Contrary to the 
beliefs of some structuralists, fundamental social functions 
are not categories of the human 'spirit, if for no other 
reason, simply because they are prior to anything deserving 
that name. The materialization of social functions is not the 
pass from the ideal to the real. There is no more reality to 
a social function than the actual generation and operation 
of the norms that express it, that render it into a working 
'institution.' Beyond the institutions of a society, beyond 
the social organisms generated by the activities of socialized 
entities or of entities in the process of socialization 
(personification), there is nothing real so far as human 
society is concerned. Hence, the limits of society are 
* absolutely congruent with the limits of legitimacy. This is 
why we can find a natural tendency in all societies toward 
the annihilation and repression of illegitimacy. By nature, 
punishment tends towards annihilation. 
* Strictly speaking, legitimate in the context of a 
society of humans is only the behavior that results from the 
materialization of fundamental and secondary norms. Such 
norms define the borders of the social space and, hence, the 
limits of the acceptable. A person can go beyond these borders 
?nly by violating the fundamental norms and thus, by endanger-
1~g the very foundations of his society. From this point of 
view, punishment appears as a defense mechanism of society. 
The most effective defence is, obviously, the neutralization of 
the threat by the annihilation of the source. This is the 
g?al of 'punitive' justice. But for reasons that will be con-
s1.dered later (Chapter II, 2, g}, punitive justice is substi-
tuted in many cases by 'corrective' justice, which administers 
punishment while, at the same time, seeking to open the door for 
the reincorporation of the offender into ~ociety, into the realm 
of legitimacy or, to put it differently, into the social space. 
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2. The Theory of Ne·ed·s ·a:n"d ·the· Ded·uction ·o·f the Futidamental 
Social Functions 
a. On the Needs and Characteristics of Human Nature 
The next two sections have two purposes. The first 
is the definition of human nature; the second is to clarify 
the methodological problems concerning both the procedure 
for the definition of human nature and that to be followed 
to deduce the conditions of possibility of human social 
existence. The first task requires that we discuss, briefly 
and selectively, some of the current attempts to define human 
nature in terms of 'needs,' 1 wants' or 'drives,' for it is 
in those terms that we intend to define it. The second task 
requires, first of all, a clear account of the relations of 
the needs or characteristics of human nature to the fundamen-
tal social functions. 
Now, the most obvious question that can be asked at 
this point is, why should we want to define human nature in 
terms of needs? It is clear, from our previous discussion, 
that what we are after is the set of qualities which enables 
humans to live socially. For the~e qualities underlie their 
existence as juridical persons. But there must exist acer-
tain parallelism between the qualities that allow them to sur-
vive as physical or biological entities, and those just men-
tioned, since it is selfevident that a society must be con-
stituted of living individuals. 
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Mere biological survival, on the other hand, does 
not make persons. Personhood, insofar as it is a relational 
quality, can.only be an attribute of entities endowed with 
certain relational qualities. Now, all these qualities are 
dynamic in character to the extent that they manifest them-
selves as demands, and not, like the color of the skin or the 
symmetric design of the body, as passive attributes. It is 
because of this that I prefer to refer to the definitory, 
dynamic qualities of human nature as needs. In a way, all 
the references to 'needs' made above have been relatively 
vague. To a great extent I have been relying on our natural, 
intuitive understanding of this notion, which is what the 
GTHSP really requires. But the fact cannot be ignored, that 
the notion of 'human needs' has been greatly blurred by the 
different uses made of it in the different disciplines. It 
constitutes the basis for very important schools of thought 
in at least three of the social sciences, anthropology, psy-
chology and sociology, and it has certainly played an impor-
tant role in the history of morality and political theory. 
I shall leave for the next chapter the task of dealing with 
the moral and, en passant, also the political implications 
of the theory of needs. Here I will simply try to give a 
universal operational definition of the notion, as required 
by the GTHSP. 
In a recent paper, 45 H.J. McCloskey has pointed out 
the importance of distinguishing the notion of needs from such 
similar,notions as 'desires,' 'wants,' 'interests, 1 'drives.' 
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Drives, McCloskey says, can be bad or negative, perhaps some-
thing like the destructive instinct that certain psychoana-
lists talk about, but it would seem that a contradiction is 
involved in the claim that 'needs' can be destructive. Fur-
thermore, it would seemj McCloskey goes on to say, that the 
connection between desires and needs is more or less acciden-
tal. Now, although his general point is basically sound, 
I think that the fact that it is formulated as an empirical 
claim betrays an important weakness, which becomes quite vis-
ible in the example he proposes. Mccloskey· wants to illus-
trate his claim by referring to the fact, noticed by Butler, 
that it is in a way extraordinary that when we have a need 
for food, hunger, we 'desire' those things capable of satis-
fying it rather than any other thing. In the first place, 
as is well known, this phenomenon does not appear so mysteri-
ous to biologists anymore. In the second place, as he him-
self notices, there are such things as 'natural desires' that 
can hardly be distinguished from 1 needs.' At most, a dis-
tinction could be made by introducing the notion of 'conscious-
ness,' that is, by claiming that a 'natural desire' is the 
result of one having become conscious or aware of one's need 
for x. But all this is unnecessary if one sticks to the 
distinction, drawn by McCloskey in an earlier part of his 
paper, between having a need qua 'person' and having a need 
qua player of a role. 46 In the latter case we could more 
properly say that we have a desire, an in.terest or a want for 
something. Needs, then, and in this respect I think McCloskey's 
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thesis is largely correct, are determined by 'human nature' 
and thus, they are permanent and remain essentially unaffected 
by the course of history and changes in society. Another way 
of putting this would be to say that natural needs are not 
socially determined. 
The problem, of course, lies in deciding what is to 
count as a 'natural need,' as a constituent of 'human nature.' 
Proposed lists are not lacking. Neither is a feeling of 
skepticism as to the possibility of constructing a list that 
is really exhaustive, especially if what one is trying to 
classify are basic physiological needs or drives. A. Mas-
low47 thinks that depending on the ndegree of specificity 
of our descriptions" we could come up with many lists of 
physiological needs differing both in the number of items 
they include and in the manner that items are classified and 
arranged. So, for instance, some people may want to classify 
as homeostatic some drives to which others attribute some 
other function. Besides, Maslow insists, only a few among the 
so-called physiological needs can effectively be isolated 
and "somatically localized." That is, even if the generalized 
presumption that the physiological drives exhaust the list 
of 'basic needs' were true, it still would be virtually 
impossible to establish a unique, final list of such drives ff 
But, according to Maslow, it is fortunately the case 
that one does not require an exhaustive list of physiological 
drives, because the identification of physiological drives 
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and 'basic needs' is untenable. The most conclusive and 
immediate proof is that once satisfied, physiological drives 
cease to be a permanent factor in the motivation of behavior. 
The real importance of physiological needs can best be recog-
nized not by observing the behavior of someone who has not 
been able to satisfy any or some of them, but rather the 
behavior of someone who has achieved a sufficient degree of 
satisfaction of his physiological needs. In the latter case, 
the physiological needs appear as one among many other needs 
that are at least equally important. Most of these other 
needs have a 'psychological' rather than a physiological 
character and they are the 'safety needs,' the 'belongingness 
and love needs,' the 'esteem needs,' the 'need for self-
actualization.' The physiological plus these psychological 
needs constitute what can truly be considered as the set of 
'basic needs.' But the recognition of this fact implies the 
dismissal of a further prejudice, i.e., the presumption that 
a list of basic needs can be established without regard to the 
"goal objects" of motivated behavior. Maslow's thesis is that 
all evidence now available tends to indicate that the aims of 
people are more stable and universal than the immediate moti-
vations of their behavior. 
This presentation of Maslow's views is, of course, 
quite sketchy, and his theory certainly deserves more atten-
tion, if for no other reason, simply because of the great 
impact it has had on contemporary psychology. But even this 
85 
brief presentation is enough to point out the main assumptions 
supporting the theory, with which I cannot completely agree, 
i.e., the conviction that there is no basic difference between 
psychological and physiological needs. Actually, Maslow 
dismisses as unimportant the one argument that points directly 
to the fundamental difference, i.e., the fact that lack of 
gratification of physiological needs can easily turn them 
into the main and even the only motivations of behavior. The 
importance of this fact becomes absolutely clear if one con-
siders that although no social function can be said to exist 
exclusively for the purpose of allowing the socialized satis-
faction of any of the psychological basic needs mentioned by 
Maslow, there is no doubt that at least the social function of 
production is directly related to the satisfaction of needs 
that we cannot but consider part of our physiological needs. 
We can certainly claim a priori that there cannot be an insti-
tution in any human society whose sole or primary purpose is 
the socialized satisfaction of the need of self-esteem or the 
need of self-actualization, and if we wanted to claim that 
the function of some institution or other is the satisfaction 
of the need of "safety" or "love and belongingness," we would, 
most probably, give a physiologically biased interpretation of 
those needs, and not, as Maslow, a purely phychological one. 
This same point can be made in a different way. Mas-
low's psychological needs, if satisfied, do in no manner alter 
the juridical existence of a person, but rather provide it 
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with happiness, i.e., they confer him psychological enjoyment. 
But it is clearly not the case that they are the basis for 
fundamental social functions, since a society of persons is 
perfectly conteivable in which most or all persons are unhap~y, 
that is, psychologically uneasy or uncomfortable. What is 
not conceivable is a society of persons in which no provisions 
have been made for the satisfaction of the most basic phy-
siological needs. 
But, if in this particular respect, Maslow's views 
are not acceptable, I think that one cannot discard so easily 
his arguments against the necessity and the possiblity of 
elaborating a final, comprehensive list of physiological needs 
or drives, such as the one proposed by Malinowski, for example. 49 
Such a list is quite irrelevant from the point of view of the 
GTHSP. All that it requires, as we shall see immediately, is 
the recognition of the existence of a set of needs broadly 
identifiable as physiological. 
In general, I feel that I can also agree with Maslow's 
insistence on the importance of taking a 'holistic' approach 
to the study of human behavior, so as to regard motivation or 
any other aspect from the point of view of its effects on the 
whole of the 'personality' of an individual and, in this 
connection, the necessity of taking into account the final 
goals of the individual's behavior. But, as they stand, 
Maslow's statements are, to say the least, incomplete and in 
need of ~eformulation. 
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Faced with the task of singling out one weakness in 
Maslow's theory that could be considered crucial, I would 
point, without hesitation, to his conception of man and his 
account of the relation between the individual and culture. 
Basically, Maslow shares the image of man as a self-sufficient 
entity, for whom culture and society in general are mere 
'means' or tools for this self-realization. It is only in 
this framework that his contention .that the basic needs, which 
are determined by the organism, are the ultimate goals of human 
behavior, makes any sense. We have already seen in previous 
chapters how it is that this inverted picture of reality 
obscures the fact that the individual is determined as such 
by his involvement in society. What this means in relation 
to the purpose of his behavior is that his most important acts 
are aimed not at the satisfaction of his own "goals," whatever 
they are, but rather at the materialization of the social 
functions that guarantee his survival as an individual. So, 
taking a 'holistic' approach can only mean starting from the 
perception of the individual as a juridical person. In this 
light, even the real role of the "psychological basic needs" 
of Maslow can be seen with greater clarity. For if they have 
any function, it must be that of furnishing fuel for the 
operation of the individual in a given society, once he has 
been constituted as such. So, for instance, self-esteem 
might be an additional inducement for a person to perform 
certain tasks connected with the materialization of a funda-
mental social function. 
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But let us go back now to our job of determining the 
main and most striking qualities of 'human nature' both 
physiological and non-physiological. Again, Malinowski can 
be of some help despite of Maslow's criticism. In the text 
that I have been quoting, 50 he proposes a list of basic 
(physiological) needs that is the result of grouping and 
condensing what he calls the "vital sequences" such as those 
that have their starting points in the drive to breathe or in 
hunger or in the sexual appetite, etc., into seven items, to 
wit, metabolism, reproduction, bodily comforts, safety, move-
ment, growth, health. The satisfaction of these needs demands, 
in each case, certain 'cultural responses' and thus, the 
development of definite kinds of institutions. Now, it seems 
quite obvious that this list of seven needs can be further 
condensed by simply noticing what they reveal about 'human 
nature.' Failure to satisfy all or any of these needs, except 
the need for reproduction, would result in harm to the body of 
an individual, thus, we can say, using Warnock's term, that 
the individual is 'vulnerable.' Actually, if we wanted to 
keep with tradition, we could also say that the fact that 
humans have a body and, hence, physiological needs to satisfy, 
renders them 'corruptible,' subjecting them to a cycle of 
generation and corruption. To make this brief, but important 
point, we do not require a comprehensive list of physiological 
needs, although we certainly have to say a couple of things 
concerning the vulnerability of humans. 
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In general, humans are vulnerable to the action of 
nature and animals, and to the actions of their fellow humans. 
Both of these forces can harm either by deprivation or vio-
lence. A drought a~d a siege are examples of the first 
instance, an avalanche and a beating are examples of the 
second. 
That the need of reproduction is basic, if not for the 
individual, undoubtedly for the species as such, cannot be 
disputed. Whether the reproduction is achieved through arti-
ficial or natural means, it is the only way in which the. 
human species can perpetuate itself. At this point, of course, 
we have left the individual behind and we are listing as a 
basic characteristic of human nature something that, strictu 
sensu, belongs to him as member of a species, rather than as 
an isolated entity. We cannot properly claim that an iso-
lated individual has the need to reproduce, although we might 
want to say that he has sexual needs. That there is a basic 
difference between the two is shown by the fact that, in the 
end, the sexual needs can be satisfied by the individual in 
isolation, while the need to reproduce, implies necessaTily 
a relation between individuals of the same species. It is only 
in the imagination of people that reproduction as such satis-
fies sexual needs. 
Connected with the need of reproduction is another 
important fact of human nature, to wit, the fact that newly 
born humans lack many of the capabilities and. a great deai of 
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the knowledge possessed by any normal adult member of the 
society into which they are born. This need for training and 
instruction has, in a sense, a twofold character, for we can 
attribute it both to the individual as such, and to him as a 
member of a society. If someone wanted to make the point 
that the individual has need of society, he would not have 
to postulate the existence of a 'social instinct.' The need 
for instruction is, probably, the strongest and most natural 
'socializing' force in the case of human beings. 
Now, while the role of other members of the species 
is basically passive in relation to the acquisition by a newly 
born individual of the physical capabilities he lacks when he 
is born (all they have to do is provide some food, shelter and 
general security); the role played by them in promoting the 
acquisition of knowlege is much more important. Even if we 
assume that people are endowed with something like innate 
ideas, categories and so on, we still would have to grant 
that not only the actualization of these ideas and categories, 
but also the acquisition of concrete knowledge concerning the 
natural and social environments, the use of tools, etc., 
depends on the efforts that the adult population of a society 
is willing to make in order to transmit the information it 
possesses to the newly born. One of the most important 
aspects of this process of training is the one connected to 
the development of what above I hive called 'understanding' 
and that could also be called 'social consciousness,' that is, 
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as we have seen, the ability to recognize the need to submit 
one's own behavior to regulations. 
This leads us to what I take to be the most notorious 
(al though perhaps th.e least noticed) fact of human nature. 
The fact that human beings, as by necessity all socializable 
entities, are relational creatures. Nothing can be more 
tautological than the statement that a set of relational 
beings is the important requirement for the existence of a 
society, which, by definition, is nothing more than the sum 
total of the relationships established among themselves by a 
given set of relational beings. 
When we think of 'relational beings,' we can think 
of two kinds of entities: 1) entities capable of relating to 
each other in one way and in one way only, and 2) entities 
capable of relating to each other in more than one way com-
patible with their subsistence as living individuals. The 
first kind of entities we will henceforth call 'unirelational 
entities'; the second kind we will baptize with two synonymous 
names 'multi-' or 'plurirelational entities.' Angels, both 
good and bad, ants, termites, bees, etc., are examples of 
unirelational entities; man is, so far, the only example we 
know of a 'multirelational' entity. In this quality lies the 
secret for the understanding of the concepts of reason &nd 
liberty, and thus, as I will try to show in what follows, the 
key to the comprehension of morality. 
But let us first dwell for a while on the concepts 
just introduced, and attempt to clarify them as much as 
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possible. In a very general sense all organic beings can 
be said to be relational.entities. Plants relate to each 
other for the sake of reproduction, and so do the most primi-
tive of animals. But the only kinds of relations that are 
of any importance for a theory of social praxis are those 
that depend for their establishment and perpetuation on what 
could be termed the purposive behavior of their elements. 
To say that an entity exhibits purposive behavior does not 
imply the attribution to it of certain mysterious or superior 
qualities of understanding. The notion of 'instinct,' insuf-
ficient as it is in many respects, would be more than enough, 
nevertheless, to account for the degree of understanding 
required to engage in purposive behavior, in the sense that we 
want to use the word here. But there is clearly some purpo-
siveness or finality reflected in the behavior of bees and 
termites living in complex colonies, as there is, undoubtedly, 
quite a bit of purposiveness behind most of the behavior of 
monkeys towards one another. Hence, it is not in terms of 
purposiveness alone that we can distinguish unirelational 
from multirelational beings. 
But what does it mean to say, then, that a being 
exhibits some degree of purposiveness or goal directed initia-
tives? A bee, for instance, not only is capable of setting 
out to look for sources of nourishment for its colony, but it 
is also capable cf going back to its colony in order to com-
municate its discoveries. The first detail to be noticed 
in this respect, nevertheless, is that bees are 'programmed' 
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to act in ways conducive to certain goals. This is why, going 
back to the distinction between organic and juridical associa-
tions made above, we can say that animal societies are organic 
and not juridical in character. The bee, or any other animal 
for that matter, does not 'deliberate' before acting, even 
though her actions might be purposive to a point. 
Things are not as simple as it might at first appear, 
though. As we know, the organizational structure of many 
animal societies is flexible enough to- accommodate a certain 
amount of change aimed at adapting to changes in the surround-
ing environment. Do we have to suppose, then, that some ani-
mals possess a limited power of reasoning which enables them 
to change consciously or willingly their societies? Do ani-
mals have a will of sorts? It seems to me that this is not 
what is to be deduced from the facts. All we have to do to 
account for the facts is postulate the existence of a complex 
program in the organism of some social animals. A program 
rich enough to handle more than one kind of environment. 
This becomes clear if we consider the kinds of changes that a 
modification of the environment calls forth in the organism 
of social animals. It is not the structure of the society 
that changes, but either the organic structure of some indi-
viduals (some worker ants turn into soldiers or start pro-
creating), or the population density of the society changes. 
The sets of relations that the members of animals societies 
have to each other remain always the same. No new functions 
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can appear in the· midst of animal societies. This does not 
mean, of course, that either some individuals or the society 
might not_ 'learn,' something new about the environment. We 
can even concede tha~ certatn monkeys are· capable of acquiring 
new technical knowledge, of learning new ways of doing things. 
What makes animals unirelational entities is not their lack 
of knowledge, but the fact that they are constituted in such 
a way that they can establish among themselves only certain 
kinds of relationships, and that these relationships are 
basically immutable. It is precisely because of that that 
animals, even when they are living in society, cannot be said 
to be juridical beings. Their behavior is not normed or regu-
lated; it does not follow a code, it simply unfolds a program. 
The potentiality of becoming juridical beings is a 
privilege of multirelational beings. While for the individual 
ant the colony to which it belongs is its natural place, for 
a man, qua biological being, society is not a natural place. 
Human society, we have seen, is the natural place of juridical 
persons, not of biological entities. But it is because they 
are constituted the way they are, i.e., it is because they 
are multirelational, that humans are capable of becoming 
juridical persons and that their relations are juridical in 
character. 
But, what is exactly the property of humans that makes 
them multirelationai beings? Is it the fact that they possess 
reason or understanding? Certainly not, for we have already 
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established that what we call reason is properly predictable 
of persons and not of biological beings as such. Is it then 
the fact that humans are, in a way, born incomplete and that 
only through the help of others can they survive long enough 
to attain biological maturity? Not either, because there are 
many species of unirelational beings which find themselves 
in the same circumstances as humans when they are born. 
Besides, what we are looking for is not a biological hypothe-
sis concerning the reasons why humans constitute societies. 
What we are after is a characteristic of humans that explains 
why their societies are juridical and not organic. 
It seems to me that if we were to persist in our 
attempts to discover a characteristic or a set of charac-
teristics which are to be identified with what we have called 
multirelational properties, we would. soon find ourselves 
committing the same mistake of traditional philosophical 
anthropology, namely, that of proposing abstract definitions 
of human nature. What we need to do here is risk a sort of 
Copernican turn. For it appears that what makes humans 
multirelational entities is not the possession of certain 
characteristics, but rather the lack of some, to wit, the lack 
of those characteristics that make animals, even social ani-
mals, programmed beings. In the tradition, two expressions 
have most often been used to refer to this quality of humans, 
'free will' and 'freedom.' In our time, the Existentialists 
have been the one group of philosophers who have emphasized 
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this trait of humans the most. Traditionally: though, specu-
lation concerning these qualities has been mystified. The 
Medievals, some of them at least, thought 'libero arbitrium' 
to be an attribute of the soul. The Moderns, especially since 
Kant, think of freedom as a quality of Reason. We need not 
concern ourselves at this stage with these matters. I have 
mentioned them in the context of our present discussion pri-
marily to dissipate any feeling of strangeness and obscurity 
by showing that the talk concerning the multirelational 
character of humans is not absolutely novel. I detect in 
Simone de Beauvoir's notion of 'ambiguity' an interesting 
. . , . h f 1 . 1 . 1· Sl I · · 1ns1gnt into t e nature o mu tire ationa ity. t 1s 1n 
fact a kind of ambiguity in its nature.which allows us to 
perceive man as both a natural or biological and as a juri-
dical being. No such distinction can be made in relation to 
any other being that we presently know of. But let us now 
examine more precisely how this multirelationality operates 
in reality by considering its limits and the possibilities 
it opens. 
A possible objector to the definition proposed above 
could argue that, in a sense, there are no such things as 
'unirelational' entities for any relational entity can, in 
principle, relate to any other entity of the same or a dif-
ferent sort in at least two ways, one of which can be destruc-
tive, that is, incompatible with the subsistence, as living 
individuals, of one or both members of the relationship. The 
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hunting of deer by a lion can, on this account, pass for a 
sort of destructive relationship. The way I see it, this 
argument r~sts on an equivocation in the .use of the term 
'relation.' A rela~ion insofar as it is social implies a 
minimum amount of cooperation and at the very least a modicum 
of reciprocal recognition of some of their respective needs 
by the elements of that relationship. Even in the case of a 
master/slave relationship, which is probably the type of 
relationship closest to what a destructive relationship would 
be, the master recognizes, as we have seen, some of the needs 
of his slave. A 'destructive relation' in the strictest 
sense of the word is a contradiction in terms from this point 
of view. When a bee of a colony kills the intruder from a 
different colony, what it is doing is not establishing a 
'negative relationship,' but rather negating the possibility 
of any kind of relationship with the intruder. But, here 
again, we can notice a great contrast between unirelational 
animals and man, for the latter is the only relational creature 
we know of that can, in principle, flatly refuse to establish 
relations of any sort with his fellow men. Only a man can 
turn against his whole species; social animals can, at most, 
turn against 99% of their fellow specie members. 
So, man is a multirelational creature, but, what does 
this really mean? I guess the most immediate and significant 
consequence of this fact is negative in character. Given a 
set of multirelational beings, they can, by definition, 
98 
establish among themselves n different kinds of relationships 
some of which are mutually exclusive. That is, only a limited 
number of the total number of relations that they can estab-
lish among themselves can actually be materialized at a given 
point in time. Let us suppose that A1 , A2, A3, A4 are all the 
subsets of the set A of possible relationships between the 
members of a given class of individuals. Let us further 
suppose that there are some external determinants such as 
climate, availability of natural resources, etc., that exclude, 
ipso facto, one of the alternatives--A- for instance. Let 
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us also suppose that the knowledge the individuals possess 
allows them to. discard alternative A4 . Note in this respect 
that there would be an immense difference between the first 
case and the second. A3 was never a tangible alternative, 
while, according to our example, A4 had to be discarded on 
some specific grounds. 
Consider the following example as an illustration of 
the point I am trying to make. A3 calls for the materializa-
tion of a set of relations implying the existence of a great 
ocean nearby, but our individuals find themselves in the 
middle of Kansas. Obviously, the possibility of materializing 
A3 will not even be considered. A4 , on the other hand, calls 
for building huts out of a type of stone to be found on top 
of a high mountain, rather than out of wood, which is readily 
available. 
There are left alternatives A1 and A2, both of which 
do not require anything else than those things and conditions 
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at hand. For the sake of argument, I will avoid taking sides 
right now in the controversy between determinists and volun-
tarists, with which I will deal in the last _chapter, and I 
will simply assume that our multirelational friends can choose. 
which set of mutually exclusive relations they want to mater-
ialize. By mutually exclusive sets of relations I mean some-
thing like the set of socio-economic arrangements that would 
result in a capitalistic order versus a set 0£ relationships 
that would result in a socialist order. Now, choosing A1 rather 
than A2 means, basically, opting for a pattern of behavior 
that is more or less self-enclosed and that consistently 
avoids the behavioral patterns on which a 'life style,' based 
on the opposite assumptions, would be grounded. The materiali-
zation of a set of relations among multirelational beings 
requires, then, an apparatus capable of sifting those relations 
that are, so to say, allowed from those that are, as a matter 
of principle, not allowed. Because of their multirelational 
character, the establishment of a- society of men asks for a 
strong mechanism of exclusion; in fact many more things have 
to be excluded than included. 
But not only other possible behavioral patterns have 
to be excluded from a given society of men; also those that 
would make any socialized behavior impossible have to be 
dealt with, for, even though the likelihood of this happening 
might be very small, any human being, as we have seen, could 
in principle opt for them. 
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So, very broadly, I have pointed out some of the main 
characteristics of 'human nature.' More than one argument 
could be brought out against the list. Already I have 
attempted to deal with the most powerful ones, i.e., the 
accusation that 'human nature,' as presented here, is defined 
as the collection of some of the most obvious and notorious 
features of humans, as opposed to a view resulting from a 
scientific study of these same qualities and of others that, 
upon observation, could turn out to be more basic. As pointed 
out above, the GTHSP cannot be based on an understanding of 
human nature that is in any way esoteric and that lies beyond 
the reach of the majority of individuals that do actually 
participate in social life. After all, the purpose of the 
GTHSP is to account for the processes that determine the 
functioning and the constitution of real societies. The claim 
that the understanding required to participate in social 
life is 'superficial' is the result of a deep misunderstanding 
of both the nature of social life- as such, and the goals of the 
science that aims at unveiling its secrets. 
An equally serious charge could be that the list of 
basic qualities has not been put together by following some 
precise, systematic procedure, but rather rhapsodically, so 
that there is no certainty that it is either exhaustive or 
non-arbitrary, for, after all, it might be pregnant with 
ideological or, simply, ideosyncratic distortions. This 
argument needs to be answered in three steps. It is perfectly 
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true that I have not followed a systematic method to estab-
lish the basic qualities of human nature. I have not even 
tried to do so. The qualities have been 'picked up,' not 
'deduced.' But this could not be otherwise, the reason 
being the contingent character of 'human nature.' The pre-
tension that the qualities of human nature can somehow be 
deduced is based on the assumption that human nature is a 
necessary entity, where the term necessity is used in a strong 
metaphysical, rather than in a functional sense. The dif-
ference between strong or metaphysical necessity and weak or 
functional necessity is that, while the first is irreconcilable 
with the notion of change, the second one is perfectly com-
patible with it. This is the case because metaphysically 
necessary entities are so in themselves, while functionally 
necessary entities are so in relation to something else. 
God is a good example of the first kind of entity, human 
nature is a perfect example of the second sort. As a matter 
of fact, the notion of functional necessity is fairly common 
in the natural sciences, including biology. Darwinian evolu-
tionary theory, for instance, relies heavily on i~. Although 
basically the products of an accident, the animal species 
that manage to survive do so because they posses~ certain 
qualities that meet the requirements proposed by the environ-
ment. These qualities are functionally necessary in relation 
to the environment. Strictly speaking, then, the 'composition' 
of human nature cannot be said to be any less contingent 
than the composition of water. So, pretending that the 
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composition of human nature can be 'deduced' is, at least, 
equally misleading as pretending to 'deduce' the composition 
of water. There is, of course, nothing self-contradictory in 
such a demand, but establishing it as a prerequisite for the 
development of social science would put serious and, perhaps, 
unsurmountable obstacles in its way. 
It is obvious, moreover, that if what has been said 
before were true, the rhapsodic method used here for the 
discovery of the qualities of human nature, could not be the 
same employed in reality, since, by assumption, the latter 
does not allow mistakes in the identification of such quali-
ties. And, indeed, the method is not the same. Like any 
other theory, the GTHSP has to rely to a great extent on 
fictions, abstractions and simplifications. After all, that 
is the way of contemplation. In fact, 'human nature' is not 
discovered as a result of an act of contemplation, but, 
rather, in the process of interaction of human beings with 
each other, a process that involves clashes as well as coop-
eration, conflict as well as observation. Besides, in real 
societies, the basic qualities of human nature never appear in 
'pure' form, for they are essentially intermingled with 
those qualities, material or acquired, which underlie the 
personhood of an individual as defined by a given society. 
Of course, one could attempt to give a more or less accurate 
and detailed account of all the factors that intervene in 
the molding and discovery of 'human nature• in real societies, 
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a task that would most likely belong to the realm of socio-
psychology. But, again, what is important from the point of 
view of the GTHSP is, merely, establishing a list of qualities 
that are, in fact, ~he ones that define human nature.· Now 
however, these qualities are assembled in practice, the final 
proof that they do indeed constitute the elements of 'human 
nature' requires a further move, to wit, the proof that they 
are the substratum for one or more fundamental social func-
tions. And this takes us to the third step in the response 
to the second objection. 
Actually, the ultimate reason why someone might have 
qualms regarding the contingent character of the qualities 
that constitute human nature and the ·rhapsodic method we 
have utilized to determine them, is a confusion as to the 
function and status of these qualities. They could wrongly 
be thought of as being identical with the conditions of pos-
sibility of social life. But we have already seen that the 
fundamental social .functions themselves, and not the raw 
qualities as such, are the only entities deserving that name. 
The raw qualities or properties of 'human nature,' both those 
that we predicated of the different individuals in isolation 
and of the species as a whole, posit some requirements, demands, 
or needs, thereby determining what could be called 'the 
prerequisites for human social life,' that is, the set of 
conditions that have to be satisfied in order to render human 
social life a feasible enterprise~ So, at the end, the final 
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test as to whether a given perceived quality of human beings 
is or is not a basic property of human nature, depends upon 
its being or failing to be a determinant of a prerequisite 
for human social li£e. 
b. The Nature of the Deduction of the Conditions of Possi-
bility of Social Life. 
After traveling in a spiral, we are back to the point 
where our brief account of the antecedents of the GTSHP ended. 
The concept proposed here of 'prerequisites for human social 
life' is similar to the one proposed by F. Aberle et al. in 
their already quoted article. 52 There is, nevertheless, a 
fundamental difference not only in relation to the specific 
items they want to count as 'functional prerequisites,' but 
also and most importantly, in regard to the method by which 
they are determined. Their whole thesis rests on their 
definition of society as: 
... a group of human beings sharing a self-sufficient 
system of action which is capable of existing longer than 
the life-span of an individual, the group being recruited 
at least in part by sexual reproduction of the members.53 
Given the definition of society, the conditions are enumerated 
th t . f 1. d ld · · . · 54 a, 1 rea 1ze, cou terminate its existence: a) the 
biological extinction or dispersion of the members, b) 
apathy of the members or cessation of motivation, c) the 
war of all against all, mostly caused by the prevalence of 
instrurnentai or practical considerations over value judge-
ments and, d) the absorption of the society into another 
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society. This last item is related to the part of the defini-
tion that specifies that a society is a "self-sufficient 
system." It should be perfectly obvious that such a qualifi-
cation is too restri~tive from the perspective of the GTHSP, 
for which the existence of more than one human society is a 
merely contingent fact. But let us analyze the other three 
terminal conditions. In a way, we have already said enough 
concerning b), and c) when we were attempting to define the 
notion of relational beings. At that point we saw that 
multirelational beings of the nature of man can conceivably 
opt for the negation of the possibility of any relationship. 
Now, this negation can either be 'active' in which case some-
thing like the "war of all against all" would result, or 
'passive,' in which case 'apathy' or lack of interest would 
prevent the development of any kind of social link between 
two or more humans. So, b) and c) are, in reality, not basic 
characteristics of human nature, but rather possibilities 
left open by one of those basic characteristics. Strictly 
speaking, then, only a) describes a basic characteristic of 
human nature. Part of the problem with Aberle's thesis is 
that he and his co-authors fail to draw a clear distinction 
between the qualities predicable of human nature sirnpliciter 
and those predicable of juridical persons. Apathy, for 
instance, is predicable only of juridical persons, that is, 
of socialized individuals, insofar as it is not a given 
quality but one that comes to be as a result of an action, 
the action of negation. The refusal to establish relations 
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with other human beings, implies, at the very least, the 
recognition that this possibility exists ~nd, hence, as we 
saw before, the exercise of reason in its most elementary 
but basic sense. To claim that a human being can feel 'apa-
thetic' toward the establishment of social relationships with 
other human beings, even before he has become aware of the 
possibility of such relationships is a paradox that rests 
on the confusion of sheer ignorance with the effective exer-
cise of the faculty of reasoning. 
But the method followed by Aberle rests on a further, 
very subtle mistake: it assumes that the deduction of the 
conditions of possibility of social life has been completed, 
even before the basis for that deduction has been set. In 
a way, Aberle can be said to have proceeded analytically 
in his efforts to determine the functional preconditions 
of social life, i.e., by starting with a definition of society, 
he assumes that the problem is, so to say, solved. But the 
purpose of the analytical method,- when properly employed, 
is simply to orient the view, to facilitate the task of 
guessing; by itself, it does not deliver an automatic proof 
for the correctness of our guesses. In fact, we have no 
scientific knowledge of the nature of society, until we have 
deduced its conditions of possibility. The basic character-
istics of human nature and the preconditions that they deter-
mine do not suffice to define society. All they show, once 
established, are vague pictures of the kinds of mechanisms 
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that we can safely expect to find when a society is actually 
constituted. But, any definition that does not take into 
account these elements is bound to be arbitrary so that, at 
the end, things might appear to be necessary or fundamental 
(v.g. certain 'psychological' qualities) that either are not 
so at all or are so only circumstantially. The proper way 
of proceeding is, then, from the qualities of human nature 
upward towards an enumeration of the conditions of possibility 
of social life. This path is what we can call the deduction 
of the fundamental social functions. 
"Deduction" is meant here, substantially, in a Kan-
tian sense. As is well-known, according to Kant, there are 
two kinds of deductions that ought to be distinguished: the 
metaphysical and the transcendental deductions. The first 
one aims at the construction of the list of all the categories 
of the understanding; the second one has the task of showing 
how, in spite of their a priori character, these categories 
relate necessarily to the objects- of experience. The trans-
cendental deduction is completed by showing or exposing the 
fact that the categories are conditions of possibility of 
experience; and thus, by proving that the relationship between 
the categories and experience is not circumstantial or acci-
dental, but necessary. Kant explicitly rejects as untenable 
a hypothesis that would suggest a merely subjective relation-
ship between experience and the categories of the understand-
ing; he calls it trMittelweg'' (middle course). 55 Such a 
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hypothesis can go in two different directions, either it can 
assume the form of a sort of Leibnitzian doctrine of pre-
established harmony between understanding and experience, in 
which case the whole purpose of the inquiry undertaken in the 
Critique is useless, for there would be ex hypothesis, no way 
for the human intellect to distinguish the objects of "possi-
ble experience" from those not belonging to this class; or it 
can pretend that the link between categories and experience 
is only subjectively necessary, that is, dependent not on the 
real constitution of the objects of experience, but solely 
on the constitution of the human spirit. The kind of neces-
sity that Kant has in mind here is the one that A. Pap 56 
wants to call "self-evidence" or necessity ·of "the incon-
ceivability of the opposite." 
Although this is clearly not the proper place to 
mingle with the complex problem of elucidating Kant's notion 
of 'a priori,' a couple of very general remarks would cer-
tainly help clarify my intentions in what follows. 
There is a very obvious way in which, I suspect, 
Kant's dismissal of subjective necessity is liable to be mis-
understood, for the remarks in B 168 are, if taken in isola-
tion, vague enough to induce the unattentive reader to think 
that Kant is committed to the thesis that the human under-
standing is, as such, necessary. Actually, neither the 
metaphysical nor the transcendental deductions depend in any 
way upon the assureption that the human understanding could 
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not have been different. In fact, it is exactly this line of 
thought that Kant is aiming at in his criticism of the "middle 
course." Following it means failing to realize that the 
connection between categories and experience is not, so to 
say, 'external,' but 'internal,' i.e., that the categories 
are constituent parts of experience. At the end, the purpose 
of the transcendental deduction is exhibiting the spontaneity 
d d . 57 of the un ers tan 1ng. 
In a way, though, this deduction is completed only 
in the Second Critique, when the concept of freedom is finally 
'deduced' on the basis of the moral law. Pure reason, insofar 
as it is spontaneous, must assume itself to be free, i.e., 
to be outside the chain of causality and thus indeterminate. 
But this 'autonomy' of reason is what is expressed by the 
moral law, which exhibits the practical faculty of pure rea-
son, that is, its ability to determine the "will as will," 
its ability to determine the will according to necessary and 
universal principles, i.e., laws. 
But what interests us the most concerning the utiliza-
tion of the concept of deduction in the se·cond Critique is 
Kant's proof that the moral law as such cannot be 'deduced.' 
For, insofar as it expresses the 'autonomy' of pure practical 
reason it is not related to any object of possible experience, 
i .. e., it is, by definition, not a constituent of experience 
and, hence, cannot be deduced, shown to be necessarily appli-
cable in the material world. 58 The order of nature that our 
Will seeks to establish when it is determined by the moral 
law belongs to a supersensuous order. It is only the 
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eudemonistically determined will, the will acting according 
to maxims dictated by desire, which remains confined to the 
natural world. This is the origin of the greatest paradox 
of Kant's philosophy and the kernel of what has many times 
been called his. "ethical formalism .. " No matter how ineffi-
cient it turns out to be, when judged from the perspective of 
the natural world, the moral law remains immutably valid. 
Its efficiency can be measured only in regard to its ability 
to regulate the will insofar as it is pure and not subject 
to determination by desire. I will try to deal extensively 
with the questions involved in the discussion of 'ethical 
formalism' (to use Schelar' s term) in the next chapter. Here 
all that really matters is noticing the consequences this kind 
of position has in regard to the possibility of deducing the 
coalitions of possibility of social life. 
What above I have called 'functional necessity' would 
certainly not be recognized by Kant as the necessity properly 
predicable of categories of any sort that really deserve this 
name. Those imperatives that are merely 'hypothetical' and 
not categorical, owe their deficiency to the fact that they 
are based on a conditioned sort of necessity, a necessity 
which is not universal, but goal directed: functional. That 
the categorical· imperative does not point at the materializa-
tion of any goal in the nat~ral world is clear to Kant from 
the fact· that it has lawful character. Laws do not admit 
exceptions, thus if the moral law is functional ~ith respect 
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to some goal or aim this goal or aim must lie in a supersen-
suous world, in the intelligible, and not in the natural 
world. The moral law is not what makes human social behavior 
possible, it is simply what can render it moral. So, once 
he has made the connection between morality and reason, Kant 
finds himself incapable of going one step further and uncov-
ering any form of necessary connection between reason, in its 
moral or practical use, and reality. In fact, what is operat-
ing here is the o~d Christian-rationalistic prejudice. This 
is the point where Kant betrays his Cartesian roots. Having 
hypothesized 'reason, 1 he is bound to regard it as absolutely 
independent and, particularly, independent from human social 
behavior. Reasonableness is not a requirement for human 
behavior, only a moral ideal. Therein lies the paradox of 
all Rationalism, a paradox that is most visible in its Kantian 
form. The way I intend to jump this paradox is not by fall-
ing into absolute idealism, which is Fichte 1 s option, for 
instance, but by sticking to a strictly naturalistic outlook. 
It corresponds to the third chapter, which deals with the 
principles of generation of actual moral codes, to give the 
definite proof strictly naturalistic outlook. It corresponds 
to the third chapter, which deals with the principles of 
generation of actual moral codes, to give the definite proof 
of its viability, here again, only its possibility needs to 
be exhibited. 
The deduction of the categories of human social life 
aims at demonstrating that they are in fact conditions of 
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possibility of social life, i.e., necessary components of any 
possible instance of human social behavior. It is obvious 
that t~is deduction is possible only insofar as the categories 
involved are postulated to be material and not merely formal 
principles, for what we want to know is not how is it that 
social life in general is possible, but how is it that human 
social life is possible. That is, our first question is, how 
is it possible that, given certain physical entities with 
~ properties, they can interrelate and come to form a society. 
The set n of properties is given. Furthermore, because we 
deal with material and not with formal principles, the deduc-
tion must be 1 ex hypothesis, at the same time metaphysical and 
transcendental. Ergo, the establishment of a list of social 
categories amounts to an exhibition of their character of 
conditions of possibility of social life. 
b. The Deduction of the Conditions of Possibility of Human 
Social· Life 
The qualities of humans that we have already selected 
to serve as the basis for the deduction of the fundamental 
social functions are the following: 
- humans are vulnerable both to their fellow men and to 
the forces of nature; 
- humans lack knowledge when they are born; 
humans are finite and thus can survive as a species 
only through reproduction; 
- h~mans ar~ multirelational beings. 
To take a further step towards the deduction of the funda-
mental social functions it is indispensable to make an 
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assumption that can bring these isolated facts together, 
i.e., the assumption that there is indeed a group of entities 
* interested or willing or ready to form a society. For only 
in regard to the formation of a human society is the analysis 
of these facts revealing and useful, given that, as has been 
established, they are independent from each other and con-
tingent and, thus, at most operationally 'relateable' to each 
other, that is to say, 'relateable 1·only in respect to something 
exterior to them.' As a result of the confrontation of the 
hypothesis to the facts we can develop a list of 'prerequi-
sites' or 'preconditions' of human social life. That is, of 
conditions that have to be met by any given group of humans 
attempting to establish a society. 
Given that humans are vulnerable to the action of the 
forces of nature, it is obviously a precondition for their 
survival that they develop mechanisms to control, escape, 
transform or cope with those forces. For, among other things, 
* I realize that the words ·interes·ted, willing, ready 
are rich in connotations, too rich, as a matter of fact, for 
our purposes. For they insinuate the existence of certain 
"pre-meditations" on the_part of the prospective members of a 
human society. Having excluded the hypothesis that this 
"pre-medi ta·tion" could be any kind of rational discourse, 
!he doors are left open for the postulation of some sort of 
innate pre-discoursive social instinct in human beings. 
Although I very much doubt that such a postulate makes much 
se~se, I would prefer not to take sides on this issue at this 
point, mostly because I do not think any of this is really 
necessary .. The hypothesis being introduced here should be 
thought of as a philosophical fiction similar to the fiction 
of the state of nature. Such fictions have in social theory 
the same use that fictions like the perfect vacuum or Bohr's 
model have in physical science. 
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they need to provide themselves with sufficient nourishment, 
with shelter so as not to be exposed to drastic changes in 
temperature or to the 'action of the elements' (lightening, 
earthquakes, tornados, floods, droughts, etc.). But humans 
are also vulnerable to the action of animals and their fellow 
men, thus their survival requires mechanisms that provide for 
their defense. The vulnerability of humans also requires 
the adoption of certain elements of hygiene or health care. 
Insofar·as they lack knowledge and certain abilities 
at the moment when they are born, mechanisms are necessary, 
if they are to survive and be able to relate to each other, 
* that allow humans to acquire this knowledge and abilities. 
Basically, they need knowledge about their natural environ-
ment, human nature, elementary arithmetic and abilities such 
as the use of language and those that would enable them to 
make tools and artifacts in general. It is pretty obvious 
that some of the prerequisites determined by the first quality, 
vulnerability, are complementary to those determined by this 
second quality. For instance, the construction of an appro-
priate shelter demands not only a certain degree of acquain-
tance with the natural environment, but also the possession 
* The question whether humans possess certain innate 
abilities and/or knowledge can be left open at this stage of 
the discussion. But I am convinced that any full treatment of 
the theory of human social praxis would need to examine and 
develop the concepts of 'cognitive' and 'linguistic' univer- · • 
sals. The former being the conditions of possibility of human 
knowledge and the latter being the conditions of possibility 
of human language. The study of these universals corresponds 
respectively to the theory of knowledge and to logic~ 
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of a great deal of technical knowledge. The connection 
between knowledge and vulnerability is also transparent, 
satisfaction of the needs for hygiene and health care depend 
on the knowledge concerning the human body and its function-
ing. 
The finitude of humans requires that reproduction be 
encouraged and institutionalized as the proper means to 
perpetuate the possibility of human relations. Actually, 
reproduction ii, in this sense, closely related to the need 
for health care and hygiene and under certain circumstances 
both could be seen as different levels of the same function. 
Finally, the multirelational character of humans 
requires the·establishment of mechanisms that eliminate or 
discourage a) the possibility of the materialization of any 
behavior capable of negating any form of human relationship, 
and b) the attempt to materialize simultaneously sets of 
possible behaviors that are mutually exclusive. Among the 
kinds of behavior included in a) are those that would impede 
the materialization of all or any one of the preconditions of 
human social life listed above. In this sense, being the 
most comprehensive, the prerequisite d~riving from the multi-
relational character of humans is the most basic. But, since 
the specificity of human nature is determined mostly by the 
first three qualities, it would be a grave mistake to pretend 
that all prerequisites can be reduced to this last one. 
Their organic or operational interdependence in no way 
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annihilates their independence, for they all act as effective 
determinants of human social life. 
Having deduced the prerequisites of human social life, 
we are now in a ~o~ition to take the third and definitive step, 
that is, to deduce the fundamental social functions which 
constitute the conditions of possibility of social life. A 
question could naturally arise at this point concerning the 
justification of the second step. For it would seem that it 
is quite possible to jump from the first directly to the one 
we are about to take. In fact, by having felt compelled to 
introduce an additional assumption regarding the readiness of 
a given group of people to establish a society, we have already 
shown such a· jump to be impossible. Neither the qualities of 
human nature that we have enumerated above, nor any other set 
of qualities, constitute in themselves, prerequisites of any 
sort. The shroud, so to speak, has to be woven before we 
can cover the dead. 
In this, like in many other cases, what seems most 
transparent and immediate is misleading. One could easily 
assume that having established a set of four prerequisites 
of human social behavior, all that needs to be done is to 
find appropriate names for the four fundamental social func-
tions that should correspond to them. The only problem is 
that there is no reason whatsoever to presume a priori that 
there is a one to one correspondence between the table of 
prerequisites and the table of fundamental social functions. 
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This is something to be settled a postoriori, that is, by 
carrying out the deduction. 
In order to take care of the demands imposed upon 
them by· the prerequisites of social life, a given group of 
individuals would have to establish among themselves certain 
kinds of relationships, and discard certain others. As we 
have already seen, human relationships express themselves 
as juridical rules, so that the fundamental social functions 
that we are seeking to define are, in fact, sets of rules 
or laws. It is quite important to bear this in mind mostly 
to avoid confusion regarding the notion of 'institution.' 
Were we to say, for example, that the main role of the insti-
tution of the family is to contribute to the materialization 
of a certain fundamental social function, this in no way would 
exclude the possibility that, at the same time, the family 
contributes to the materialization of a different fundamental 
social function. In this light, the widespread anthropo-
logical thesis that in 'primitive' societies most if not all 
of the social functions of the society are condensed by family 
relationships, seems fiarly plausible~ The appearance of 
highly specialized institutions seems to be a result of 
technological sophistication, increased division of labor 
and the bureaucratization that results from that. Although 
even in these cases, institutions are, as a rule, more complex 
than they. seem at first glance. This explains also why there 
is nothing surprising if in some very simply societies we 
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cannot devise anything even vaguely resembling 'institutions' 
in the current sense of the word. So, again, it is through 
or by the-establishment of human relationships that fundamen-
tal and, in general, social functions are materialized. 
What we want to deduce are, thus, norms. 
Now, by simple analysis, we can determine that the 
first prerequisite of social life demands the creation of at 
least three basic sorts of norms, to wit, norms establishing 
productive defense and hygienic relationships among the mem-
bers of a community. The productive relationships, aimed 
primarily at the satisfaction of the physiological needs that 
render humans passively vulnerable, define the fundamental 
social function of production and are materialized through 
norms relating to the division of labor, the property rela-
tionships, and the administration, exchange and distribution 
of goods. The fundamental social function of production 
aims also at the satisfaction of safety needs, much as the 
construction of shelters, the storage of foodstuffs, etc. 
The defense relationships define the fundamental social 
function of defense, which is materialized by rules pertain-
ing to military and hunting activities. Hence, they aim at 
the satisfaction of those physiological needs that render 
man actively vulne:rable. Finally, the heal th or hygienic 
relationships, which define the fundamental social function 
of health-preservation, are materialized by those norms that 
have to do with the distribution of space and time in regard 
to the satisfaction of bodily needs (designation of a 
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schedule for meals, recreation, and rest; designation of pro-
per areas for micturition, defecation, etc.) with the art 
of healing, the treatment of the sick, and death, etc. 
The second prerequisite of human social life demands 
the establishment of the fundamental social function of 
instruction and .training. The norms that materialize it 
create the relationship master-pupil between the adult popu-
lation of a society and the children or immature portion of 
the population., To this function correspond the norms under-
lying the transmition from generation to generation of the 
accumulated knowledge of the society~ the technical and 
linguistic traini~g of children, the ceremonies of maturation 
(i.e., those that mark the borders between childhood and 
maturity) . A very important aspect of this social function 
is the relations that make possible thi permanent flow of 
information between the different individuals and groups of 
a society. 
The third prerequisite of social life, determined 
by the finitude or mortality of humans, is the ground for-the 
development of norms regulating the mating of individuals, 
the distribution of responsibilities in regard to the off-
springs and the rights and duties deriving thereof. As is 
obvious, these norms are liable to overlap, to a certain 
extent, with those defining some of the tasks related to the 
fundamental social functions of health-preservation and 
instruction. An adequate name for this function is the 
fundamental social function of reproduction. 
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The prerequisite determined by the multirelational 
character of humans calls for the establishment of the funda-
mental social function of morality or conductivization. The 
use of the word 'morality' to designate.this social .function 
can, I realize, be a bit misleading, since I want to use the 
same word to refer to all norms regulating the materializa-
tion of fundamental social functions. The reason why I want 
to use the word in spite of that is, simply, to indicate that 
this social function is the most general and primary of the 
four. How exactly these four social functions relate to 
each other we will see in the next Chapter. Here it is 
enough to suggest that we try to think of conductivization as 
a sort of synthesizer.. The norms that materialize this func-
tion define the most general and basic principles of social 
life. First and foremost they set socialization as an ideal 
by proclaiming the need to r~gulate behavior and thus by 
laying the foundations for the development of juridical 
persons. Two kinds of norms are necessary for this purpose: 
those that demand the exclusion of behavior and that could 
make impossible the development of any kind of social rela-
tionship and those that demand regard for persons. Although 
the difference may seem arbitrary, it is extremely important 
to stress it, for demanding regard for persons implies not 
only prohibiting harm, but urging cooperation. A third kind 
of norms is required for the full materialization of these 
social functions, namely, those wh6se task it is to enforce 
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a minimum degree of coherence in the socialized behavior of 
the individuals of a society. As mentioned before, many of 
the norms that materialize the social function of conducti-
.vization receive their matter or contents from the nther 
prerequisites of social li£e. This fact is the strongest 
guarantee against any charge of formalism, for it shows with 
all clarity that the legislative force of the norms that 
materialize fundamental social functions does not rest on their 
form, but~ mainly, on their contents. It is what they demand, 
not how they do it, that makes them into conditions of possi-
bility of social life. 
So, with the establishment of the list of fundamental 
social functions, the deduction of the conditions of possi-
bility of human social life has been completed. The eluci-
dation of each of these functions could constitute a 
dissertation in itself. Here we are going to concentrate our 
attention on their most general features, on those that 
define their function in respect to social life. Now, as is 
plain from what has been said so far, morality could properly 
be defined as the study of fundamental social norms- But it 
is obvious that any serious attempt to study morality must 
concern itself also with th~ study of non-fundamental norms. 
Therefore, it is perhaps more fruitful to define morality 
as the study of social norms in general_ And this is precisely 
the task for the next two chapters4 
But viewing moral theory as an appendix of the GTHSP 
has more implications than one would at first suspect. 
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Whoever chooses this trial is not only committed to an abso-
lutely naturalistic conception of morality, but; more impor-
tantly, expects to be able to account for all axiological 
problems relating to ethics in the same manner. Last but not 
least, a theory of social norms, besides exhibiting their 
peculiar structure, must further clarify the relation that 
they hold to each other. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE BASIC SOCIAL FUNCTION OF MORALITY 
1. Preliminary Remarks 
a. Morality and Law 
Before attempting to analyze more closely the nature 
of morality and deduce the fundamental moral norms, it is 
perhaps necessary to examine an issue of great relevance for 
traditional philosophers: the relation between law and morals. 
So far I have been working on the assumption that, at least 
at the level of the GTHSP, there is no distinction to be made 
between moral and legal norms. Here I will try to explain 
why I think this to be the case. 
Most, if not all writers, agree that the distinction 
between law, morals and custom is not a 'natural' one, in the 
sense that it is not something that comes with society, but 
rather develops as the result of various social and economic 
changes. Certainly, there is no lack of anthropological and 
historical evidence to this effect. Not even the procedures 
that we usually identify with the administration of law are 
natural. In an important sense they too have to be 'discovered. ' 
L. Fuller1 refers to a paper by M. Mead to illustrate this 
point. There she explains how the Manus 'learned' from the 
Austra:ians that litigations can be solved by adjudication. 
The gruesome descriptions in the Niebelungen Lied of the 
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fights between Huns and Germans are, according to some critics, 
not only a secret plea for Christian caritas, but also an 
illustration of the senselessness and obvious disadvantages 
of institutionalized revenge. 
Confronted with the question we are dealing with, some 
authors will claim that law and morals are in opposition to 
each other, some that they complement each other and some that 
they are or, at least, ought to be independent from each other. 
In a way, Hegel is a proponent of the first thesis. 
Reflecting the narrow circle of interests of the familiar 
group and in spite of its divine origin, the moral law inevi-
tably clashes with the law of the state, earthly in origin 
and universal in scope. Behind the opposition of law and 
morals is the opposition of the concrete individual, as per-
ceived through the network of family relationships, and the 
abstract juridical person which is the subject of Roman Law, 
that is to say, the opposition between 'innate' and 'conferred' 
rights. 
The most lucid defenders of the third thesis are, I 
suppose, :the members of the Analytical School or, as they are 
also called, the Legal Positivists. Laws being rules or norms 
to which a penalty is attached, derive their validity from the 
power of the legislator who established them to ensure their 
. 
enforcement. Although it would be misleading to call him a 
Legal Positivist, Durkheim proposes a similar definition cf 
law distinguishing it from m~rality by the fact that the 
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infringement of moral commands carries only a non-institution-
alized condemnation by the members of the community. 2 But 
the.re is a 'fundamental difference between Durkheim and Austin 
or Kelsen, for while for the Frenchman even the most sophis-
ticated varieties of civil law are expressions of the same 
needs that determine primitive morality, both corresponding to 
different stages in the development of the division of labor, 
for the latter law is a self-contained, self-sufficient reality 
which, in its most advanced manifestations, is wholly inde-
pendent from morality. Seen from the narrow perspective of the 
positivists, neither the fact that legal and moral rules tend 
to overlap, nor the fact that morality is often the source 
of law are particularly revealing, at most, the interference 
of morality 1n the province of law appears to them as a mark 
of imperfection. 
Historically, the second thesis has been more fecund. 
In different ways it has been maintained by the adherents of 
the school of Natural Law, by some of the jurists of what 
Pound calls the Historical School and by many a contemporary 
theoret~cian who, contrary to the Positivists and more sensi-
tive to the demands of science, has chosen to explain rather 
than to dismiss as unimportant some of the most remarkable 
phenomena of human social life. To this group belong L. 
Fuller and H:1.A. Hart. Although not all those that have been 
mentioned would suqscribe to the extreme motto that an immoral 
law is no law, they all share the belief that the most 
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fundamental forms of law must conform to the fundamental 
demands of morality; what these are is, again, a matter of 
dispute. 
There is a line of argument that surprisingly few 
philosophers have chosen to pursue that, nevertheless, I take 
to be the proper one to clarify the relationship that concerns 
us now. For although most agree that the separation between 
morality and law took place at a certain stage in the history 
of the West, they do not attempt t6 find an explanation for 
this bifurcation in history. I think that treating this issue 
as a matter for mere logical clarification is entering a blind 
alley. That kind of analysis is useful only as a second 
instance, after the socio-economic and ideological background 
of the issue has been thoroughly revealed. Here too the 
puerility of those who in the name of science choose to shrink 
their sight and their understanding has proven fatal. So, 
before embarking on a discussion of the merits and demerits 
of the different theories mentioned above, let us observe some 
historical facts. 
R. Pound3 has perceptively noticed that the separation 
between law and morals becomes particularly indispensable when 
dealing with ''rules of property, rules as to commercial trans-
actions, the rules that maintain the security of acquisitions. 
" I O 0 Partly unaware of the full implications of his state-
ment, Pound chose to believe that in relation to this particu-
lar area of law perhaps the Positivists have a good point to 
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make. But surely his conclusion would have been different, had 
he paid more attention to another relevant historical fact, 
to wit, the fact that the demand for a strict separation 
between law and morals was especially strong during the period 
of conso Iida tion of capitalism. 
There are really few aspects of the history of capi-
talism more revealing than the evolution of bourgeois juris-
prudence. In its heroic, revolutionary stage, the bourgeoisie 
adhered strictly to a theory of natural law. Locke, Paine 
and Rousseau are magnificent exponents of that period. I would 
think that two separate factors explain this phenomenon. The 
. 4 
first is, like Pound has also noticed, rather universal. 
In what he calls "periods of growth" morality is often seen 
as a source of law. Aspirations, hopes, ideals are translated 
into 'moral language' as an attempt to stress their legitimacy. 
In a way, the language of revolution is necessarily 'moral,' 
insofar as the goal of a revolution is the bringing about of 
a state of affairs viewed as just and equitable. The purely 
'objective,' that is, to use the more or less ridiculous term 
popular ~mong social scientists, the 'value free' exhibition 
of the evils of a society is of no consequence for revolution-
aries. Revolutionary denunciation, to be effective, must be 
not only objective, but also righteous, morally loaded. Only 
soulless bureaucrats can be interested in 'value free' descrip-
tions of social affairs. Revolutionaries must wait to be in 
power to become soulless. 
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The endowment of a moral character upon revolutionary 
ideals accomplishes at least two important things, it covers 
these idea-ls with the forceful sense of necessity proper of the 
moral 'ought' and, thus, purifies them of any suspicion of 
arbitrariness, while at the same time marking them with the 
seal of universality. In their universal appearance, ideals 
seem desirable in themselves, inherently good, or, in real 
terms, classless. This classlessness, in the case of the 
bourgeois revolution, was achieved at the price of a high 
degree of vacuous formalism. Stretched to their maximum, the 
ideals of liberty, fraternity and equality were temporarily 
able to accommo~ate the aspirations of all classes, though only 
to leave the most numerous of them gnawing at their frustra-
tions. 
At this point we can securely introduce the second 
factor that, I think, explains why the bourgeousie adhered 
initially to a doctrine of Natural Law. It has to do with 
the conception of man akin to capitalism. From Luther through 
Descartes, and Locke to Kant, man appears as an isolated, self-
sufficient individual, endowed with enough Grace to be able to 
communicate directly with God, with enough Reason to discern 
truth from falsehood, with enough Sense to recognize the proper 
path of justice and, most importantly, with enough Autonomy 
to act as a legislator. From this inherent dignity of man 
certain rights emerge that must serve as a basis of law in any 
free society. Being innate, these rights are natural. In the 
heroic period it was this aspect of the conception of man that 
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was emphasized, the other half of the conception, that of man 
as partly irrational, impulsive and selfish was consistently 
downplayed.. This situation did not last very long, however. 
very soon after its triumph, the inherent contradictions of its 
conception of man became an obstacle for the bourgeoisie. 
The attempts to enforce the law, and particularly the laws 
of property, required that the dignity of many a man be 
stepped one Suqdenly morality became a nuisance, for its 
precepts seemed to be incompatible with the objective demands 
and needs of society, primarily, the need to subject to law 
(to a law that could be enforced, that is), the animal nature 
of man. To preserve the rights of a citizen, many men had to 
be allowed to starve. But this required that law be imposed 
over morality. Law no longer emerged from within, it was no 
more a command of reason or consciousness, it was a command of 
the state backed by the force of the state. The law had to 
become blind, at the very least blind to the demands of moral-
ity. It was then in order to preserve inequality that all law 
was proclaimed to be positive law. 
Marx concerned himself with this contradiction of 
bourgeois ideology in a brief article entitled "Zur Juden-
frage."5 There he sees the contradiction inscribed in the 
very title of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man." In 
its French version, Marx notices, the rights of man, proper, 
"les droits de l'homme" are distinguished from the "les droits 
du ci toyen," where 'man' turns out to be a real human being of 
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flesh and bones, the real bourgeois with his needs and aspira-
tions, while the citoyen is a legal fiction, that is, man as 
a subject of law. Underneath this dualism is the opposition 
between the 'political state' and the 'bourgeois society~' 
In his actions, the former, that in theory is supposed to 
exist only as a means to insure that the 'droits de l'homme' 
are preserved, cannot but limit them. Proclaiming as its goal 
the freedom of the press, it has to deny it in reality for the 
sake of 'public welfare,' etc. The contradiction will be 
abolished, according to Marx, when the purely political eman-
cipation achieved by the bourgeois revolution gives way to the 
total emancipation of man, which Marx characterizes as follows: 
Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on 
the one hand, to the member of bourgeois society, to the 
egoistic, independent individual, on the other hand to 
the citizen, to the moral person. 
Only when the real individual man has reabsorbed the 
citizen and has become a generic being as an individual 
man in his empirical life, in his individual work, in his 
individual relations, only when man has recognized and 
organized his 'forces propres' as social forces and there-
fore does not alienate from himself these social forces 
in the form of political force, only then is human eman-
cipation completed.6 
Now, this view is grounded on the assumption that the ideo-
logical perception of man proper to the bourgeoisie, is based 
not on a failure to recognize the different aspects of humanity, 
but rather on the isolated, abstract perception of each of these 
aspects. With this view, as can be inferred from what has 
been said so far, I partially disagree. More than schizophre-
nic, the bourgeois conception of man is plainly unilateral. 
The attribution of a 'social' sphere to human essence is only 
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accidental. At the end, the social realm of human life is 
reduced to the blind application of brute force. This is the 
real end of.bourgeois 'political emancipation.' 
In what amounts to an ex post facto legitimization of 
its world view, bourgeois philosophy has proclaimed, since 
the XIX century, a new conception of man, which emphasizes 
mostly his 'animal' nature. This 'scientific' conception, 
which finds its most recent expression in the narrowness of 
Behaviorisms has deprived man of all rationality and, thus, 
has placed him beyond 'dignity,' that is, beyond morality. 
Turned into a brute, man has lost his capacity to communicate 
with God and to legislate autonomously, and has to be 'trained' 
to live according to law, for law is absolutely alien or 
external to him. At the end, the bourgeoisie seeks to abolish 
or, at least, weaken morality. For that it has traditionally 
had a good weapon in its atomistic conception of man, and in 
its philosophical counterpart, 'Relativism.' If the existence 
of objective and universal moral standards is denied, and the 
individual's consciousness or, simply, opinion is posited as 
the sole measurement of goodness, then the force of all moral 
condemnation is annihilated. Moral statements become 'opin-
ions,' expressions of mere subjective preferences, as the 
Emotivists wtll have it, and since all opinions are equal 
in worth, nothing distinguishes the preferences of the exploi-
* ter from those of the exploited. Kelsen, the most lucid 
* What we are postulating here is, in the last instance, 
the existence of a necessary connectio~ between Subjectivism, 
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representative of contemporary Legal Positivism, has clearly 
shown the consequences of that kind of approach for legal 
theory: 
Emotivism·and certain forms of Relativism. Actually, I think 
that Emotivism is best described as an instance or a species 
of Subjectivism, given that Subjectivism, in its more general 
sense, is the position according to which there is no objective 
counterpart, either material or theoretical, to any moral 
judgement, such that that counterpart is publicly accessible 
in an immediate manner, i.e., without the mediation of the 
individual making the moral judgement. Emotivism, which 
claims that moral utterances express nothing more than the 
feelings of the people who utter them, as they are experiences 
by these people, fits perfectly the mold of Subjectivism. 
The possible argument against our definition of Subjectivism, 
that a position like a Realist Subjectivism is possible, is 
taken care of by the qualification that, according to the 
Subjectivists, the content of moral utterences, whether real 
or not, is not immediately accessible to 'other minds.' For, 
insofar as we are dealing with a truly Subjectivist position, 
and whatever the content of moral judgements might be, it must 
be a quality of the person making the judgement and, hence, 
this person must be thought of as being in a privileged posi-
tion regarding the possiblities of apprehending that quality. 
Now, in a sense, all Subjectivism is necessarily 
Relativist, unless, of course, one wants to postulate a doctrine 
that could be described as 'mental parallelism,' that is, a 
doctrine according to which, for some reason or other, there 
is always a perfect syncronization between the events taking 
place in the mind of a person making a moral judgement and those 
taking place in the minds of all the persons that comprehend 
that judgement. The refutation of such a, fortunately, imagi-
nary doctrine, would certainly not be a demanding task. For it 
is obvious that in terms of such a hypothesis there is no way of 
accounting for differences in moral opinions, while at the same 
time explaining how moral judgements with which we do not 
agree, are understood by us. It is clearly contradictory to 
assert, at the same time, that I am experiencing moral indig-
nation, but that in fact I do not regard the event that prompts 
that indignation as immoral. 
To sum up, then, what the subjectivization of morality 
expressed by theories such as Emotivism accomplishes is the 
:eduction of moral judgement to the status of 'point of view, r 
1:e., it makes the validity of the moral statements of indi-
viduals dependent upon the specific and temporary circumstances 
surrounding their utterance. 
. . On the other hand, it is not the case that all Rela-
t1v1sm is Subjectivist. Conventionalism, which is undeniably 
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It is self-evident that a purely relative morality 
cannot--either consciously or unconsciously--perform the 
required function of furnishing an absolute standard for 
the evaluation of a positive legal order. Such a standard 
is not in .. fact to be had by way of scientific knowledge. 
This does not mean, however, that there is no standard at 
all. Every moral system can serve as such a standard. 
But if the framework of a positive legal order is to be 
judged 'morally,' it is necessary to bear in mind that the 
standard is a relative one, that another evaluation on the 
basis of another moral system is not excluded; that if a 
legal order is reckoned unjust by the standard of one moral 7 system, it can be reckoned just by the standard of another. 
8 Before, Kelsen has already told us that all law is good; 
"For the concept of 'goodness' can only be defined as that which 
'ought to be,' as that which accords with a norm; and if law 
a species of Relativism, is not necessarily a form of Subjec-
tivism, for example. But in fact, and even if we grant this, 
not only will our previous argument remain unaffected, but, 
moreover, it can be shown that for all practical purposes, 
Conventionalism can be made to play the same role in the con-
sciousness of the bourgeoisie. Without engaging in a long and 
detailed discussion of Conventionalism, which neither can nor 
should we undertake at this point, let us briefly consider 
some of the ideological consequences of Conventionalism. (For 
a treatment of related problems from a different point of view 
see Chapter II,l,b, particularly the discussion of Downie's 
theses.) 
Behind all kinds of Conventionalism looms the con-
viction that it is materially and theoretically impossible to 
find a point of reference firm enough so as to allow the 
generation of a set of norms valid for all times and places. 
But more sophisticated than the average Subjectivist, the 
Conventionalist does not want to deny or ignore the fact that 
some degree of interpersonal agreement concerning a variety 
of moral issues does in fact exist in all societies. He does 
not want to succumb to defeatism either, by explaining away 
such agreements as the result of accident. So, he cleverly 
a!tributes them to an agreement in the way the world, the 
circumstances or conditions of existence of the collectivity 
are perceived. There are two major faults with this type 
of Conventionalism, to wit, that it denies the existence of 
human nature and, consequently, deprives itself from the . 
possibility of explaining its specificity; and that it commits 
what we could call the Ptolomeic Fallacy, i.e., the fallacy 
o~ believing that basic norms can be derived from the quali-
ties of the environment. 
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is defined as a norm, this implies that what is lawful is a 
crood." So, regardless of whether a law is good in itself or 
0 
good only for two out of four million citizens, the fact that 
it is enforced makes it a sort of good. At the end, the only 
thing that counts is the rule of law, even if it takes place 
without the rule of justice. 
In spite of some isolated useful distinctions that 
the Positivists have been able to make, the bulk of their 
legal theory can be dismissed, I think, as mere ideology. 
In no way does it help to clarify the real relationship between 
law and morals. To do that, we have to turn to the analysis 
of the group of legal theories that accept at least the partial 
dependency of law on morals. 
A popular view in this respect is the one that origi-
nated in the writings of Christian Thomasius 9 and was developed 
in our time by G. del Vecchio. 10 According to it, the basic 
demands of law and morality are the same only that morality, 
being in del Vecchio's terms "subjective" in character, has 
as its object the demands that the individual places on him-
self, while law, being "objective" in character, is concerned 
with the demands placed on the individual in the course of his 
relationships with his fellow men. In this sense, morality, 
subjective ~orality, that is, cannot be enforced. Although 
this view has the advantage of leaving the door open for the 
moral criticism of law, and thus is fundamentally incompatible 
with any attempt to identify the rule of law with the exercise 
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of force, it does not provide an adequate explanation for the 
fact that not 'all' principles of morality are principles of 
1aw, that is, it fails to offer a precise criterion of demar-
cation between subjective and objective morality. Morality, 
aoverning the forum internw~ does not need to be codified and 
0 
can thus remain "indefinite, vague" while law, governing the 
forum externum, has to be more precise, particularly because 
it regulates those actions or behaviors that make life in 
society possible: 
Should we wish to use another metaphor, we could say that 
Law i~ the backbone of the social body, or of the ethical 
organ1smc More simply it can be said that law is the part 
of Ethics which establishes the basis of coexistence between 
several individuals. Consequently, without law one could 
not even conceive of a society. Ubi societas, ibi jus. 
Since ub 1i homo, ibi 
societas, we can conclude, Ubi homo, 
ubi j us. 1 
The syllogism is, according to what we have established in the 
previous chapter, perfectly true. Only that in the context 
of del Vecchio's juridical thought it is arbitrary, for nowhere 
does he offer a clear method by which those moral principles 
can be deduced that must also be expressed as laws. 
Somewhat in the same line of reasoning is Georg Jelli-
nek's well-known doctrine according to which law is a sort of 
ethical or moral minimum (ethischen Minimums) . 12 He not only 
rejects explicitly the dualism that del Vecchio seeks to 
moderate, but, assuming the viewpoint of 'social ethics,' which 
he contrasts to 'individual ethics,' he attempts to explain 
both morality and law taking into account their function in the 
social body. Also, and in spite of the fact that his reasons 
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for doing so (i.e., the attempt to apply to the human sciences 
the methods of the natural sciences), are, to say the least, 
rather shaky, Jellinek adopts a thoroughly naturalistic approach 
to the study of legal phenom.ena, setting as the starting point. 
of his speculations the same one adopted in this thesis, to 
wit, the human being of 'flesh and bones.' From that, and 
by postulating the existence of certain 'natural' drives 
(egoistic and altruistic drives), and natural demands of social 
existence, he proposes the following definition of law: 
We have recognized as the objective content of ethics, those 
norms that demand realization by the human will, and that 
derive from the existence and development requirements of 
society. When, given a determinate historical stage of a 
society, we ask for those norms, which, if followed, would 
make possible the subsistence of that state of affairs, 
then we obtain the law of that society. The law is noth-
ing but the ethical minimum. Objectively it is the sub-
sistence conditions of society, and also the subsistence 
minimum of ethical norms, subjectively it is the minimum 
moral and emotional demands required from the members of 
society.13 
Although this ethical minimum is variable and depends 
on historical circumstances, there is a small portion of it 
that Jellinek recognizes as permanent. This portion consti-
tutes the "eternal, absolute law" and comprises all the norms 
without :which "not even the most primitive variety of human 
social life is imaginable. " 14 
Such a basically correct intuition of the nature of 
morality is marred by the same deficiency as del Vecchio's 
view, to wit, the failure to specify a criterion for deter-
mining the norms that constitute "eternal or absolute lav-1." 
Also, Jellinek leaves unclarified the functional relationship 
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between morals and law in complex societies. Nothing of what 
~ says would help us settle an argument about the proper 
limits for what some modern writers call the 'legislation of 
morality. ' 
H.L.A. Hart has attempted to solve these deficiencies 
in his book the Concept of Law. To deal with the first one, 
he proposes a list of five "obvious truisms" which describe 
some characteristics of human beings that have to be taken 
into account if "survival," according to Hart, the main and 
primary purpose of human activity, is to be possible. We·will 
deal with these truisms in a later section of this paper. 
What interests us now is the general form of the argument 
insofar as it can help clarify Hart's opinion on the relation-
ship between law and morals. Once these elementary facts of 
human nature have been determined, one can naturally deduce 
from them, Hart claims, certain "universaJly recognized prin-
ciples of conduct" which constitute the "minimum content of 
Natural Law."15 Among such "rules of conduct that any social 
organization must contain if it is to be viable," are those 
prohibiting the use of violence, and those requiring truthful-
ness, f~ir dealing, and respect for persons. 
Whether we agree in detail with his account of the 
II ' • • , • munmum content of law" or not, we have to recognize, 1.n view 
of what has been said" in the first chapter, that Hart has 
adopted the proper approach for the solution of the question. 
The enumeration of a set of basic social rules is the only way 
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out from the paralizing vagueness of positions like those of 
del Vecchio and Jellinek. Obviously, once this has been done, 
the second question, i.e., the one regarding the functional 
relationship of law and morals, is at least partially solved, 
for we know in which cases the demands of both have to coin-
cide. We still do not know, however, why it is that in com-
plex societies some, but not all moral convictions give rise 
to law. Hart's mild theory of social contract constitutes 
the basis of his attempt to solve that issue. 
"Authority," Hart claims, originates in the voluntary 
assent. by a group of individuals both to accept a "system 
of mutual forbearances" and to establish a system of cooperation 
for sanctioning violators. Now, in societies where all or 
the majority of members agree voluntarily to abide by the terms 
of the contract a centralized apparatus for the enforcement of 
rules determining obligations and forbearances is not neces-
sary. Such an apparatus, that is, a "legal form of control" 
is required, -on the other hand, in societies where some or many 
individuals view themselves as victims rather than benefici-
aries of the legal system. 
Again, in general, I cannot but agree with the spirit 
of this argument. The agreement, though, cannot be so absolute 
when the difficulties that Hart encounters when confronted 
with the t~sk of elucidating in detail the influence of morals 
on law, are taken into account. His troubles are partic~larly 
visible in the course of his polemic16 with P. Devlin regard-
ing the question of the 'legislation of morals.' To refute 
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Devlin's archconservative thesis that the state has, under 
certain circumstances, the right to legislate in matters con-
cerning sexu~l behavior considered by a majority of individuals 
to be 'deviant,' Hart has to resort to the classical bourgeois 
conception of man and his relation to society. Carefully fol-
lowing Mill, Hart argues that, in principle, legislation is 
admissible only as a means ~o reduce the danger that one 
man's behavior may posit to another man's 'natural rights,' 
so that no legislation is justifiable when the stated pur-
pose of such legislation is the protection of an individual 
against harm inflicted by himself. 
Wh~t is wrbng with this thesis is not that it proposes 
a limit, and a fairly strict one, for that matter, to the 
legislation of morals, but rather that it rests on a view of 
law, according to which the legislation properly or legiti-
mately derived from the moral minimum promotes cooperation 
among men only by positing limits to their behavior by means 
of a system of forbearances. In fact, as we shall see in 
detail in what follows, only some, few indeed, of the norms 
connected with the materialization of fundamental social func-
tions are of this type. In reality most of them are incor-
porated into penal law. But there are many basic rules, such 
as those relating to the materialization of the basic functions 
of production and education that aim at something more than 
at establishing a system of forbearances or at designating 
officials. So, incapable of accounting for the nexus between 
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iaw and morality beyond a very limited number of cases, Hart 
has to dismiss the majority of them as either too obvious and 
d 1 . 17 b" trivial to eserve an exp anation or as ar itrary and subject 
to historical change. In fact, it is because he has no way of 
explaining sexual morality on the basis of his doctrine of the 
"minimum content of law'' that Hart must rely on Mill's abstrac-
tions to defend homosexuals against repression. And it is 
because he cannot see civil law as partially mirroring the 
demands of certain basic social functions that the fact that 
"the prevailing views of moral responsibility" interfere with 
legal processes involving this sort of law, appear to him 
obvious but unexplained. 
* I see L. Fuller's already quoted book as part of an 
attempt to enrich Hart's notions of morality and law. Accord-
ing to Fuller two kinds of moralities can be distinguished: 
the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration. The role 
of the former is to achieve what Hart's "minimum content of 
law" is supposed to achieve, that is, to "lay down the basic 
rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or with-
out which an ordered society directed towards certain specific 
goals must fail its work. " 18 What these rules are, Fuller 
does not bother to inform us. He tells us only that, from the 
perspective of legal science, they can be classed as pertain-
ing to the "external niorali ty of law," that is, they belong to 
*· See note 1. 
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the group of rules to which a legal system has to conform not 
qua legal system, but qua system of norms generaliter. 
The ~orality of aspiration, on the other hand, is char-
acterized. by Fuller in 'the following terms: 
The morality of aspiration is most plainly exempli-
fied in Greek philosophy. It is the morality of the Good 
Life, of excellence,. of the fullest realization of human 
powers, ... Generally with the Greeks instead of ideas 
of right and wrong, of moral claim and moral duty, we have 
rather the conception of proper and fitting conduct, con-
duct as beseems a human being functioning at his best. 1 9 
Starting "at the top of human achievement" the morality of 
aspiration posits ideals, speaking more of desirable, than of 
necessary behavior. This, according to Fuller, makes the 
transition from it to legislation rather difficult, since it 
is not easy to "create . . . the sufficient conditions . . . 
for a rational human existence." Clearly, this transition is 
smooth in the case of the morality of duty, where all that has 
to be done is to· give a 'legal' formulation to necessary moral 
principles. Legislation regarding an ideal, though, tends by 
nature to be more an exhortation than a command. But in spite 
of all these difficulties, it is the morality of aspiration and 
not the morality of duty, that is the most relevant from the 
point of view of legal science. In Fuller's opinion, the moral 
content pertaining to law proper, and not as a system of norms 
in general, ·has the form of a morality of aspiration. Fuller 
calls it the "inner morality of law," and the eight principles 
/ 
that constitute its core are a kind of "procedural version 
of naturai law. 11 
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Actually, Fuller follows a method similar to the one 
followed by Abele et al. to determine the prerequisites of social 
1ife, in ord~r to deduce the basic principles of "inner moral-
ity." Having enumerated the eight ways in which a system of 
1aw is liable to go wrong, he concludes that the basic princi-
ples of legality are precisely those that aim at avoiding 
one or more of the eight "disasters. 1120 At this point, we 
really do not need to discuss the eight principles of "inner 
morality" in detail. What interests us is the general argu-
ment behind Fuller's conception. Two issues are especially 
important in this respect, on the one hand, the claim that 
these principles define what could be called the conditions 
of possibility of legality and, on the other hand, the fact 
that, having the form of a morality of aspiration, the "inner 
morality of law" does not· simply propose a network of forbear-
ances, but rather a complex of "affirmative demands." 
The first claim rests on the assumption that legality 
* or law constitutes a more or less well-defined and indepen-
dent entity or, actually, a process or activity that Fuller 
defines as "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules . .,Zl Given that it is independent from other 
forms of social action, legality is not necessarily present in 
all societies, but those in which it is present are, Fuller 
* I think that the word 'legality' reflects bet~er the 
dynamic character that Fuller attributes to law, than the word 
law itself. 
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says, superior not only in the sense that they turn out to be 
more "efficient" mostly because they allow the individual a 
greater degree of security and mobility, but, most importantly, 
in the sense that they have attained a higher degree of jus-
tice. The exercise of legality, then, is not God-given, but 
rather an historical acquisition, an invention. It is this 
conception of legality that leads Fuller to underscore or 
minimize the role of the "external morality of law." The rea-
son is that he has to account, if only vaguely, for the fact, 
implied in his theory, that some societies have survived and, 
possibly, survive still with the exclusive aid of morality, 
of the external forms of morality, that is. Furthermore, it 
seems to me that Fuller wants to be able to claim that in a 
society where the inner morality of law has been fully realized, 
there can be no conflict between morality and law in the usual 
sense. Or, to put it differently, in such a society the limits 
of legislation would be clearly drawn. This is the lesson, 
I suppose, that we are to learn from Fuller's dismissal of the 
Hart-Devlin controversy as a mere misunderstanding. In effect, 
Fuller claims, the reason why the laws attempting to regulate 
homosexual practices are unacceptable is, simply, that they 
are unenforceable and hence not rules at all, for, as we have 
seen, it is'one of the conditions of possibility of legal rules 
that they be enforceable. 
In spite of their ingenuity, and even if they are 
partially true, these arguments tend to blur the issue more 
than they clarify it. For even if we grant, like most people 
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probably would, that legality is an invention, this still 
ieaves the question open as to why such an invention is neces-
sary in some.societies and not in others .. To point out some ot 
the practical advantages of settling disputes.by legislation 
rather than through butchery is not enough of an explanation. 
Neither can we be satisfied with Fuller's attempt to beg the 
issue by postulating the inherent goodness or morality of law, 
for whether he likes it or not, Hart's assertion that the 
"inner morality of law" is "unfortunately compatible with 
· · · ,,zz · f 1 If H" 1 h very great 1n1qu1ty, 1s per ect y true. 1t er, w om 
Fuller criticizes mostly because he failed to make his laws 
public and because he had a tendency to abuse the enactment 
of retrospective laws, had complied with these principles of the 
"inner morality of law," Fuller would now have a very diffi-
cult time condemning his antisemitic legislation. 
Things are not at all facilitated by the claim that the 
inner morality of law is a variety of the morality of aspira-
tion, which requires a set of "affirmative demandsu for its 
materialization. In the first place, as Fuller himself recog-
nizes, the line between duty and aspiration is extremely thin 
even in the most elementary cases. It is quite difficult to 
see, for example, how the duty to restrain from killing a 
fellow man ~iffers from the affirmative demand to respect him. 
Later on in this chapter we will see that this dis-
tinction, insofar as it can be made at all, must be drawn in 
terms of certain types of virtues, and does not depend on the 
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intuition of people. Furthermore, as we will hopefully also 
see later on, obligations or duties are predictable only of 
persons, an~ the recognition of someone as such implies a 
certain amount of regard for him that goes beyond any simple 
utilitarian calculation. This last fact is not so irrelevant, 
particularly if one takes into account that the materialization 
of fundamental moral norms is perfectly compatible with the 
institutionalization of inequalities and, even, with the 
denial of the quality of personhood to many individuals. After 
all, Fuller must be partly aware of this for he nowhere 
claims that a legal system must have universal applicability 
to deserve being considered as such; nowhere does he say that 
universal love is a prerequisite of legality. 
At the end, one can say both of Hart and Fuller that 
they have not gone far enough in their rejection of positivism. 
Both, but particularly Fuller, remain trapped by a formalist 
conception of law. 
So far, we have concluded that the origin of the dis-
cussion of the- relation between law and morals in the West 
is to be found in the concrete political needs generated by 
the histdrical development of the bourgeoisie. These needs 
have colored all the appearances this discussion has taken. 
Because of the need to impose its rule by sheer forceJ the 
bourgeoisie had to postuiate the independence of law from 
morality. Not doing that would have been leaving the doors 
open for the moral indictment of its rule. But one can 
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probably go a step further and ask whether it is the case that 
the existence of law is in all cases explainable in terms of 
the needs of.the ruling classes. In other words, one can 
ask whether the bifurcation between law· and morals that has 
occurred in the West is a phenomenon common to all class 
societies. This seems to me to be indeed the case, insofar 
as we define law as a set of norms backed and enforced through 
the centralized exercise of state or governmental authority. 
Such authority becomes the basis of legality whenever there 
are institutionalized rivalries or conflicts of interest in a 
society, and the same moral convictions cease to be shared by 
everyone or, at least, by an overwhelming majority of indivi-
duals, these convictions become ineffectual and need to be 
'enforced.' By 'moral convictions' we can mean only the con-
sensus regarding the applicability of the notion of 'person' 
and the limitations that this imposes on the range of applica-
bility of the universal moral norms. Centrally enforced laws 
are indispensable only when the personhood of some or many 
individuals has to be denied or diminished against the will 
and the convictions of the majority of the population of a 
society. This last qualification is vital, for as we will 
see later on, not all !imitative or secondary norms have to be 
imposed by force, that is, not all secondary norms must dege-
nerate into laws. This happens only under particular circum-
stances, namely when the conditions in which a society lives 
do not ma~e possi~le the production of believable or plausible 
ideological justifications for the imposition of limitations 
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on the range of applicability of universal norms. In this 
respect it is important to notice that laws must be distin-
guished from moral norms of all kinds by reference to their 
role in the social and not in the geographical space. A law 
imposed by force in the entire globe is not less repressive 
than one imposed by the same means in Andorra. 
A law, then, in this sense, can be defined as a limita-
tive principle which has to be imposed by force. The fact 
that it is limitative and non-universalizable does not neces-
sarily make a norm or principle into law. All contingently 
necessary or secondary norms are by definition non-universaliz-
able, since their function is by definition the limitation of 
the range of validity of universal rules. But not all secon-
dary norms are laws. To identify a law, then, it is not 
enough to point out, following Fichte's advice that a given 
norm requires attitudes that universal moral principles condemn. 
It is equally important to determine whether this norm is pri-
marily 'justified' by a threat of violence. 
But even if we grant that this is indeed the case, the 
question still remains whether a complex society can subsist 
as· an or·ganized entity without some of the legal ins ti tut ions 
known to us. For one might want to argue that there are, in 
all moderately complex societies, certain 'laws, 1 in the sense 
of administrative rules, which are indispensable for the day-
to-day functioning of the institutions of these societies. 
What I have in mind are tools such as courts, the practice of 
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solving problems through adjudication, etc. I think that the 
answer to this question requires that we emphasize the distinc-
tion between penal and civil law. It seems obvious that in 
a classless society, in which nothing but the fundamental laws 
are included in the penal code, the separation between law and 
morals will hardly be necessary. Things are not that clear, 
however, if we think of civil law or contractual law. Of 
course, it could be argued that these types of laws are not 
necessary if capitalism has been eliminated. But even in this 
case, the ·existence of institutions will generate certain 
demands for the establishment of rules quite similar in nature 
to those of civil law. In this limited sense I feel we can 
in fact speak of law as a set of sui generis mechanisms with a 
peculiar and well-defined social function. It should be quite 
clear, though, that these mechanisms or procedures are con-
tingent and that far from being conditions of possibility of 
social life, their existence presupposes the existence of 
basic moral rules. The reason for saying this is obvious, 
for these administrative rules that we are talking about are 
not conditions of possibility of social life in general, but 
mechanisis necessary exclusively for the materialization of 
certain kinds of social arrangements. In the third chapter 
we will examine these rules in some detail after rebaptizing 
them with the name of 'tertiary rules.' 
By way of c,onclusion we can say, then, that there is 
no essential distinction between law and morals, and that 
what has usually been called 'law' is reducible to two kinds 
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of moral norms: 1. secondary norms that are imposed by 
means of violence instead of ideological persuasion, and/or 
z. instrumental norms which_ regulate the technical aspects 
of the operations of some institutions in certain kinds of 
societies. 
b. Of the Passage from Is to Ought 
Having shown that moral and legal norms are identical 
in essence, there are still a couple of problems that we 
ought to discuss before going on to the deduction of the basic 
moral norms: the question of the transition from is to ought 
and the question concerning moral obligation. 
It has been a standard practice for many years now to 
put the blame on Hume for starting this controversy. Some have 
even talked about Hume's Guillotine with which, supposedly, 
the heads of evil moral systems should be chopped off. In 
regard to this, there are two different points that I will 
attempt to make. First a historical point, namely, I will 
try to offer an interpretation of some of the relevant passages 
of the Treatise and, on the basis of this, try to determine 
the extent to which this traditional belief is true. But, 
most important.ly, I will try to spell out what I take to be 
the crucial ethical problem uncovered by Hume and later refor-
mulated by kant. This problem, it seems to me, has only 
partially been perceived by modern writers and, in some cases, 
it has been blatantly misperceived. The second part of this 
section ~ill briefly deal with these modern treatments of 
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the problem and will also present an alternative solution 
to it. 
What Hume was attempting to prove in the much quoted 
chapters of ·the Treatise 23 is that c·ertain kinds of impressions, 
to wit, emotions or passions, constitute the basis for our 
moral judgements, th~t is, impressions relate to moral judge-
ments as ideas do to empirical judgements. For if ideas were 
at the basis of mo.ral judgements, reason alone would be suf-
ficient to treat moral issues. That this is not so is seen, 
first, by the fact that morality has an influence on action, 
which reason, being "wholly inactive" 24 cannot have, at least 
in an immediate fashion. Reason can influence behavior only 
indirectly by 'exciting' certain passions and that it can do 
either by 0 informing us of the existence of a proper object 
of passion" or by exhibiting causal connections between 
b. bl f . . . 25 o Jects capa e o . exciting a passion. 
Furthermore, if reason alone were able to establish 
moral distinctions, there would be no difference between error 
and wrongdoing or ttmoral deficiency." A claim that is obvi-
ously false. 
This whole first part of Hume's argument depends clearly 
on the assumption that reason is 'inactive.' Trying to explain 
the full meij?ing of this claim would lead us away from our 
topic. But, in general, what is meant is both that reason by 
itself can never cause us to act and) also, the fact that 
reason lacks what Kant would later call 'spontaneity,' i.e., 
156 
the ability not only to be impressed by intuitions, but also 
to produce representations on the basis of the concepts that it 
possesses. Precisely because reason lacks spontaneity it is 
restricted to two sorts of· operations, for, as Hume never 
ceases to remind us, it either deals with relations of ideas 
or with matters of fact. So, if morality were the subject of 
reason alone, it would have to do with one of these operations, 
and moral decisions instead of being formulated· in terms of 
aood and evil, would have to be formulated in terms of truth 
0 
and falsehood. And, thus, again error and wrongdoing would 
have to be identified. 
But Hume's strongest arguments lead in a different 
direction since, at the end, they aim at the most refined sorts 
of rationalism. Let us assume~ he says, that morality has 
something to do with relations of ideas. If this were so, 
morality would have to be identical with one or more of the 
four relations susceptible of demonstration or it would have 
to be a fifth sort of demonstrable relation. That the first 
alternative is absurd, Hume proves by pointing out the fact 
that these four relations are "applicable, not only to an 
irrational, but also to an inanimate object."' Here Hume 
relies on the fact, which he believes to have firmly estab-
lished befo~~, that only ·human beings are proper objects 
of passion and, thus, by implication, of moral concern. It 
seems wise to note, nevertheless, that this implication 
presupposes to·a certain extent what Hume wants to demon-
strate, i.e., that passions and not reason are the proper 
carriers of morality. 
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The second alternative is, by far, philosophicaliy 
more interesting, since, in a way, it states the problem 
that Kant sought to solve in the Second Critique. For the 
sake of brevity, and because our task is not so much the 
exposition of Hume's theory as the elimination of a misunder-
standing, I will concern myself only with two of the, at least, 
three arguments developed in this connection. 
If there is one or a set of moral relations suscep-
tible of demonstration, Hume goes on to say, that these rela-
tions must place on the understanding but, most importantly, 
also, on the will, the operations of which would be the 
'effect' of the operations of the understanding, such con-
straints that a) moral norms would have to be perceived by any 
and all rational beings as absolutely necessary and obligatory 
and, b) the connection between "every well-disposed mind" and 
the will would have to be necessary and admit of no exceptions. 26 
According to Hume, this last presumption not only contradicts 
our experience, but also requires of an a priori demonstration 
that cannot even be imagined. 
The plausibility of this whole argument rests on the 
anti-Socr~tic assumption that the knowledge of virtue or good-
ness does not automatically compell the will to act properly. 
As is well-~nown, Kant accepted this and used it to differen-
tiate between human and divine natures. 
To close this part of his discourse, and on the basis 
of several examples which purport to show that animals and 
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plants can engage in exactly the same relations with one 
another as human beings, Hume develops an argument that not 
only turns out to be a powerful attack on a position of the 
sort that how we would call ethical intuitionism, but that 
also helps make sense of the famous final remarks on the tran-
sition from is to ought. 
Suppose that 'incestuous' relationships occur among 
animals. Obviously, Hume says, no one in his right mind would 
want to claim that they are a sign of moral 'turpitude' on the 
part of the animals involved, even though the relationship 
is identical in form to one that, if it were to occur among 
humans, everybody would immediately condemn. In other words, 
it is not the mere perception of a relation between objects 
that prompts us to act morally. The problem now is that of 
explaining the origin of our moral indignation. Hume cannot 
say that it originates in reason alone, since he has declared 
reason to be 'wholly inactive.' All reason can do is appre-
hend ~he relation, but it cannot spontaneously initiate any 
moral distinctions, since such distinctions belong to the 
realm of the practical. 
_But Hume still has to prove beyond doubt that moral 
qualities are -not matters of fact, properties of the real 
world, which could be apprehended in some way by reason. To 
do so, Hume initiates a maneuver similar to the one he used 
to combat the substantialist conception of causality. He sim-
ply requests that evil actions be examined "in all lights" 
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and an attempt be made to find in them some one quality or 
qualities that could be called 'vice.' Hume's assumption is, 
of course, that there are no more vices in the world than 
there are ,·connections' that could be called 'causes.' 
In our time, people who have arrived at the same con-
clusion that moral distinctions do not originate in reason 
alone, and that neither are they qualities of the world, 
have been tempted to adopt one of the many varieties of 'Intui-
tionism.' By Intuitionism I mean here the general thesis that 
moral qualities are a special sort of entity knowable only 
through a certain special faculty, different from Reason and 
the external and internal senses. Now, it is quite obvious 
that Intuitionism as defined above is absolutely incompatible 
with Hume's Empiricism. There is no room in Hume's map of 
human faculties for an intuitive faculty. The path that Hume 
chooses to follow is a different one. He attempts to account 
for morality .in terms of our feelings and emotions. Let us 
briefly sketch his solution. 
The problem, again, is that mere inspection of 
matters of fact does not reveal any special qualities in these 
facts that could be termed 'vices' or 'virtues.' Yet, it is 
undeniable 'that it is of matters of fact that we predicate moral 
qualities. r, We say this or that relation is immoral. But if 
they are not properties of matters of fact, virtues and vices 
must be generated by the a~tion of our self on the world. 
That is to say, 'they must be 'secondary qualities.' 
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But since reason does not discover them, and, since being 
inactive it cannot generate them spontaneously, they must be 
the effect of matters of fact on the non-rational, emotive 
component of our self. And indeed, when_we say of something 
that it is virtuous or vicious, what we notice when we inspect 
our mind is a certain kind of 'feeling' or 'emotion.' Hume 
explains all this quite clearly in the following way: 
... Here is a matter of fact, but 'tis the object of 
feeling not of reason. It lies in your self, not in the 
object .... Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd 
to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which according to modern 
philosophy, are not qualities in objects but perceptions 
in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that 
other in physics, is to be regarded as a consi1erable 
advancement of the speculative sciences; ... 1 
But let us turn back now to the controversial passage 
concerning the transition from is to ought. The problem is, 
of course, to determine what it is that Hume finds illegiti-
mate in the sudden move from is to ought that he has detected 
in many a writing on morality. Mind, first of all, that what 
bothers him initially is the fact that moralists do not con-
sider a justification of their move necessary. Hume's point 
is, clearly, that even if they wanted to provide such a justi-
fication they would fail in their attempts since most of them 
start either from the false assumption that 'ought,' the term 
that signal5 the presence of moral judgements, denotes a rela-
tion and, hence, originates in reason, or from the equally 
false assumption that 'ought' denotes some quality of the world. 
I 28 · n the famous passage, Hume is simultaneously condemning 
these two fallacies. Most Df the controversy concerning the 
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proper interpretation of the passage would disappear, it 
seems to me, were this to be noticed. In general, the second 
point is emphasized. And al though this is bad insofar as it 
contributes to create confusion, it is good insofar as it 
puts the stress on the most important issue, namely, that of 
explaining how nature and morality are related, how it is that 
~ral judgements can be deduced from matters of fact. 
That Hume thought this deduction of 'ought' from 'is' 
to be possible is proven by his own ethical system. Hume 
performs the deduction without breaking the limits of legiti-
macy, i.e., without assuming that 'ought' is a relation. His 
treatment of the notion of 'justice' is the best example I 
can think of to illustrate the way in which he considers fit 
to perform this transition. 
Justice, being an artificial virtue, is nothing towards 
which we are naturally inclined. The source of our allegiance 
to justice and the fact that we feel that we have an obligation 
to act justly must, then, be instilled upon us. But, although 
artificial justice is perceived as a moral virtue, i.e., it 
has to be accompanied by the feeling of satisfaction proper of 
moral virtues. -The explanation of this fact demands two dif-
ferent steps, in Hume's eyes, mostly because in order to avoid 
a vicious circle one has to distinguish neatly between the 
motive of our just actions and the reason why we regard justice 
as virtuous . 
The motive or reason that inclines us first to act 
justly is provided by reason, which teaches us that there is 
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a connection between the selective limitation of our demands 
and the cooperation with others and our well-being. Now, 
although this, plus the natural interest we have in uniting 
with members of the opposite sex is enough to convince anybody 
that the establishment of society and thus the respect for 
obligations, property, in short, of justice is reasonable, 
this alone is not enough to explain why we consider justice 
to be a virtue. For, although virtue and interest usually coin-
cide, they do not always and are thus distinguishable in prin-
ciple.29 It is a natural sentiment, called 'sympathy,' which 
enabling us to "partake" in the feelings of others, gives 
justice its moral character, insofar as it causes in us the 
feeling of satisfaction or displeasure, according to whether 
somebody else, who may not even be closely related to us or to 
our interests, suffers justice or injustice. 
For Hume, then, a philosopher would commit the fallacy 
that he denounces in the is-ought passage, if he were to claim 
that we ought to act justly because doing so is in our best 
interest, since, as we have seen, the knowledge that doing 
'x' is related in ways 'y' to our well being is, at most a 
good motive to do 'x,' but not grounds or a reason for feeling 
obligated to do 'x.' The moral use of 'ought' can be justi-
fied in th~s context only by referring to the feeling of sym-
pathy. Therefore, even if our self-interest or the interest 
of our community prompt us to act, this action of ours does 
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not deserve the name of 'moral' unless it is accompanied by 
a sense of satisfaction arising from the feeling of sympathy. 
But let us stop here our brief discussion of Hume's 
ethics and ·attempt to summarize what we have learned from it. 
our most general conclusion has been that the is-ought question 
as conceived by Hume comprises at least three fundamental 
issues: lo the question concerning the relation between 
reason and morality; 2. the question of the relation between 
nature and morality and 3. the question concerning the nature 
of moral qualities. At present, and since the beginning of 
this century, moral philosophers in the Anglo-American realm 
have been predominantly concerned with question 2, as shall 
become obvious in the next few pages. This is not necessarily 
bad, for when it is formulated in a broad manner, this ques-
tion points directly at the most important of Hume's discover-
ies concerning morals, to wit, that moral qualities are like 
secondary qualities, that they do not exist independently 
from human consciousness, in other words, that they are not 
'natural,' but man-made. 
If we insist on seeing things in this particular way, 
it should not strike us as surprising that parallels have been 
drawn between Hume's Guillotine (let us keep this suggestive 
name) and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. To a certain extent, 
what bothers Moore is also the identification of such things 
as self-interest and universal happiness with the moral good, 
this being a peculiar, indep~ndent, non-natural quality. The 
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point common to both Hume's and Moore's arguments is, I think, 
properly emphasized by H. Prichard' s-30 remark that the cause 
or reason of behavior is not always and not necessarily a 
source.of morality, that is, of obligation. This I take to. 
be the meaning of his apparently bizarre claim that " . an 
~ligation can no more be based on or derived from a virtue 
than a virtue can be derived from an obligation .. 
Apart from the fact that the choice of words is most unfortu-
* nate, and to the extent that the point is reasonable, it means, 
simply,. that not any motive for action is conducive to moral 
goodness. Prichard's thesis ceases to be reasonable when 
dramatized to mean that no motive of action whatsoever, other 
** than obligation, is or can be conducive to moral goodness. 
* Prichard has another.reason to choose these particular 
words, i.e., his intention to disassociate himself from Hume. 
In pages 31-32 he wants to distinguish between intrinsically 
good feelings, v.g. sympathy, and obligation. An act accom-
panied by such a feeling is virtuous in a sense, but not obli-
gatory. This is a consequence of his previous claim on page 
24 that the "apprehension of the goodness" of something does 
not "necessarily arouse the desire for it." Or, inversely, if 
we were to perceive some action as being bad in some sense 
or other, we would have, in Prichard's view, a good reason to 
avoid it, but not a moral obligation not to do it. 
** :Certainly this is not the best place to discuss 
Prichard's paper in detail, btit there is· one comment I would 
like to make regarding this particular thesis of his. The most 
conclusive proof he seems to feel he has offered in support of 
~is view that obligation is, so to say, a moral atom (p. 27), 
~s that, granted that feeling that I ought to do something is 
~dentical to my "feeling moved toward" doing that something, 
it follows that stating that I need a motive, different from 
my feeling of obligation as such, to be so moved, involves a 
contradiction similar to th~ one involved in the claim that I 
can will to will. Since by having a motive other than the 
feeling of obligation "I would be moved toward being moved, 
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This unreasonableness is not present, though, in either 
Kant's or Hare's versions of the thesis, for in both cases a 
foundation for the moral sense of obligation is postulated 
apart from ·the perception of this feeling as such. In response 
to Hume's defiance, Kant sought to demonstrate the autonomy 
of the will, and thus the capacity of the human intellect to 
act as a legislator. Moral obligation (Pflicht) is generated 
only when the will acts disregarding particular interests, 
attempting to conform its actions to a universal law applicable 
to all rational beings. In real terms this means that only 
interests capable of being universalizable can be the subject 
of moral ob 1 iga t ion. 
Now 1 there is a sense in which, for Kant, one can 
validly say that 'ought,' the moral ought, that is, is not 
derivable from 'is.' In the First Critique Kant shows that 
Reason, although active in the sense of being spontaneous, 
is inactive in the second Humean sense of being incapable of 
prompting us to act. It is the will alone which determines 
whether we are to act or refrain from acting. All that the 
pure understanding can do is exhibit the laws governing the 
objects pf nature. But insofar as the will is capable of 
which is impossible." Actually, Prichard has the whole of 
Christian ethics to prove him wrong. For, as is well-known, 
for Christians an action is good only and only if it is per-
furmed for the proper reasons or motives. In fact, there is 
nothing contradictory in the attempts of moral educators to 
teach people to act oµt of the right motives, i.e., to try to 
move them to be moved by the right motives. All the talks in 
courts of law regarding intentions rests on the assumption that 
this is so. 
166 
prompting us to act in accordance with laws, it is practical 
reason. Practical reason or ~will' is 'good' will without 
qualifications, only when it acts, disregarding everything 
else, according to law. But laws are valid a priori, not 
derived from observation through abstraction, induction or any 
other such means. Hence, it is not in experience but in the 
understanding itself that the causes of moral action, of the 
action of the good will without qualification, have to be 
sought. 
But Kant had learned from Hume that the human will 
need not conform to reason, i.e., to law. It can derive maxims 
for action from other sources, from a concern about individual 
happiness or social welfare,. for example. When this is the 
case, the will acts according to hypothetical rather than 
according to categorical imperatives. The former are impera-
tives in the very general sense that they confront the will 
with a sense of objective necessity, but not of moral neces-
sity. An hypothetical imperative indicates the means to be 
followed once a certain end has been chosen, which end can be 
either possible or reai. 32 
Again here, as in Hume's Treatise, the concern is with 
the need to distinguish between those things that can simply 
' 
incline us 'to act in this or that other way, and those things 
that generate an obligation to act. As far as I can see this 
is what the problem of-der~ving 'ought' from 'is' amounts to 
in classical philosophy. 
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With the advent of the very crude varieties of empiri-
cism that became popular at the beginning of this century 
the problem was reformulated. The most unsophisticated and· 
typical ver.sion of this reformulation is to be found in A. 
b k L T h d L . 33 Ayer's oo anguage, rut an ogic. There Ayer sets out 
to prove not that the basis for the meaning of moral statements 
is different from the basis for the meaning of non-moral, 
empirical statements (which is a perfectly obvious, though 
intriguing truism), but rather that because moral statements 
cannot be reduced to empirical statements, the former must be 
meaninglesse According to Ayer, the function of moral terms 
is to express our (arbitrary) feelings or emotions concerning 
certain actions. Because of that, these terms do not add new 
information about the actions themselves, when attached to the 
sentences that describe them. In a way, then, moral terms could 
be replaced by cries or exclamations. The obvious question in 
this context is, of course, why is it that Humanity, that has 
otherwise given numerous signs of being relatively reasonable, 
has invested, each time a new language was developed, so much 
effort in creatini absolutely unnecessary terms. 
:In part, I think, to avoid this kind of criticism, 
Stevenson has insisted upon the fact that apart from communi-
cating ou~~feelings, moral terms are meant also as means to 
influence other people's emotions, that is, to propagandize 
our feelings and have others imitate our approvals and disap-
provals. What reason we have to want to do so, Stevenson, 
168 
of course, does not say, assuming, presumably, that this is a 
task beyond the scope of philos?phy. 
In one of his articles, Stevenson states, with remark-
able candor·, what I take to be the basic assumption of Emoti vism, 
to wit, that "we do not know what good ( or any other moral 
term) means. "34 Such a statement is understandable only from 
the perspective of extreme, naive empiricism and from the 
perspective of the so-called 'picture theory of exhibiting 
meaning.' That is, from a perspective that is incapable of 
exhibiting the richness of language and of social life in 
general. S. Hamshire 35 has pointed out the main defect of this 
approach, namely, its failure to explain moral statements in 
their uniqueness. 
I see two major weaknesses in the position of the 
Emotivists, apart from those already mentioned. Faced with the 
Humean problem of describing the connection between nature and 
morality, but unable, unlike their master, to even conceive of 
the possibility of describing moral qualities as secondary 
qualities of sorts, the Emotivists deprive moral judgement of 
all substantive content and reduce them to the status of mere 
signals.: The difference between Hume and the Emotivists is 
immense, for while Hume argues, as we have seen, against any 
reductionist attempt in regard to morals, the main thrust behind 
Emotivism -is a naive physical reductionism. What the Emotivists 
want is not to avoid the N~turalist Fallacy, but rather to 
commit it. And it is because they are unable to do so in their 
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own terms, that they feel forced to deny any substantiality to 
moral judgements. 
On the other h~nd, Stevenson's trick of a~tributing a 
propagandistic force to moral expres·sions. is mis leading and 
question-begging. For even if we grant him his main thesis, 
he still would be left with the task of explaining the reason 
why most persons do not run around making moral judgements in 
front of persons or other entities whom, they assume, will not 
be susceptible to their moral propaganda. In other words, it 
seems that there are certain facts concerning other humans that 
~ do take into account before uttering moral statements. And 
I see no reason, other than caprice, to want to deny that these 
facts about persons do contribute to the meaning of moral terms. 
It is certainly not an accident that moral statements are 
usually thought to be meaningful only when uttered in the pre-
sence of certain types of persons. 
In modern times there has been another attempt to 
reformulate the is-ought question, which is quite a bit more 
. h h . d H P · " 36 serious t an t e one we have just mentione . . 01ncare, 
in a brief essay dealing with the. impact that the advancement 
of the n~tural and social sciences can reasonably be said to 
have on morality, seeks to refute the claim that eventually 
an empirica:1 science of 'morality,' as opposed to a mere sci-
ence of 'human customs' will be developed. He points out that 
it is logically impossible ~o derive an ought proposition 
as the conclusion of a syllogism all the premises of which 
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are is-statements. From this logical impossibility we learn 
that under no circumstances can we find, by the sole inspec-
tion of nature, a response to our question concerning the 
~rally pro~er course of action. Mostly, because all science 
can provide are propositions in the indicative form. 
K. Popper 37, makes a similar point in the following 
terms: 
All moral decisions pertain in this way to some fact or 
other, especially to some fact of social life, and all 
(alterable) facts of social life can give rise to many 
different decisions--which shows that the decisions can 
never be derivable from these facts, or from a description 
of these facts. 
So, for instance, if we were to establish that humans need to 
be properly fed in order to survive in society, we still would 
have to decide by ourselves whether we want to derive from this 
fact either an equalitarian or an exclusivist morality, that is, 
either one that considers that all humans have the right to be 
fed or one according to which only some have that right. Both 
moralities are perfectly compatible with the same £~ct, pri-
marily because they have nothing to do with the fact as such. 
According to Popper this proves the 'conventional! character 
of moral norms. That they are conventional does not mean, 
nevertheless, that they are necessarily 'artificial,' but 
simply that they are man-made and thus "that men can judge them 
and change them, not necessarily that they have created them." 38 
There is, at least, one natural barrier for moral legislation 
that aspires to be effectiie, according to Popper, to wit, 
"sociological law," i.e., those laws of society that determine 
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the functioning of "social institutions" and that resemble 
the laws of nature. Our decisions have to conform to them or 
they will become ineffectual. 
Before continuing the discussion of the is-ought ques-
tion, I would like to make a couple of general comments on 
Popper's views. I can see two major faults in his doctrine 
concerning the 'conventional' character of moral norms and in 
his attempt to distinguish them from "sociological" norms. 
Precisely because he wants to postulate that all moral norms 
are conventional, he finds himself forced to make this distinc-
tion, a distinction that, as he himself concedes, is not easy 
to draw when studying the functioning of a social institution. 39 
To illustrate his general point Popper relies on an analogy 
between machines and their 'plan or design' and sociological 
and moral rules, warning us immediately, nevertheless, that he 
does not want to push the analogy so far as to allow an iden-
tification of 'social institutions' and machines. 
Obviously, what Popper fails to see in this respect 
is that the ,cons ti tuti ve ,rules of social ins ti tut ions are indeed 
moral, so that, as we have seen in the first chapter, they 
inherent~y or necessarily reflect their purpose or purposes. 
Popper's doubts as to whether it is wise to claim that every 
institution has a purpose, are to be understood in this light, 
as are his remarks about the 'natural' character of certain 
economic laws. The rules -that constitute the economic insti-
tutions of a society, and they alone, are the ones tha~ 
materialize the basic social function of production, and this 
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exhausts all their purpose or meaning. Another way of putting 
this would be to say that Popper fails to recognize that some 
moral rules function as conditions of possibility of social 
1ife. 
Now, and this takes us to the second comment I would 
like to make, attempting to answer this criticism, Popper could 
call in his argument that social institutions do not always 
operate for the advantage of all the members of a society. 
Here we meet a twofold confusion. We have already seen more 
than once that morality as such has nothing to do with the 
aspirations of universal justice; a social institution does 
not seek to serve everyone in a society but only those who 
possess the status of full juridical persons. But let us 
suppose that we adopt the point of view that only those things 
are good which serve all members of a society. What follows 
from this is not that a given social institution that serves 
only some of the members of a society is in itself 'amoral,' 
that is what Popper wants to claim, but that, from our perspec-
tive, the ~imitations imposed on the concept of juridical 
person in this society are 'immoral.' It would seem, then, 
that Popper's arguments to press the distinction between moral 
and sociological laws rest on a fallacy similar to the one he 
,, 
want to ke,ep us from committing. For he seems to deduce from 
the fact that social institutions can sometimes be judged to be 
immoral, the conclusion that social institutions are 'amoral.' 
Once the need that humans have to eat in order to 
remain alive has been recognized, all that can be a subject 
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for discussion are the limitations that ought to be imposed 
upon the extensional meaning of the notion of juridical person. 
That this is a different kind of moral problem than the one of 
recognizing the universal moral rioims as such, should not lead 
us to deny the moral character of the latter. 
I take J. R. Searle's point about 'institutional facts' 
to be in the same line as this criticism of Popper's distinc-
tion. Searle40 claims that, to a great extent, the is-ought 
issue has been generated by a failure to see that there are two 
different kinds of descriptive statements, those referring to 
* 'brute' facts and those referring to 'institutional' fact. 
* From what we have been saying so far concerning this 
issue it should be clear that Searle has in mind not its tradi-
tional formulation, but the first modern reformulation. For 
this reason I will not concern myself at all with his contro-
versial proof, that I take to be utterly unnecessary and that 
he directed against the first reformulation. In fact, the. dis-
cussion of this 'proof' has accomplished nothing, having rather 
obscured even more some of the substantial problems. En 
passant, it is perhaps worthwhile to note, nevertheless, that, 
in a general sense, Hare's argument against Searle's proof 
is conclusive (see "The Promising Game" in W. D. Hudson (ed.), 
The Is-Ought Question, pp. 144-56). For if the derivation 
~rom premises 1 to 5 is possible, they must all be tautologies, 
and it is hard to see how a tautology can entail the necessity 
to act in a certain way. Searle' s response (see "Deriving 
'ought' from 'is': Objection_s and Replies" in W. D. Hudson 
(ed.) The Is-Ought Question, pp. 261-271) that a tautology 
alone does not generate obligations, but because the conclusion 
of his derivation has hypothetical form, when an empirical 
statement is added ("he in fact promised . . . "), then the 
obligation- to do what the conclusion states is generated, is 
not satisfactory. For this argument implies either that the 
empirical statement itself is part of the derivation in which 
case it is, ex hypothesis, not empirical but tautological, 
or it is not part of the derivation) in which case the initial 
~roblem is reconstituted. ·we can hardly agree with Searle I s 
implied belief that the statement presumably uttered by a third 
person, that "X in fact promised ... " is somehow or other 
entailed by "x' s promising. ' X's promising is done through 
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In our language, institutional facts are those pertaining solely 
to the materialization of social functions, i.e., those that 
'constitute' the institutions through which they are materia-
lized. These 'cons ti tuti ve rules, ' Searle says, "constitute 
forms of activity whose existence is logically dependent on the 
rules. ,, 4l Now, Searle' s point is that once I have placed myself 
inside an institution by following the established procedures 
(uttering words or phrases or going pl aces, etc.) the dis tine -
tion between what is and what ought to be collapses, for the 
very act of accepting the institutions imposes certain obliga-
·tions and responsibilities upon me, i.e., precisely those 
laid out by the constitutional rules that make such an activity 
possible. 
This particular way of understanding Searle's arguments 
is, obviously, compatible with the point of view of the GTHSP. 
The main difference being that Searle fails to realize that 
certain institutions are necessary and that, thus, the very 
fact of living in society makes us part of them. That is, the 
rules governing the basic institutions of social life are, so 
to speak, accepted not through a series of separate and unre-
lated ac;ts, but, because they are entailed or implied in the 
very exercise of reason, as defined in the previous chapter. 
All basic social institutions are accepted as a package from 
~erformative, not through empirical statements, since Xis 
incorporated into the game of promising by actually promising, 
not by talking about promising and, much less, by having some-
one else talk about his promises. 
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the very beginning of our life in society. Searle gets into 
the paradoxes pointed out by Hare, that we have briefly dis-
cussed above because he seems to assume that all social insti-
tutions ar~ contingent and that our acceptance of each one of 
them is not, unlike our acceptance of baptism, a one time 
affair; but, rather a sort of compromise that has to be renewed 
as many times as we ~ake use of these institutions. 
But, at this point, at least three objections based 
on the original and the second modern reformulation of the 
is-ought question could be raised. 
For Hume and Kant, we have seen, self-interest alone 
or, for that matter, collective interest, can never generate 
moral obligation but, in Kant's words, only heteronomy. 
Applying this line of argument to our views concerning the 
nature of basic moral norms, someone could argue that, even 
if granted that they are conditions of possibility of social 
life, that is, even if the claim that they are functionally 
necessary is accepted, it still will not follow that there is 
an inherent
1 
necessity to -obey those rules. Two types of 
responses can be given to this argument. First, it is clear 
that th~ only proper subjects of obligations are and can be 
what we have called 'juridical persons.' So, in a way, the 
question whether there are obligations previous to the exis-
tence of society, i.e., to the existence of juridical persons, 
is non-sensical in a simil~r way as the question "what was God 
doing before creation?" is non-sensical according to Saint 
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Augustine. There are no obligations before the institutions of 
society, as there is not time before the creation of the uni-
verse. Time comes with the universe; moral obligation comes 
with society. 
The Kantian claim that obligations are binding not only 
for human beings but, in general, for all rational beings is, 
for this same reason, senseless, since there is no rational 
being in the sense in which humans are rational who is not a 
person, and, consequently, who does not accept the obligation 
of abiding by the fundamental social norms. 
There is a sense, nonetheless, in which the Kantian 
claim that moral obligation originates in the exercise of 
reason is perfectly true. For, as has been established in the 
first chapter, the primordial act of reason is, precisely, the 
acknowledgement that there is an absolute need to accept the 
rule of the basic moral norms in order to make life in society 
possible. The recognition that there are certain obligations, 
this is basically the content of the original act of human 
rationalityt Hence, it can be said that the notion of obliga-
tion is a primordial one. 
Saying that it is mere self-interest or collective 
interest which motivates people to accept the basic social 
norms is, therefore, a highly distorted way of describing 
reality. 'What is at stake is not the well-being of this or 
that other group of individuals, but the very possibility of 
existence of human rati~nal life. Whether the development of 
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~man rationality takes place in stages, like certain psychol-
ogists are now suggesting, or if it comes to maturity as a 
result of a single act, is an independent question. In princi-
ple, Piaget's and Kohlberg's theses that there are stages in 
the development of human moral awareness seem to me fairly 
plausible. Particularly interesting is the claim that the 
first stage implies calculations that take into account the 
~dividual's self-interest, fears, etc. As I have already 
suggested, this is probably the reason why in all societies a 
period in the life of persons called 'childhood,' during which 
* the individual is not seen as a full person, is recognized. 
Most probably, what induced Kant to separate between 
morality and heteronomy so sharply is the fact that it seems 
to exist an obvious discrepancy between the universality of the 
norms generated by reason, and the imperfections of their 
worldly instantiations. From the fact that the universal norms 
are nowhere perfectly instantiated, he deduced a) that the 
grounds for their validity are independent from the form of 
their instantiation since; b) the human will is incapable of 
materializing them in their universal form, i.e., as veritable 
laws that allow of no exceptions. A very hasty conclusion 
* . I ,think, though, that even if Kohlberg's account of 
!he first stage of moral life is true, one ought to be careful 
1n not hurrying to deny the existence of a more developed moral 
consciousness in children. That they have it to a degree is 
P~oven by the fact that they are perceived as such and not as 
wild animals. 
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* indeed, which, among other things, forgets, again, that the 
obligatoriness, so to say, of basic moral norms applies to all 
juridical persons, whether they be two or two billion. The 
~rd 'all' ·in this context refers always to the quality of 
personhood, to the number of real persons existing in the 
world. Assuming that "do not lie" is a universal moral norm, 
the obligation to obey it falls with no restrictions on all 
persons actually existing. These persons comprise what could 
be called the extensional validity of the norm. 
But even if we grant that there is such a thing as a 
primordial act of rationality, by or through which the obliga-
tion of regulating behavior is instituted, still the question 
can be asked, why should anybody, once having consented, 
refrain from withdrawing his consent. In the first instance, 
this question brings us back to the problem of suicide, which 
** we have briefly considered above. In a recent paper, H. 
Krttmer 42 sees what he calls "Suizidalitttt," the capacity to 
end one's life, as an intrinsic quality of the good life, and 
thus, of human life in general. For refraining from committing 
suicide is a proof that life is valued positively. In this 
sense, ~r~mer thinks, the "Suizidalitt!t" is a component or a 
'category' of the good life, that he calls "eudemonistic mini-
mum.'' 
* See the discussion in Chapter I, Part II, a. 
** See Chapter I, Part I, d. 
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But although what are being raised here are philosophi-
cal questions of the utmost importance, they can hardly be 
said to relate to the is-ought issue. For the question whether 
r should end my life, assuming that I am already a person and 
hence accept many an obligation, is, at most, a question about 
these obligations, i.e., whether I have an absolute obligation 
to be a person, and not a·question as to how obligations are 
generated in the realm of human social life. The question as 
to whether I have an absolute obligation to be or to remain a 
person transcends the GTHSP both in the manner considered in 
the first chapter and, in the way in which wonder concerning 
the meaning of the universe as a whole transcends the scientific 
explanation of natural phenomena. Morality gives a meaning to 
human life only in the very narrow sense in which making some-
thing possible gives that something a meaning. The study of 
human morality does not contain the clue for the answer to the 
deeper philosophical and religious questions concerning the 
ultim~te meaning of existence. Or, to put it crudely, whether 
life has a4 ultimate meaning or not, the circumstances for its 
existence are the same. And it just might be that we humans 
are indeed condemned to be good for nothing. 
There is a different way of understanding this objec-
tion that ~eems to be more relevant to the GTHSP. For, .even 
if one grants that there is a primordial act of rationality 
that entails the acceptance. of obligations, one can still feel 
that it is possible to accept some, but not all obligations. 
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fuis can perhaps be best understood if we recall that the 
basic norms are tied to needs, so that accepting the obliga-
tion to abide by a basic norm implies consenting to partici-
prte in social functions aimed at satisfying these needs. 
Hence the argument can be proposed, that maybe it is possible 
to consent to participation in some but not all the fundamental 
social functions. From the definition of social function alone, 
it follows that this argument contains a contradiction in 
terms, for one cannot accept some, but not all the conditions 
of possibility of some entity and still expect that entity 
to subsist as such. 
This last point is fairly important, as can be seen by 
the fact that ignorance of it has led most, if not all philoso-
phers who claim that there is a relationship between human 
nature and human morality, to propose confusing and vague 
theories. So far, I have been able to find only one paper where 
this issue is intelligently discussed, a brief, but lucid 
paper by Eilleen M. Loudfoot. 43 There she examines the posi-
tion of two recent defenders of ethical naturalism--G. J. War-
nock and R. S. Downie, 44 and claims that while the first 
postulates that there is an 'analytic' connection between 
human nature and morality, the latter believes that the connec-
tion is 'synthetic' or 'causal.' Loudfoot offers excellent 
arguments to show that the 'analytic' theory, as formulated 
* by Warnock, is untenable. Her arguments, nevertheless, contain 
* This theory claims that any rule is moral which tends 
towards the "betterment or non-deterioration of the human predica-
ment." 
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weaknesses. She thinks that the main fault in Warnock's 
theory is that it fails to recognize that "even granted that 
implementation of moral rules results in amelioration of the 
~man condition, it does not follow that this is what makes 
these rules moral. That is to say, we can distinguish between 
the consequences of implementing a moral rule and the criteria 
for its being a moral rule, ... u 45 Because Warnock does not 
make this distinction, he is committed to, in Loudfoot's view, 
the inadequate view that a rule like "People ought to destroy 
the human race" is non-moral, rather than immoral, that is what 
we, as normal speakers of English, would be tempted to think. 
Now, we have seen that such a rule is in fact non-moral, for 
its implementation implies the denial of the possibility of 
human social life. Of course, Loudfoot is right in pointing 
out that there are other non-moral rules, like "You ought not 
to raise your head when striking the golf ball." What I do 
not think she proves is that Warnock is in any way committed 
to the view that these two non-moral rules are part of the 
same class 1 of rules~ A philo~ophical theory cannot be judged 
according to whether it complicates the common use of language, 
and besides in this case the word "immoral" can be introduced 
if desired, for there is no contradition implied in calling 
those rules that do not only fail to contribute to the "amel-
ioration" of the human predicament, but also direct behavior 
against this amelioration, . 'immoral rules.' 
Loudfoot has another argument, stronger in my opinion, 
to defend her point. She notices that in Warnock's account 
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art or science acquire a moral character only when they have 
an immediate bearing on the human predicament, but otherwise 
they are substantially different and independent from each 
other. But, if this is the case, Loudfoot continues, conflicts 
can arise between these spheres of human activity so that one 
would have to decide, for example, between improving the human 
predicament and developing a certain line of research. Such 
a conflict cannot be resolved a priori, according to Warnock, 
because morality is only one, though important, among many 
"considerations relevant to practical issues, and accordingly 
liable to be weighed in the balance against others," and "when 
so weighedli be adjudged not decisively weighty. " 46 From this 
Warnock concludes that there is nothing intrinsically "irra-
tional" in such behavior, so that, at the end, there is no 
intrinsic necessity for a man to be moral and if he is so, it 
is only because he wants to: "Thus, it is possible for a 
person to want to be moral; and a person is moral, by and 
large, exactly in proportion as he really wants to be so. "47 
Having correctly detected the weakness, Loudfoot fails, 
in my opinion, to see its real origin and all its implications. 
For her,_ the main problem of Warnock's view that "it is not 
analytic that moral rules are the most important" is that this 
commits him to an infinite regress of sorts for if the moral 
ought is not "overriding," the existence of a superior "ought" 
has to be postulated to solve the conflicts between competing 
practical demands, and hence we are back at the starting point. 
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But although this is a sound argument, there is much more to 
Warnock's thesis. His view that the moral ought is not over-
riding has to do with his failure to recognize morality as a 
condition o.f possibility of social life; it is also because 
of this same failure that he is forced to make morality depen-
dent on the wishes of individuals. His argument that it is in 
fuct the case that people do sometimes attach a greater weight 
to non-moral, than to moral considerations is an abstraction 
that does not prove anything. For not only does he not take 
into account the fact that such decisions never concern the 
welfare of those recognized as persons or, when they do, they 
are backed by reasons similar to those that can easily be 
seen if his examples are examined. For, even if one could show 
that in all cases in which non-fundamental moral norms are 
involved, other, non-moral considerations, are regarded as more 
important by the majority of people, this would not allow us 
to draw the conclusion that morality as such is not necessarily 
overriding. Such a claim is self-contradictory, since what 
it really means is that the obligation to destroy society is 
more important than the obligation to preserve it, especially 
when ou~ aim is to preserve it. 
To summarize, then, although not necessarily backed 
by the best reasons, Loudfoot's claim that Warnock's theory is 
unable to provide an acceptable account of the necessary con-
nection between human nature and moral obligation, is correct. 
The main defect of Warnock's theory being his inability to 
recognize ~orality as a condition of possibility of human life, 
and presenting it rather as a merely desirable end. Refusing 
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to choose desirable ends is certainly not irrational; refusing 
to choose the foundation of human rationality is, on the other 
hand, most certainly irrational. 
Loudfoot's examination of Downie's "synthetic" thesis 
is equally reveal in.g, more, I would think, because of her own 
suggestions, than because of what she has to say directly 
about Downie (which is n~t much) or because of the latter's 
insights. Let us start then, by commenting on Downie' s view. 
In a passage on page 27 of his book, which Loudfoot 
also quotes in part, he claims, after having listed what he 
takes to be "some trivial facts about human nature" relevant 
to morality the following: 
The point is simply that because people and their 
environment have certain obvious characteristics they will 
tend to accept certain forms of social organization. The 
"because" here is to be analyzed causally rather than 
logically; it is not that "ought" means "what pertains to 
social survival," but only that most people in fact desire 
this.48 
In an earlier passage he had emphasized the same thought: 
It (pointing out trivialities about human nature) will, 
secondly, bring out the close link between the kind of 
nature we have and the kind of morality we have. To say 
this is not to say that morality can be deduced from the 
facts of human nature, but rather that we accept the ktnd 
of morality we do because we are the kind of people we are; 
that any plausible account of morality must have close 
links· with an account of what people and their environment 
are like.49 
There are many things that can be learned from these quotations, 
one being that Downie is obviously eager to avoid the accusa-
tion that he is trapped in the 'naturalistic fallacy.' So, 
he does not want to maintain that morality can be "deduced" 
from human nature. But, instead, he wants to make the more 
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prudent and tautologous claim that a correct account of human 
morality must take into consideration human nature. Actually, 
he is not the only recent writer who insists in making this 
claim. Kohlberg so thinks that therein lies, in part, the 
secret of "committing the naturalistic fallacy" and "getting 
away with it." He too feels that although moral psychology 
might not be enough to allow us to construct a normative 
morality, it can nevertheless provide us with sufficient infor-
mation concerning the workings of the human mind, to allow us 
to discard those moral theories that are based on false assump-
tions about it. The point seems fairly acceptable to me, and 
I suppose it could even be a little bit useful for a discus-
sion with a Kantian or with some other kind of misguided moral 
philosopher, who confuses man with God, and sets for the former 
standards of moral behavior appropriate only for the latter. 
Now, the first problem arises when we try to under-
stand what Downie really means when he posits both that morality 
cannot be deduced from human nature and that, as a matter of 
fact, because they are what they are, human beings accept 
certain kinds of moralities that "must have certain structural 
f t . ,, 51 ea ures. 1n common. Loudfoot is right in asserting that he 
does not o~fer too many clues for the clarification of his views. 
She, on the other hand, believes that the reasonable claim in 
this respect would be that given the characteristics of human 
nature, "people causally must have a system of organizational 
rules or morality as such," 52 the differences between actual 
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moralities being explainable in terms of prudence or of the 
differences in temperament of human groups. I do not think 
that this explanation is satisfactory, nonetheless, mostly 
because it does not clarify the sense in which the word· 
"causal" is to be used. In fact, both Downie and Loudfoot 
seem to· assume that the term is more or less transparent and 
in no need of explication. 
From the two quotations we are considering, it would 
seem to follow that Downie believes that the recognition of the 
morally relevant trivial facts does not obligate people to 
accept any particular moral principles, but rather causes or 
inclines them to accept certain principles. In other words, 
knowledge of human nature is not in itself capable of originat-
ing obligation, but, presumably, only the will or inclination 
to assume obligations of a definite sort. So, Downie could 
be making a kind of Humean point, by stressing the £act that 
although knowledge can, under given circumstances, excite 
passions or desires, that is, function indirectly as a cause 
of action, it can never by itself cause us to act and, much 
less, cause us to act morally. The first question that arises 
in this c:ontext is, of course, "if not here, where, then can 
the origin of moral obligation be found?" Downie can probably 
not answer ~his question without stepping outside the frame-
work of his theory, for his· theory suffers of the same illness 
as Warnock's: it fails to recognize morality as the condition 
of possibility of social life and relegates it merely· to the 
level of a desirable thing. We have already seen that 
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desirability can never be the origin of moral obligation and 
that, at most, it can, incorporated into a hypothetical syl-
logism, be connected to practical necessity. The form of 
such reasoning would ·be "if you desire X, then . . . " 
It is in these terms, too, that Downie would probably 
try to justify his claim that all forms of human morality must 
have something in common. The 'must' here indicates that we 
are in the presence of a form of practical necessity. Thus, 
if you desire to establish some sort of social organization, 
then you have to accept a morality that takes into account 
h~an nature and, hence, you have, to accept certain patterns 
of behavior. 
There are two things to be noted at this point. In 
the first place, it would seem that we have not been able to 
completely escape the assumption that it is human nature which 
determines what our moral rules are going to be. For, on this 
account, we discover what can and cannot be done by exploring 
the capacities and the limitation~ 'of human nature. In a sense, 
t~n, the norms that can in fact govern our behavior will be 
deduced from human nature. But, before dealing more exten-
sively with this form of deduction let us consider a second 
consequence of ··townie's 'volitional' thesis. 
Presumably, if you are capable of 'being inclined to 
desire' the establishment of a certain kind of morality, you 
can, by the same token, be inclined not to desire that sort 
of morality .. For it follows from Downie's account that there 
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is nothing that inclines you a priori in one sense or another. 
But if this is so, it is, in a way, like asking what God was 
doing before creation with the aggravating feature that here 
it is assumed that God could have been inclined to destroy the 
universe even before having created it, since the assumption 
that one can opt not to choose the basic moral norms is basi-
cally compatible with Downie's theory. After all, such norms 
do not constitute, in his view, an absolutely privileged class 
of norms. 
It is only by remembering that the constitutive act 
of morality is an act of reason and not simply a volitional 
act, that this absurd consequence can be avoided. Moreover, 
unless we identify the will with a sort of animal instinct, 
we cannot even conceive of its existence until we have estab-
lished the existence of persons, since only of persons can 
volitional acts, in the proper sense of the word, be predicated. 
In a recent paper, a writer by the name of Kunt E. 
Tran~y 53 at~empts to explain the transition from needs to 
norms by introducing what he calls the 'Bridge Principle,' 
which, under certain circumstances, will enable us to "gener-
ate" norms .from "certain types of scientific or well grounded 
insights. _..- .. " 54 This principle states that : 
... , it is not legitimate (it is forbidden, unjustified, 
immoral) for any norm-giver to order or forbid a norm 
subject to do any action which is (known to be) not (phy-
sically) contingent for the norm subject. Only contingent 
actions can legitimately be ordered or forbidden--or, indeed, 
permitted if permissions are norms . 55 
To understand this principle one has to consider Tran¢y's 
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conviction that the proper function of law and morals is to 
"make possible forms of human life, tt 56 so that any norm or 
command demanding what is "physically" impossible for a man 
to do, would ultimately be aimed at the destruction of human 
life. On the other hand, the norms generated in accordance 
with the Bridge Principle are "unrej ectable," because rejecting 
them would be tantamount to a rejection of human-life as such, 
that is, to a rejection not of this or that form of human life, 
but of the very possibility of human life. 
Once the general form of the Bridge Principle has been 
established, it is necessary to determine the facts of human 
nature capable of constituting the basis for the generation of 
"unrej ectable norms." This is achieved, in Tran¢y' s eyes, 
by establishing what humans can and cannot do, which, in turn, 
can only be done if a list of the "basic human needs" is com-
piled, such a list defines the "minimum concept of human life." 
It should be fairly obvious that I consider Tran¢y's 
theory to ~e basically correct~ at least, the part of it that 
* I have here attempted to present. Although the fact that he 
~pes that future scientific research may uncover features of 
human natu~e relevant to basic moral norms indicates that he 
is not fully aware of the real implications of his position, 
* I take this qualification to be indispensable, because 
I consider Tran¢y's discussion of the nature of basic needs 
and their relations to legitimate needs, as well as his whole 
account of the structure of basic needs and the processes of 
recognition of such needs, totally confusing. A detailed dis-
cussion 0£ his views is, nonetheless, unnecessary for our pur-
poses in this paper. 
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and that he, too, fails to see "basic norms" as conditions of 
possibility of human life. Most probably this has to do with 
his insistence on regarding the Bridge Principle as a principle 
of legislation, possibly a legacy of Legal Positivists, that, 
among other things, does not permit him to comprehend the 
mechanisms of need recognition in real societies and commits 
him to a 'contractualist 157 perspective. 
What interests us the most of this theory is the notion 
that norms can be 'generated' on the basis of the perception 
of certain needs, for its discussion will provide us with a 
natural bridge, so to speak, to the discussion of practical 
or moral reasoning, insofar as such a discussion is relevant 
to the second reformulation of the is-ought question. 
The reason why the Bridge Principle works, according 
to Tran¢y, is that a legislator who demands that people do 
what they cannot possibly do, would not be seeking the per-
petuation but rather the destruction of human life, and there-
fore, of la~ as such. Tran¢y is aware that sometimes the 
impossible is demanded from people and he is right to suggest 
that when this occurs, what the legislator usually has in mind 
is the destruction of the people that fall under his juris-
diction. Obviously, in such cases the legislator acts more 
like a politician than like a law-giver. But, the weakness 
of Tran¢y's position is that,it really does not explain why 
anything other than good faith and, perhaps, prudence would 
'force' or better, 'incline' the law-give to act like he is 
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supposed to. In other words, it would seem that prudence alone 
is not enough to incline us to show respect for persons. If 
we indeed ·do so, it must be because we feel that by the very 
~ct that they are persons, we owe them some respect. Only 
so can we explain the fact that not always and, as a matter of 
fact, not even most of the time, does the recognition of some-
body's needs lead to the conviction that we ought to apply in 
regard to him the Bridge' Principle or any other principle. 
Only benevolence can make me feel compassionate toward a 
stranger whom I do not expect to incorporate into my society. 
In other words, what Tra~¢y fails to realize is that the 
Bridge Principle applies only to persons. 
A typical moral, or, if one prefers, practical syllo-
gism, if there are such things, needs have as its major premise 
only "Persons do (do not) do x to other persons" where x can 
mean kill, lie, love, etc. So, for example, if I wonder 
whether to kill John or not, all I need to do is establish 
\ 
whether killing other persons is a thing that persons ought 
to do. Obviously, such a syllogism must also include a premise 
identifying ,me (the actor) as a person, since moral relations, 
we have seen, obtain only between persons. Now, the way I 
determine w·hether a certain action is permitted is by re-
enacting the primordial act of rationality, i.e., by asking 
whether a certain type of relations vioiates any of the condi-
tions of possibility of social life. It is clear that in 
reality this step is not necessary, given that persons, insofar 
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as they are indeed persons, know the limits of their actions. 
It is equally evident that as soon as I cease to regard myself 
as a person, the notion of obligation collapses. 
This is one of the reasons why I cannot agree with 
Hare's view that moral obligation can be accounted for in 
terms of the logical properties of certain kinds of statements 
or (and this amounts to the same thing) by reducing the logic 
of imperatives to the logic of indicatives. Let me use one 
of his most interesting articles to briefly clarify my point. 58 
The article I have in mind is devoted to the analysis and 
discussion of the notion of "the logic of satisfaction" first 
introduced by A. Ross and A. Kenny. 59 The basic contention 
of these authors is that, given that an indicative sentence 
reporting its satisfaction, corresponds to any imperative 
sentence, the logic of imperatives is identical to the logic 
of indicatives. In defense of this view, Hare argues that 
* all the major problems generated by it can be solved without 
* For example, the fact that from "shut the door" accord-
ing to the rules of standard logic we can deduce "shut the 
door or open the window." Or the fact that, from "open the 
door" w~ cari inf er "open the door and smash the window," since 
doing both of these things would satisfy the initial request. 
All that is' ,required to eliminate these paradoxes, Hare argues, 
is to distinguish between "arguments to necessary conditions" 
and "arguments to sufficient conditions." So, to "open the 
door" is a necessary condition to comply with the command, 
while to do both "open the door" and ttsmash the window," 
although a sufficient condition, is not a necessary condition 
to comply with the request. · The only logical fallacy in this 
context would be to assume that the last couple of actions 
coi:istitute a necessary condition for fulfilling the command. 
Using some .of Aristotle's famous example of "practical syllo-
gisms" (see De motu animalium, 6, 7 (70la10-35) Hare tries 
to clarify his distinction. So, for instance, the inference 
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having to commit oneself to the claim that a special sort of 
logic is required to handle practical inferences. So, at the 
end, the reason whi I do not want to issue contradictory 
commands is that, having consented to play the "logical game," 
r want to avoid inconsistencies. Now, given that moral norms 
are universalizable commands, commands that apply to all 
persons including myself, what makes me want to act morally 
is, above all, fear of being logically inconsistent. It is in 
this sense that Hare wants to claim that, once I have con-
sented to play the· moral game (he, of course, does not explain 
why I should do so), many decisions, all those involving rea-
soning to necessary conditions, are made for me by logic. 
This view, we ought to recognize, has at least one advantage, 
for it allows Hare to avoid Searle's erroneous assumption that 
every time I have to do something, a new decision has to be 
made. But, unfortunately, this is not enough to save an 
essentially weak thesis. 
At the end, what Hare seeks to do is to defend his 
ethical formalism. And this is why he is so interested in 
showing that imperative logic "is valid independently from the 
from the objective validity of commands." 60 In fact, he dares 
people to show that the word 'objective' has any meaning in 
"All men are to march; I am a man, ergo, immediately, I march," 
is an inference to necessary, conditions, while the syllogism 
"I ought to create a good; a house is good, ergo, immediately 
I make a house," is an instance of reasoning to sufficient 
conditions,· s-ince there are, more goods in the world than just 
houses. · 
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this context. A moral command is valid, not in virtue of what 
is commanded, but rather because it has certain 'logical' 
properties-,. But, if this were the case, I would have to feel 
that I have an 'obligation' to be consistent when ordering a 
slave to do something, of the same sort as my obligation to 
be consistent when commanding my peers to do something, since 
none of the 'logical' properties of the statements I use to 
command people to do something insinuate or indicate in any 
way whatsoever a difference between slaves and persons. This 
difference is not a 'logical' but a 'moral' one. This is 
not to deny, nevertheless, that certain logical distinctions 
can be grounded upon this moral distinction. 
Saying that an inconsistent behavior on my part, 
when ordering my slave to do something, would be inefficient 
and self-defeating, is besides the point, for, certainly, I 
have no intrinsic moral obligation to use my slaves efficiently. 
~w, it is evident that unless I am arguing for the emancipa-
tion of the slaves, it makes no sense to claim that my moral 
obligations toward my slaves is identical to my moral obliga-
tions towards my peers, unless I claim that every time I make 
a moral claim, I am indirectly arguing for the abolition of 
slavery. So, even if my will to act morally and my desire to 
avoid inconsistencies are one and the same thing, this is not 
the primary datum of moral behavior, for more fundamental is 
the need to recognize somebody as my equal, as a person. It 
is exclusiyely with persons that we play the moral game. 
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So, moral obligation derives from the awareness that I, 
as well as others, am a person. And when I recognize some-
body as a.:person, many things follow, to wit, my duty to obey 
all the fundamental social norms and, hence, my duty t-o accept 
the right of all other persons to demand the satisfaction of 
their needs. The notion of person is, therefore, the only 
~ceptable bridge within 'is' and 'ought,' and no argument, 
from which it is lacking, can properly be called a moral 
argument~ In this sense, the 'logic' of morality is a particu-
lar kind of logic, not reducible ~o any other kind. So, if 
one insists on using the word 'logic' in the narrow sense in 
which it is presently used, moral or practical reasoning can 
be called 'logical' only in the very general sense that it 
too is a kind of reasoning. Although, strictly speaking, one 
ought to say that assertion logic is a sort of reasoning, only 
insofar as it resembles moral logic. 
Arguing from a different perspective, H. von Wright 
has come to the same conclusion. For him too: 
We must, ... accept that practical syllogisms are 
logically valid pieces of argumentation in their own right. 
Accepting them means in fact an enlargement of the province 
of l6gic. We cannot reduce the practical syllogisms to 
other patterns of valid inference.61 
Practical iillogisms, according to von Wright, express uprac-
tical necessitation," "necessitation of the will to action 
through want and understanding." The understanding that von 
Wright has in mind here is the understanding of "natural 
necessitiesfT which enter in syllogisms in the form of hypo-
thetical imperatives as the equivalent of a minor. What is 
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wanted are goals or ends, which occupy the place of a major. 
The conclusions, on the other hand, contrary to what seems to 
be the claim of Aristotle, are not actions, but.decisions to 
act. 
Now, not all 'practical syllogisms' are moral syllogisms, 
but the 'logical form' of the latter is identical to that of 
the former type. And here is where we can find the first and 
most important weakness of van Wright's thesis, namely, his 
fuilure to emphasize the uniqueness of moral arguments. For, 
although he maintains that there are certain norms, to wit, 
"autonomous norms," that are in some sense "intrinsically value-
directed," insofar as a subject recognizes that his goals 
can be attained only by taking into account natural necessities, 
and thus automatically hooks his values to norms covering these 
necessities, 62 von Wright explicitly denies that ends and 
goals as such are normative. He justifies this last claim 
by exhibiting a linguistic fact, i.e., the fact that ends and 
\ 
goals are said to be 'desired' or 'wanted.' At the end, what 
he really wants to prove with this rather shaky argument is 
that there are no necessary moral ends or goals, that is, that 
there are no ends or goals that can be desired for their own 
Sak f h 6 3 . f h h e, or, e argues, 1 t ere were sue., no autonomous 
norm would be needed "to move the wil 1 to action." 
I must confess that L fail to see the force of this 
argument. For I do not perceive any contradiction inherent in 
the claim that ends can be wanted or willed or, what amounts 
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to the same thing, in the claim that values desirable for their 
·awn sake are wanted or willed. All that needs to be done to 
make sense: of this is exhibit the fact that in some cases that 
will is automatically determined to be inclined to act in 
certain ways by the sole perception of necessary values. This 
is exactly what happens when I recognize myself and somebody 
else as persons. When I see a person I am immediately inclined 
to recognize as lawful or legitimate his claim to be treated 
according to certain values and norms. If this were not the 
case, I woul<l not be able to distinguish between a slave and a 
person. Let us examine this:closely and see if there is any 
difference in the way I view the demands of a person in rela-
tion to his right of satisfying certain needs and the 'demands' 
of a slave to do likewise. Consider the model of von Wright's 
practical syllogism: 
L I want this slave A to work for me in the fields. 
Unless A eats, he will not be able to work ergo, 
A has to eat. 
I. 
This is, without doubt, the way I will reason in relation 
to a slave. Here my goal (I want A to work) and the 'natural 
necessity' that A needs to eat, appear 'hooked.' But, cer-
tainly, my goal is not a necessary one, so that not only do 
I not want~it for its own sake, but neither do I perceive it 
as generating an obligation of any sort. 
Consider now a different case: 
II .. I want this person B to work for me in the fields. 
Unless Beats, he will not be able to work, ergo 
B has to eat. 
If we were to stop here, and this is how far van Wright's theory 
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will take us, we would be··committed to the evidently false 
thesis that there is no difference in the way we perceive slaves 
and persons. For, apart from the use of the word 'person' in 
II instead of the word 1 slave 1 used in I, there are no logical 
differences between these two syllogisms. The elements that mark 
this difference cannot be generated from the natural necessities 
plus my goals alone; rather, their generation requires that 
we assign a special logical force to the word 'person.' If 
we do so, the conclusions of both syllogisms can be expanded 
in the following way: I. "A has to eat and I have to 'allow' 
him to eat." It would seem contradictory, on the other hand, 
to say that "I have to 'allow' B to eat," since, by definition, 
I cannot prohibit B from eating. So, the conclusion of II 
will have to read more or less like this: "B has to eat, and 
I have to empower (make it possible for, provide him with the 
means) to eat." And al though in a sense all these other expres-
sion~ could 1 be incorporated into the conclusion of I, what, 
once more, is really important to notice is that the words 
'allow,' 'permit,' 'authorize,' could never be introduced into 
the conclusion of II without producing a contradiction. 
In~ way, what I am arguing for here is something like 
the Kantiai point that persons ought to be treated as ends in 
themselves. Only that I would like to give the claim a much 
stronger form. For it is not only that I ought to desire to 
treat persons as ends in themselves, but rather that I cannot 
do otherwi~e. Therefore, the proper form of syllogism II is 
the one that brings this out into the light. In order to do 
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50 , II needs to incorporate two new premises: "I am a person," 
* and "Bis a person." What this proves is, simply, that the 
notion of .. 'person' is, by itself, a source of norms and obliga-
tions. How all this relates to the existence of necessary 
values will, I hope, become even clearer in what follows. 
But let us first attempt to do what this long digression has 
been keeping us from doing, namely, deduce the fundamental 
moral norms .. 
z. The Deduction of the Fundamental Moral Norms 
a. Preliminary Remarks 
Having already sketched the structure of the Fundamental 
Social Functions, the task of deducing the Fundamental Moral 
should not be particularly hard or esoteric. All that needs 
to be done, actually, is to show which are the norms that 
make the materialization of each of the Fundamental Social 
* It could be argued that I do not have an obligation to 
feed B just because he is a person, and that if I in fact do 
feed him it is because I expect him to be of some use. to me. 
This may even be partly true, but in no way alters my argument. 
In a capitalist society, for instance, many 'persons' starve to 
death an_d not many of their peers seem to mind. But all this 
shows is th~t no one has in this society a prima facie obliga-
tion to feed his peers; rather, only an obligation to recognize 
their 'right' to eat. What is misleading is the fact that this 
right is not isolated but.hooked to a set of other rights and 
obligations, both contingently and necessarily so. That is, a 
pe~son living in a capitalist society has the right to eat, but 
~his right is hooked to his obligation to work, for example, 
1n such a way that his peers assume that his failure to work 
~xonerates them from their obligation to feed him. Furthermore, 
it is not clear whether in fact all the citizens of a capitaiist 
society are perceived as full persons. Many a doubt, I think, 
could be raised in this respect. 
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Functions possible. Another way of putting this would be to 
~y that what we are after are the norms that define or deter-
mine the behavior of persons. 
Furthermore, having established that the substance of 
law and morality is one and the same thing, it follows that there 
is no need to postulate as necessary the existence of an insti-
tution of morality absolutely independent from the institutions 
that materialize the other fundamental social functions, since 
all the norms that materialize these functions, materialize 
at the same time the furidamental social function of morality. 
The reason why in spite of this we have to distinguish the 
fundamental social function of morality from all the other 
is that, as we have seen, its nucleus is constituted by the 
multirelational character of human nature, a character not 
reducible to those determining the other fundamental social 
functions. At the end, it is this character which gives all 
the others ~heir typically hum,n flavor, by determining the 
form in which all the fundamental social functions that they 
in turn determine are instantiated. So, finally, a society 
of men is essentially different from a society of ants, because 
the latter, ,being composed of uni-relational entities, lacks 
morality in the most precise sense of the word. That is, the 
institutions of animal societies do not simultaneously instan-
tiate the social functions that they are prima facie supposed 
to instantiate, and morality, but rather only the former. 
This is pr:ecisely why they can be compared to an organism of 
sorts. In order to see this clearly, let us think of these 
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animal societies in which the individuals undergo biological 
transformations to fit the role they play in their societies. 
such societies are held together not because they are grounded 
on a system of rights and obligations, but simply because 
enough 'organs' have been developed to perform all the tasks 
required for the survival of each of the individuals and of the 
group as a whole. The link between individuals ,and classes 
of individuals is organic, not legal or moral. 
We can see, once more, the absurdity of the discussions 
concerning the "enforcement of morals" .as formulated tradition-
ally. What confuses people is not only the insistence on 
thinking of law and morals as separate entities, a topic with 
which we have sufficiently dealt, but also the failure to 
recognize that morality is pervasive, that morality is being 
enforced when the laws that make education or production pos-
sible are 'enforced.' Morality concerns the whole of the 
social space 1• 
There is, still, one important consequence of what we 
have been say~ng that ought to be stressed at this point. 
For, given that we are not postulating the existence of a 
particular moral institution, and that we take morality to be 
pervasive, Jthe mode of deduction that we will have to follow, 
when deducing the norms pertaining to the fundamental social 
function of morality proper, will be slightly different. But 
let us leave this for the end. 
In, general, then, we will consider that the deduction 
of a given norm is complete_d when we have successfully shown 
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that it is a condition of possibility for the materialization 
of a fundamental social function. That is, what we have to 
show is that a given norm is a constitutive element of 'per-
sonhood,' that no person can be such, who does not abide by 
it, It will always be necessary to keep in mind that the 
persons referred to here are 'juridical' persons, inhabitants 
of the social space. These persons are, by definition, the 
subjects of all the fundamental laws, since they define their 
essence. This does not mean, though, that all norms have to 
be followed by all persons all the time. What this means is, 
simply, that no entity either incapable of following any of 
these norms or unwilling, when the occasion arises, to ~bide 
by them, can be a person. It is logically possible, then, 
that one juridical person might never have to participate in 
the defence of his society, either because his is a peaceful 
society or because he is too old to go to war when wai finally 
breaks out. 'What is incompatible with the concept of person 
is treason. This is one of the reasons why it is important to 
* notice that there are two kinds of fundamental norms, to wit, 
those that demand respect or forbearances and those that demand 
permanent activities. Later on we will see that behind this 
distinctio~ is the fundamental one between 'benevolence' and 
'love.' 
If one desired to do ,so, one could establish a list of 
'rights' and 'obligations' on the basis of the list of basic 
* See Chapter I, 2, b .. 
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Mrms, for they·tell persons how they should behave toward 
other persons. The rights are the same as the obligations. 
A person establish~s what his rights are simply by thinking 
of himself as the passive subject of the basic norms. 
Let us, then, start by presenting, for the sake of 
simplicity, a table of the fundamental social functions accord-
~g to what was established in the first chapter: 
1. Fundamental Social Function of Production; 
2. " " " of Defence; 
. 3. " " " of Health-Preservation; 
4. " " " of Instruction and Training; 
5 .. " " " of Reproduction; 
6. " " " of Morality or Conductivization. 
In what follows we will discuss each of these items 
separately, trying to determine the laws or norms that make 
them possible. 
b. The Fundamental Social Function of Production 
That 1the laws of property are an indispensable part of 
any body of law, is an undisputed fact accepted by social 
scientists of all sorts. Controversies concerning this notion 
arise o~ly ~hen certain types of property arrangements are 
attributed the degree of necessity and universality which 
corresponds exclusively to the institution of property as such. 
In this respect, it is quite useful to think, once again, of 
Marx's criticism of classical political economy. That laws 
of property ~re necessary is shown iri the following way: the 
satisfaction of the basic -human needs is a prerequisite for the 
survival of the individuals conforming a society. Human needs 
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can be satisfied only if the right of persons to possess and 
use the goods required to carry out this satisfaction is 
recognized. It is obvious, therefore, that, first of all, no 
laws can exist in a society· which absolutely prohibit the 
possession and utilization of goods by the persons conforming 
that society. But given that it is a fact of nature that the 
goods required for the satisfaction of human needs are scarce 
and, generally, have to be produced by the labor of man, it 
is also necessary that laws exist in all societies creating 
mechanisms that allow the exchange and distribution of goods 
and that impede the accumulation of all goods produced in a 
society by some persons at the expense of all others. This 
can be accomplished in different ways. Either by establish-
ing a system of distribution that dependi on the amount of labor 
and effort invested by each individual, or by introducing peri-
odical ceremonies of distribution, or by having give-away fes-
1 
tivities like Potlatch, etc. 
But certain obligations are also generated. For, given 
that it is necessary that everybody be permitted to possess 
and use thos_e things that allow him to satisfy his basic neces-
sities, each person has the obligation to abstain from depriv-
~g a fellow person from those things. In the same way, given 
that it is indispensable that certain goods be produced through 
human effort, each and every person has the obligation to 
contribute to the process of production. 
Furthermore, production requires cooperation, both in 
the sense that people have to work together toward the same 
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~al, and in the sense that, given that in most cases more 
than one thing has to be produced for the satisfaction of the 
totality 9f the human needs, people have to take responsibil-
ity for the execution of different tasks. In regard to the 
first, people have the obligation to follow 'technical rules,' 
that is, the rules that make a given activity viable, and to 
associate with fellow persons in ways that make the materiali-
zation of these rules possible. In regard to the second, 
people have an obligation to engage in the exchange of goods. 
Obviously, this kind of exchange is not possible unless cri-
teria are established to measure the relative worth of the 
goods produced by the members of a society in charge of each 
of the branches of produGtion, in relation to one another. 
This, it seems to me, does not imply that the traditional 
notion of exchange value is absolutely necessary, for the 
amounts of two kinds of goods can be said to be equivalent in 
function of th~ needs they are to satisfy. For instance, it 
is quite evident that quantitatively fewer pots than proteins 
have to be produced'by any society. In real terms, then, the 
pottery sufficient to satisfy the needs requiring it is equi-
valent to the imount of pr6teins required to satisfy the 
demand for .. ·it in the population. Time does not play a role 
here, and that is why the labor of the pot-makers over a period 
of a year, and the labor invested during a comparable period 
by the hunters, can be said to be equal, although the latter 
clearly requires more time. in real terms. The factor 'time' 
could be introduced, as Marx does in his analysis of exchange 
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value in terms of the time invested by the society as a whole 
for the education of the pot-makers. But this seems to me to 
be an unnecessary move, since nothing changes even if we 
assume the training.periods of pot-makers and hunters to be 
equal. Therefore, the relevant factor to measure the values 
of labors of two different sorts in respect to one another 
are the needs that they help satisfy. 
From what has been said it seems to follow that, at 
the level of use value, the economic and the moral notions of 
what is 'good' and 'valuable' have to be perfectly congruent, 
since nothing that is required for the satisfaction of basic 
needs can be deemed to be immoral or bad. Those who do so, 
place themselves outside society, although, for the most part, 
those who see a contradiction between appreciation of earthly 
goods and morality, mean by 'earthly goods' useless or super-
fluous ones. 
( 
So far, then, we have generated the following funda-
mental moral norms relating to the fundamental social function 
of production: 
_le Persons should not steal, they should not deprive 
others of what is assigned to them as their pos-
sessions. 
2. Persons should practice liberality, they should not 
refuse to share with others the product of their 
labor. This could also be formulated by saying: 
persons should not be egoists, they should not 
demand more than is their share. 
3. Persons should not be lazy, they should not refuse 
to contribute to the task of producing when required 
to do so. 
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4. Persons .should be forthcoming, they should not 
be unwilling to cooperate with others. 
Clearly, certain rights correspond to each of these 
obligations, for if I have an obligation to abstain from 
robbery because other persons are persons, and if I am a person, 
I have the right to demand that my possessions be protected. 
one can reason in the same way for each of the other cases. 
We will see that in general there is a symmetry between obliga-
tidns and rights. It is obvious, nonetheless, that all soci-
eties require mechanisms that can allow individuals to break 
the symmetry in some cases; these mechanisms necessitate the 
virtue that we could call 'generosity,' which prompts me to do 
my obligations without expecting everybody else to do the same. 
Such an allowance is mostly necessary to ensure the survival 
of the sick, the crippled and the old. Children are not to.be 
included in this list, because, by definition, they are not 
full persons, although we can i~agine that certain allowances 
are conceivable during pe~iods of transition between child-
hood and maturity. Contrary to what some anthropologists seem 
to think, no society based on a strict ·system of reciprocity 
is possible. Such a society would not be able to subsist over 
a long period of time. In fact, there seems to be consid-
erable empirical evidence to show that there is a correlation 
between scarcity and inflexibility in the sense in which 
we are using the word here. That is, a society tends to be 
less flexible, the more difficult it finds to survive. This 
is why it is not surprising at all that Kohlberg's studies 
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show that, among the poor, first stage, strict retributionist 
morality is prevalent. 64 But let us go back to our main busi-
ness. 
c. The Fundamental Social Function of Defense 
Because men are vulnerable to the attack of. other men 
and predatory animals, both in the sense that they can lose 
their lives or be incapacitated, and in the sense that they 
can be deprived of their possessions, the Fundamental Social 
Function of Defense is necessary for the preservation of 
society. 
Now, the protection of the group requires that all or 
some of its members be able to engage in combat with those 
threatening it. But this in turn requires that at least those 
who are in fact going to engage in combat be physically and 
mentally prepared to endure pain and, in general, that they 
be able to deploy atl their capacities, somatic and others, 
in time of war. From this., certain norms follow: 
5. Persons who go to war should not behave cowardly, 
they should not refuse to confront the enemies of 
the group when it becomes necessary to defend its 
territ?rY or its members. 
6. Persons who are to go to war ought to maintain 
themselves physically and mentally be ready to 
fight. 
7. Persons should wage war only under the orders of 
the group; never against the group. Or, persons 
should wage war only against non-persons. 
Again, it is quite clear that in order to accommodate the 
'rights' that correspond to the first norm of the Fundamental 
Social Function of Defense, a certain degree of flexibility 
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is necessary. For, when a 'soldier' suffers an injury in 
battle, he has the right to expect that his fellow persons 
rill .exempt him from participating in other activities, given 
that the value of defense is equivalent to the value of any 
of the other activities necessary for the survival of society. 
Strictly speaking, then, war can lawfully be waged only 
against non-persons. Persons with arms are not .:exempted of the 
obligation to avoid harming or abusing their fellow persons. 
The third norm is necessary both to prevent armed men 
from turning against their own society, especially when they 
constitute a group not identical with the ruling group, and to 
prevent single individuals from engaging in 'private' wars 
that could cause unnecessary hardships to the rest of the 
communityo This, together with the concern for efficiency, 
accounts for the emphasis on 'discipline' among the military. 
It should be evident that when the environment sur-
rounding a given society is particularly hostile, we ought to 
expect the worth of defense activities in relation to the worth 
of other activities to rise, and, with this, the tendency of 
the military to occupy positions of power. On the other hand, 
it should be equally obvious why it is that those who are not 
required to participate in military activities are sometimes 
regarded as semi-persons. For in those societies in which 
warfare is the principal means of survival, individuals not 
capable of engaging in combat are simply not capable of behav-
ing like ftil 1 persons. 
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d. Fundamental Social Function of Health Preservation 
There are two main sides to the preservation of health 
by the individuals of a society. Sickness and injury have to 
be avoided, but, once they have fallen upon an individual, 
they have to be removed and, also, isolated. The first is 
accomplished by norms demanding prudence: 
8. Persons should not seek danger unnecessarily; or, 
persons ought to be prudent and consider the con-
sequences of their behavior for their own physical 
integrity and that of others. Or, persons should 
show respect and regard for the safety of others. 
The derivation of the norms pertaining to the second 
condition needs some more work. Obviously, such norms cannot 
demand that sickness be in fact removed, for their fulfill-
ment would require the possession of comprehensive knowledge 
of nature and human nature. But, if the possession of such 
knowledge is required to comply with a rule that, in turn, 
contributes to the mat~rialization of a necessary condition 
of social life, then we would have to commit ourselves to the 
view that human societies have never existed. So, if we call 
the art of attempting to remove illness 'medicine,' it follows 
horn wh~t ha~ been said that the justification for the existence 
of this art in human societies is not to be sought in its 
effectiveness. An ineffective variety of medicine is as neces-
sary as one that is very effective. This paradoxical claim 
helps account for one of the ,most puzzling facts concerning 
so-called 'primitive societies.' For the most part, with, 
as we know·now, remarkable.exceptions, witchcraft and primitive 
medicine are fairly ineffective, and their curative capacities 
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are, to say the least, limited. So, if effectiveness alone 
were the criterion for the acceptance or rejection of medical 
practices ·Of that sort by the members of human communities, 
we would have to expect that after a very short period of time, 
no one would be willing to submit himself to those practices, 
nor should we expect medicine to remain a respectable profes-
sion. The more or less traditional thesis that.witchcraft 
survives thanks to its supra-terrestrial or religious connec-
tions does not seem to me to be totally satisfactory, although 
it is clearly partly true. The reason why reference to reli-
gion is not enough to account for the survival of ineffective 
sorts of medicine is that it cannot explain why they survive 
even in environments in which they are in no way connected to 
religion without being, because of that, short in advocates 
and followers. 
If not effectiveness and success, something else must 
provide the basis for medicine. It is to this something else 
that the fundamental social norm that we are seeking to deduce 
~st refer. Now, although we cannot command that a person be 
cured whenever he 'is sick, unless curing him is accidentally 
possible, ~e can always command that he be taken care of, that 
he be attended and helped. And this is all that is required 
for the materialization of the second facet of the fundamental 
social function of health care. Consequently, the norm can 
be expressed as follows: 
9. Persons should.care for the sick, they should 
not be indifferent towards the suffering of others; 
or simply, persons ought to show compassion. 
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Mainly, then, the reason why you call in the witch-
doctor is to show compassion toward those who are sick, and 
thls is also the reason why his 'work' is valued by the com-
munity of which he is a member. To a great extent, the fact 
that people are increasingly skeptical concerning contemporary 
medicine and turn to other forms of medical care is explain-
~le in terms of the insistence of doctors to relate the quality 
of their performance to the salary they are paid. For, in doing 
so, they are indicating that they are not willing to perform 
the task that, by nature, they ought to be performing, to wit, 
be the carriers of the concern of the whole community for the 
persons who are sick. To say of somebody that he does not 
deserve to be cured because he cannot afford to pay for the 
treatment) is to deny him the quality of personhood. The prob-
lem here is not that d-0ctors want to be paid, for there is 
nothing intrinsically wr?ng with that, given that they perform 
an indispensable social service "equal in value to any other 
necessary social service. The problem is that some doctors 
of today fail to see that if they are paid, it is not solely 
because they cure people, but rather because they show compas-
sion for them. If this were not the case, it would be impos-
sible to understand why patients with terminal illnesses are 
entrusted to doctors. 
But sickness has to be isolated, which is not to say 
that the institution of quarantine is a necessary one, but 
rather thai there is an intrinsic need to control and impede 
the spreading of disease from one or a few persons, to all 
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the persons of a society. Obviously, keeping the sick in 
quarantine is a good way of achieving this objective, but such 
a practice presupposes knowledge of the existence of contagious 
diseases, that is to say, awareness that in some cases a person 
can act as carrier of a disease and that contact with an 
infected person can result in acquisition of the disease. This 
type of knowledge is elementary enough, but it can hardly be 
said to be necessary. Besides, it relates to specific kinds 
of illnesses, and not to illness as such, and this is what 
needs to be perceived as evil. In other words, what is impor-
tant to isolate is not a person, or a certain illness, but ill-
ness as such, illness generaliter. Such a need is consistent 
with carrying the relative infected with pest away to a city 
that is, so far, free from it. So, if a person is in fact 
isolated or put in quarantine, this is mostly an indication 
that the group desires to stop the advance of a disease, a 
desire that, by the way, has to.be shared by the sick person 
himself, whose voluntary submission to isolation is a sign of 
his regard for the rest of the community. 
One norm make~ all this possible: 
10 .. Persons ought to attempt to stop the spread of 
disease. 
A different way of exhibiting the rationale for this 
last norm is by pointing out the effect of disease on persons. 
Mostly what disease does to persons is to incapacitate them 
for the performance of their roles in relation to the materiali-
zation of the universal moral norms. Although a society can be 
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flexible, as we have seen, in relation to the impotence of a 
~all group of persons, it cannot survive if this group grows 
beyond a certain threshold. The awareness of this fact is what 
underlies the efforts to stop the advance of disease. 
Death is often thought to put an end to the obligations 
and duties of a person, as well as to the obligations that 
other persons have toward him. This would seem. a perfectly 
acceptable thesis, if it were not contradicted by the practice 
of all known cultures, all of which go to great pains to take 
good care of their dead. The way the body of a person is 
disposed of is sometimes perceived as more important than the 
way it was fed while the person was still alive. In most 
societies, burials and matrimonies are the main events in a 
person's life. 
One thing at least is perfectly clear relating to the 
death of persons: those who die are the ones the least con-
cerned with what happens to their bodies. Whatever happens 
to them depends entirely on those who remain alive. So, the 
question should be, why is it that those who stay alive think 
it their responsibility to engage in complicated rituals to 
dispose of the body of persons who have died? Like always, 
the answer should be "because they are (were) persons." That 
is to say, if burial ceremonies are due to persons because 
they are persons,, they must .be, in some way or other, neces-
sary constituents of social life. 
Actually, there ar~ only three things that one can do 
with a body: at tempt to preserve it, destroy it or allow it 
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to decompose following the normal pace of nature. There are 
innumerable examples to illustrate the point that all these 
things have been done at one time or another, in some place 
or another to persons as well as to slaves. So, it is not 
what is done to the body of persons, but simply the fact that 
something is done to them, that is not done to the body of semi 
or non-persons, where the secret, if there is any, must lie. 
Again, someone may argue that to understand the nature 
of burial ceremonies we have to look at their religious mean-
ing. It is, after all, a well-known fact that the mummifica-
tion of bodies is often times justified in terms of the belief 
in an afterlife. But this does not explain why the bodies of 
Lenin and Mao have been p~eserved. Not even references to the 
survival of the deep-rooted religious collective subconscious 
of the Russian people would do the job. For this explanation 
fails to clarify the differences between these cases and those 
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in which religious justifications are given openly and directly. 
That is, in the final analysis, the ieligious hypothesis fails 
to account for the specificity of the cases involving self-
proclaimed atheistic societies. 
Fo~- exactly the same reasons we shall not take too 
seriously the official explanations of political character given 
in such societies. What this argument shows, then, is that 
unless we want to commit ourselves to the implausible view 
that all religious manifestations in human societies are 
political or vice versa, w~ have to attempt to find a deeper 
common characteristic of cultural phenomena, that can take 
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either political or religious appearance, in order to be able 
to understand the true meaning of such phenomena. 
Let us think of a story that has proven to.be philo-
sophically useful more than once to try to see why there have 
to be institutions concerned with the death of persons. What 
r have in mind is the story of Antigone and her desperate 
attempts to bury her brother. She feels obliged to do so by 
Divine Law, while his uncle, the King, feels obliged to impede 
the burial by Civil or Human Law. That Creon, as head of state, 
has no alternative, becomes clear if we recall the universal 
moral norm of the fundamental social function of defense 
according to which one should never turn against one's own 
group. Having violated that law, Antigone's brother has auto-
matically lost his personhood and, with it, his right to be 
buried as such. He is a traitor. But, traitor or not, Anti-
gone feels that she is united to him by a bond superior to ', 
those that Creon considers most important. We have not yet 
studied the nature of that bond, but this does not affect our 
argument, for what is really important in this context is, 
simply, to notice that "the conflict is between two extensionally 
different ~onceptions of person. For Creon, persons are all 
those who belong to the state; for Antigone persons are pri-
marily those who belong to the family group. The tragic dilemma 
for her, then, is not that she has to choose between obeying 
the laws of the state or the law of God, but that her two 
brothers have turned against each other. The reason why 
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Creon's plight does not strike us as particularly tragic is 
that his choice is made for him in advance. As a King he has 
to treat both Antigone and his brother as traitors, the latter 
for the reasons stated above, the former for choosing a limit 
for the notion of 'person' incompatible with the existence of 
the Theban state. 
So, what Antigone refuses to recognize is that she and 
all the other persons of Thebes ceased to have any responsi-
bilities toward her brother as soon as he became a traitor. 
It might seem paradoxical or even contradictory to insinuate 
that one may have responsibilities toward the dead, but this 
is exactly what follows if, in fact, there are universal norms 
regulating burial. procedures. Obviously, the basis for such 
responsibilities must lie in the actions performed by a person 
before his death. During their lives, persons are a part to 
certain relationship that, by necessity, involved all or some 
of the persons of their societies. Now, some of these relations 
at least, such as family and property relations, are the 
instantiations of fundamental social norms and, hence, are 
basic components of the" juridical structure of the society. 
If they were to be dissolved each time a person dies, death 
would become a source of permanent trouble, since scores of 
persons would be periodically excluded from society for rea-
sons totally escaping their control. The death of a person, 
for instance, would be tantamount to the exclusion of his 
immediate relatives from the social bond. It is absolutely 
necessary, therefore, that every time a person dies, the 
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commitment of all these related to him to the responsibilities 
generated during his life time be reaffirmed. Only so can the 
permanence of ~uman society be guaranteed. This is especially 
important when persons occupying.high offices die, since the 
official burial ceremonies signal the continuation of the 
commitment of the entire group to the social relations already 
in existence. 
Perhaps a good way of understanding this is by think-
ing of property relationships. The importance of property 
relations for the subsistence of society makes it mandatory 
that procedures be established to avoid a disruption of the 
prevailing order every time somebody dies. On the other hand, 
it should be clear now why confiscation of property tends to 
be such a prevalent form of punishment in relation to traitors; 
property is a right that belongs exclusively to persons and 
* that, thus, can be taken ~way when personhood is lost. 
So, at this point we can formulate one more universal 
moral norm: 
11. Persons,ought to show respect for the dead; or, 
persons s~ould honor the memory of the dead. 
Why peo~le are particularly concerned by the death of their 
relatives will become clear when we discuss the nature of fam-
ily relations; and why it is that people are particularly 
* d . In some societies this whole point is ma e quite 
explicit by developing the belief that the dead can return 
once in awhile to check whether their interests and the proper 
traditions· are being safeguarded. And they can get quite upset 
when this is not the cas~ · 
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shocked by the dead of some relatives and friends, will become 
clear when we discuss the nature of love. 
Orie of the most interesting aspects of Western history 
have been the attempts to decide what is the period of time 
that should be devoted to work every day of the week. Espe-
cially since the Industrial Revolution, important issues of 
justice have entered the discussion. Something,similar is 
beginning to occur concerning the distribution of space, as 
illustrated by the disputes surrounding the notion of 'zoning.' 
All the writers of social utopias have felt that there was a 
need to make proposals for the ideal distribution of time and 
space and, furthermore, to offer a 'rational'justification for 
their proposals. What 'rational' means in this context is not 
clear. Certainly, there is nothing rational, in the sense of 
necessary, with the arrangements presently accepted in most 
societies. Most of them, if we are to believe what little the 
historians have to say about, the subject, derive from vague, 
although basically true conceptions elaborated by medieval 
monks. According to this conception, given that there are 
three basic functions of life--work, worship and rest--the 
day should.be divided so as to allow identical periods of time 
to be devoted to each of these activities. The Anarchists 
who fought for the eight hour work-day had similar theories, 
as probably most of us do, particularly if the worship com-
ponent can be replaced by the more attractive notion of fun 
or entertainment. 6 5 
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Psychologists and physicians like to argue concerning 
the amount of rest, measured in hours, that the human psyche 
and body need in order to perform their functions properly. 
Most of them agree that the ideal amount is subject to change 
rith age and other such factors. What is clear and undeniable 
is that some time is necessary for rest and some for work. 
For, without the first, the human body would collapse, and 
without the latter it would, at the very least, die of star-
vation, since, as far as is known, no one yet lives in 
Schlaraf en land and, to use E. Bloch's beautiful phrase, "hunger 
still runs through human life." Whether periods of time 
devoted to fun or worship are indispensable is not so evident. 
But let us examine what it is that makes the distribution of 
of time a necessity. 
It has always amazed me how little philosophers have 
inquired into the nature of time. True, some efforts have 
been made to elucidate the notion of 'physical' or 'natural' 
time and since the development of the Theory of Relativity 
the investigation of this issue has taken some quite fasci-
nating turns. But apart from the relatively recent specula-
tions of some phenomenologists, little has been said concerning 
the form of time that is most immediate to human experience, 
to wit, social time. The question of social time is not the 
question of the perception of time that interests the psychol-
ogists. This issue, together with the question of the nature 
of physical time, are secondary issues, for it is only in the 
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unilateral imagination of philosophers that the measurement of 
time has been undertaken by men of all ages for the sake of 
mere intellectual curiosity. A means to measure apd, hence, 
to divide time is necessary, because there is a need to allo-
cate periods of time for the performance of the different 
tasks of life. So, as long as some kind of criterion for 
measurement is proposed, it is irrelevant, from.the point of 
view of social existence, whether it is arbitrary or not. 
On the other hand, how, in general, time has to be allocated, 
follows from what we have been saying. For, if it is true that 
there are fundamental social functions, it follows that some 
time out of the total time of each person's life span has to 
be set aside for his continual participation in each of the 
fundamental social functions. So,. for example, some time 
has to be destined for participation in the fundamental social 
function of production, and some time for participation in the 
fundamental social function of health-preservation. The 
periods that we reserve for rest are part of the time consumed 
by this last function. 
At this point, sbmebody could object that it is not 
obvious tha.t every person has to participate in each of the 
social functions, so that it might be the case that some per-
sons do not need to devote time to one or more social functions. 
There are two things to be said in response to this argument. 
First, it can easily be shown that all persons have to devote 
time to at least some of t~e functions, the function of health-
preservation being one of these, since no person can survive 
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without rest or nourishment. Second, although it would seem 
that not all persons have to participate in the functions of 
production and defense, this does not constitute a counter-
example to our thesis that time has to be divided, because, 
a) at least some persons have to be occupied with these func-
tions or with activities relating to them, and b) those per-
sons not occupied with these functions need to devote some time 
to the performance of other fundamental social functions, to 
wit, enough time to generate the amount of value equivalent 
to the value generated by those involved in production or 
defense, or must have a valid excuse for not going to war or 
for not working, such as old age, for instance. In fact, the 
division of labor is necessary precisely because many of the 
fundamental social functions have to be materialed simultane-
ously. 
A very interesting question that suggests itself in 
this connection is whether the Sabbath or resting day is 
necessary. One could even make the question more comprehen-
sive and ask whether periods of holidays, that is, periods 
during ~hich people who participate regularly in such funda-' 
mental social functions like production are allowed to take a 
break. Several matters have to be considered before the 
question can be answered. 
Assuming that such periods are necessary, one would 
have to determine whether they are so in relation to all the 
fundamental social functions that can cease to be performed 
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* fur a period of time, or only in relation to some or to one 
of these functions. Also, if sabbathi or holidays are neces-
sary, they must be so for reasons other than those that make 
the daily or more regular resting periods necessary, since 
the latter, if they are indeed indispensable, should be suf-
ficient to satisfy the n~eds that generate them~ 
In order to study this issue, let us imagine a very 
poor society, such that its members have to work incessantly, 
without being able to stop their work completely at any given 
moment. Let us further imagine that to keep the mechanisms 
of production going without interruptions, they have estab-
lished a system of turns, so that not all have to work at the 
same time and some are always free to rest and to perform all 
the other social functions. Now, let us ask in regard to this 
society whether a period is necessary during which all the 
members of the society rest simultaneouslye Obviously, the 
need for such a period has to be fairly fundamental, given that 
its celebration would imply days of fasting and other hardships. 
* This qualification is needed because such functions 
as health-preservation and defense cannot be suspended totally 
during any period, although obviously they may be partially 
suspended.· Days of fasting, vigils, and the designation of 
periods of peace like the one that helped prolong Socrates r 
life, are examples of suc4 partial suspensions. Besides, 
there is a contradiction involved in thi affirmation that 
the performance of all social functions can be simultaneously 
suspended. For, what such affirmation really means is that 
in order to preserve the soc"ial bond~· the social bond must be 
d~ssolved. .Probably, the closest one can get to the dissolu-
tion of the social bond is the celebration of a traditional 
carnival. But even in this case, the rule of only some, not 
of all the basic moral norms is temporarily lifted. Even in 
the midst of the wildest of cainivals, no one is allowed to 
kill., 
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Suppose that in order to avoid these hardships the 
people of this miserable society decide not to have holidays. 
The crucial question in that case being whether such a soci-
ety does still deserve the name of society. If this is the 
case, then we are assuming that not a single one of the funda-
mental social functions requires that all persons be ever 
engaged in its materialization at the same time. It is impor-
tant to realize that we are talking about a society that does 
not possess the institution of slavery or its equivalents, 
for in a society where such an institution exists persons can 
easily find time for holidays, all they need to do is make 
sure that the slaves take turns doing their jobs. Aristotle 
was perfectly aware of this fact, and this is why he maintains 
that only free man can partake of the good-life. Of course, 
he had. assumed what we are tryi~g to prove, namely, that there 
are some social functions the materialization of which requires 
that all persons participate periodically in the activities 
relating to them. His justification of the institution of 
slavery depends precisely on this assumption. 
In order to establish whether there are fundamental 
social functions that require the celebration of holidays, we 
have to examine complex societies, since the simpler a society 
is, the more acute is the likelihood that all its members know 
each other and/or are related by emotional ties. Let us then 
think of a society where the persons do not all know each 
other and where the divisi9n of labor is well developed. Are 
holidays necessary in such a society? What is it that is 
225 
celebrated during holidays? In Western societies, at least, 
a division is made between religious and civil festivities. 
But I doubt that this division is a reflection of some neces-
sary trait of social life in general, for it makes sense only 
against the historical background of the separation of Church 
and State. We can think both of a state in which all holidays 
are religious and of one in which all festivities are civic. 
so, it would seem that the pretext for a holiday is not what 
characterizes it essentially. The same can be said concerning 
Sundays, for if their religious justification were the real 
reason why they are set apart as days of rest, then they would 
have long banished from Western societies. As a matter of 
fact, the tendency seems ~o be to push for the creation of 
more 'leisure' time. This has always been a major goal in any 
program aiming at the emancipation of the workers, suggesting 
that they perceive the increase of leisure time as a 'right' 
that, once obtained, will enhance their condition as persons. 
But, what is it that people do during their holidays? 
It has become a fairly common thing to hear well-meaning, 
usually_conservative and not very imaginative persons, warn 
us about th~ dangers of the multiplication of leisure. The 
argument is that people do not know what to do when they are 
not working or sleeping. Some wise intellectuals see the 
solution in a widespread interest in the arts; more realistic 
but not less ·narrowminded businessmen suggest, on the other 
hand, that people should invest their free time acquiring 
226 
unnecessary goods. Obviously, the appearance that the serious 
sociological problem of the 'use' of leisure time takes in 
western, industrialized societies is not the only ~ppearance 
that it can adopt. Besides, what underlies these recommenda-
tions is the clearly false assumption that 'working' is the 
only obligation that a person really has. For leisure is 
conceived as 'time-off-work.' Now, we have already estab-
lished that time has to be allocated for the realization of 
all fundamental social functions, so that, leisure in the 
limited sense of time during which there is absolutely nothing 
that has to be done, is to be carefully distinguished from the 
notion of leisure as time-off-work. In consequence, given a 
certain period of time reserved as a holiday in the narrow 
sense of time-off-work, not all of this time can be devoted 
to leisure in the general sense of the word. But, of course, 
it might well be that the division of the day is enough to 
take care of all obligation~ and so, we are back to where we 
started, unless we find an obligation or necessity inherent 
to the notion of person the materialization of which demands 
that 1011:g periods be set aside for its sake. 
In ·order to create in the United States conditions 
similar to those of the miserable society we described above, 
all we need to do is imagine that class distinctions solidify 
to the point that no social mobility is possible. If this 
happens, the members- of the different classes will not relate 
to each other according to. the same rules, that is, there 
Will not be a relation of reciprocity between them, for the 
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subject of obligations will not be at the same time, a posses-
sor of rights equivalent to these obligations. In other words, 
if this happens, the members of the lower classes will have 
lost at·least part of their personhood. Such a society is·· 
certainly possible. What is not possible is to call all those 
living in it 'persons,' for the notion of 'persons' implies, 
as we have seen, that any given person can relate to any 
other given person according to a unique set of rules equally 
applicable to both. As we will see, this is a consequence of 
the fundamental social function of conductivization or morality. 
But the concept of juridical or social relations itself requires 
that this be possible.' Insofar as I am a person I should be 
able to move freely in the social space, that is, I should be 
able to relate to any person in any point of the social space. 
This very general need requires that enough time be destined 
for these relationships to develop, irrespective of whether 
they in fact develop, and this is the primary meaning of the 
periods of holidays. No person is fully a person, who is 
condemned to perform a single activity throughout his life, 
especia~ly if the performance of this activity is associated 
with the loss of certain alternatives. 
Several things follow from this. In the first place 
we are now in a position to answer the question whether the 
miserable society described above is possible. The answer is 
'no.' No, unless a number of its members are deprived of their 
personhood. No society of. persons can subsist without periods 
during which all persons, with the sole exception of those 
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needed to perform the basic social functions that cannot be 
suspended, are granted holidays. 
rt should be clear also that there must be a correla-
tion between the complexity of a society and the length of its 
holidays. The more complex a society is, the longer its holi-
days. As a matter of fact, in simple societies, where all 
or most members know each other, holidays and week-ends tend 
to be confused. 
A great deal of the apparent implausibility of this 
thesis can be dissipated if one thinks of the kinds of col-
lective sentiments that prevail during holidays. It is par-
ticularly during holidays that people attempt to hide their 
differences, so to say, they all dress in Sunday clothing. 
Carnival, the period during which anybody can be anything is, 
perhaps, the clearest example of this. 
Connected, but not entirely identical with the primary 
function of holidays, is the need to reaffirm periodically the 
collective commitment to the social bond. In the modern 
national states this takes the form of national holidays. In 
some other societies it might surface, as we have seen, as a 
day of remembering the forefathers~ Such celebrations are 
not a waste of time, as some would have it, but a reiteration 
of the fundamental act of rationality, that is, a reiteration 
by each individual that his commitment to the norms that make 
his society possible is still in force. 
From all that has ~een said in the last pages one more 
fundamental norm follows: 
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12. Persons should time their activities properly, 
i.e., they should be able to participate in the 
materialization of all the fundamental social 
functions. 
As far as·I know, geographers and economists have been 
those most interested in the structure of the social space 
and in the rules governing the allocation of space. Again, 
philosophers have little to say on this matter. But that 
space is a primary component of social life is obvious. What 
is not so obvious is the relationship between social and physi-
cal or, better, geographical space. We have seen that social 
relations are conceivable between people who do not occupy 
the same geographical space. The first question, then, should 
be whether it is also conceivable for a society to exist which 
lacks a location in the geographical space. Another, clearer 
way of putting this would be to ask whether a society is pos-
sible which lacks a territory. There is at least one reason 
to say that this is not possible. The reason is provided by 
the fundamental social function of production. The minimum 
of territory required for a society is, consequently, the 
territory necessary for the materialization of the fundamental 
social °function of production. This explains why, of neces-
sity, the defense of this minimum of territory has to be one 
of the primary functions of the military. 
But once this has been established, a second question 
naturally arisesi is more territory than the minimum just 
determined necessary for the materialization of society? I 
think the answer is no,'for none of the other social functions 
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demand additional territory; all they demand is a certain 
organization of the available geographical space. This is true 
especially of the function of health preservation, which 
requires that space be allocated for the edification of rest-
ing places, meeting places and special areas for the satisfac-
tion of bodily needs related to the processes of nourishment 
and metabolism. We can see that in this case there must be 
a certain correspondence between the allocation of time and 
space. But this should be no surprise, since the forces 
determining both are the same. 
The fundamental social functions of reproduction and 
instruction require that some space be set aside for use by 
children, who can neither.participate in the tasks of produc-
tion, nor protect themselves, and who need to be instructed. 
This does not mean that space for 'schools' or their equiva-
lents is necessary, for much if not all the instruction can 
certainly be done 'in the field. ' 
What has been said so far, .does certainly not exhaust 
the topic, but is nonetheless enough to show that a fundamen-
tal nor~. relating to the allocation of space is necessary: 
13. Persons ought to allocate and demarcate a terri-
tory so that all fundamental social functions can 
materialize. 
As a digression, and before leaving this issue, let 
us ask whether there is a maximum territory that societies 
can claim as theirs. The word 'claim' in this context is 
relatively misleading, fo~ it seems to insinuate that socie-
ties possess, as a matter of fact, a certain inherent 'right' 
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to lay claim on portions of territory. This is evidently not 
the case, for such a right presupposes the existence of con-
tracts or: agreements binding all existing societies (or, at 
1east, all neighboring states). But different societies have, 
by definition, nothing_ in common, so that any contracts or 
agreements between them must be explicit and capable of being 
dated or else be the result of lack of interest. Considering 
what has just been said, somebody could be tempted to resur-
rect the old and popular thesis that the maximum of territory 
that states can have is the territory that they can in fact 
hold and defend. The only problem with this thesis is that 
counter-examples to it abound. There are, indeed, many soci-
eties that have much less.territory than they could possibly 
defend against a foreign attack, while there are also innumer-
able societies that could not possibly defend the territories 
they possess against an aggression by one of their neighbors. 
In reality, territorial limits are set, mostly, by what in 
general we could call 'international agreements,' which can 
be tacit or explicit. 
_ There is, nonetheless, a way in which the thesis that 
we are discussing can be understood, that sheds light on one 
of the important aspects of warfare. Picture a crowded world 
composed of nations with expanding populations and, hence, 
with constantly increasing territorial needs. In that case, 
it would seem correct to claim that the maximum territory a 
state can have is the terr~tory it can defend and hold. But, 
most likely, in such circumstances the maximum and minimum 
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_are not going to be very far apart, unless, of course, the 
conquest of additional territory by a given society is accom-
panied by genocide. 
At any rate, it seems to me that the only thing that 
can safely be concluded from all this is that there is no need 
to determine a maximum territory for a society, save in the 
limited sense of a territory that could not be,defended but 
at the cost of its destruction. 
At the beginning of the discussion concerning the 
allocation of space, we reminded ourselves of the fact that 
persons leaving the geographical space can still be said to 
have remained in the social space. But there is an intriguing 
question to be asked in this respect: how many persons can 
simultaneously leave the geographical space assigned to their 
society without causing its desintegration? Undeniably, if 
all Peruvians left Peru simultaneously, nothing much would be 
left of Peru, save an empty.piece of land that, furthermore, 
is not likely to remain in that stage for a long time, given 
that, as we know all too well, national states 'abhor vacuum.' 
When all members of a society leave simultaneously the terri-
tory assigned to them, the real consequence is the abolition 
of the social bond. Therefore, a norm is necessary to pre-
vent this from happening. So, the limits of the liberality of 
the state concerning the freedom of movement of its members 
are set by the need to keep those social functions from col-
lapsing, the collapse of which would lead to the dissolution of 
the social bond. 
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14. All persons should not leave the geographical 
space simultaneously. 
e. The Fundamental Social Function of Instruction and Training 
Without pretending to be a soothsayer or witch, I would 
dare to predict, nevertheless, that Ivan Illich's criticism 
of the institutions of schooling of modern societies 66 will 
tur~ out to be one of the most lasting sociological studies 
of our age. Among many other things, Illich's study is impor-
tant because it proves that education, training and instruc-
tion ought not to be confused. That is to say, education, 
understood as the sort of training given in schools, is not a 
necessary and not even a desirable trait of society. But if 
schooling is not necessary, the same cannot be said of instruc-
tion and training. Why they are necessary, we have now to 
show. 
A society can perpetuate itself only if the vast 
majority of its members, a) .know the basic rules that make 
possible the materialization of fundamental social norms, 
b) if they master the skills required to follow those norms 
and to relate to each other according to them and, c) if they 
are sufficiently acquainted with the conditions of their 
environment directly related to the materializations of these 
norms. All those things that persons need to know, we will 
call 'cognitive universals.' At this point it is not neces-
sary to discuss in detail each of the cognitive universals, 
for all we have to establish in order to deduce the fundamental 
norms connected to them is show that they indeed exist and that 
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they demand the existence of the institution of training and 
instruction. 
That a) describes a set of necessary coriditions for 
human social existence is self~evident and does not need of 
further clarification. It could be argued, nonetheless, that 
given that all fundamental social norms are, so to say, learned 
through the primordial act of rationality, no specialized 
institutions are required to instruct the young in their 
meaning. Two remarks have to be made in relation to this. 
We have seen several times now that it is not clear, a priori, 
whether children fully understand the necessity inherent to 
* the fundamental social norms. It seems, rather, that their 
lack of full understanding, i.e., the fact that they have not 
completely performed the primordial act of rationality, is 
what distinguishes them as children, in which case instruc-
tion is required to help them reach that point .. But even if 
we choose not to adopt this .line of argument, there is another 
fact that cannot be ignored and that forces upon us the same 
conclusion. Children living in real societies not only have 
to come_ to understand all fundamental social norms and, hence, 
the concept of person in general, but also the extensional 
limitations attached to this concept in their societies, i.e., 
those norms that we have called contingently necessary, namely, 
necessary for the subsistence of the particular society in 
* What is obvious is that they have some understanding, 
for otherwise they would not be perceived as prospective persons. 
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which they are to live. This knowledge is undeniably not 
innate, but has to be acquired through instruction and train-
ing. 
But it could be argued that this knowledge is inherent 
in the language spoken in any society, and that therefore no 
especial effort needs to be invested in teaching it to children. 
This very plausible argument proves, at most, that no special-
ized institutions for 'moral' training are needed, but it does 
not prove that training as such is not needed, since nothing 
can be more obvious than the need to instruct people in the use 
of language. And this takes us directly to the discussion of 
the cognitive universals in group b). The principal of this 
universals is, by far, la~guage, the one tool that makes inter-
personal communication possible at the level required for the 
existence of human societies. Without language only the most 
primitive affective relations could be established between 
people. A human society requires that all persons living in 
the social space be able to relate to each other without 
necessarily establishing immediate contact, and to achieve 
this, ~ medium capable of spreading information over the 
entirety of the social space is indispensable. This can be 
done with more or less speed and efficiency, but it must be 
done, and language is the only means available to humans for 
that purpose. 
On the other hand, the social functions of production 
and defense require that people be trained in the skills and 
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techniques necessary for conducting the activities that 
materialize them. These techniques vary in each society. 
Fur~hermore, given that humans have a finite intellec-
tual capacity and limited gnoseological power, they rely for 
the acquisition of information regarding the conditions of other 
humans relevant to their own action, and for the acquisition 
of technical knowledge, on the good will of other persons. 
Persons, then, ought to be willing to communicate information 
relevant to the materialization of the fundamental social norms 
and, at the very least, they should not attempt to block the 
flow of such information. 
So, it is clear that three kinds of norms are neces-
sary for the materialization of the fundamental social func-
tion of instruction and training: 
15. Persons should instruct and provide training for 
the young and, in general, for all persons in 
need of it. 
16. Persons should not attempt to impede the flow of 
information relevant to the materialization of the 
fundamental social functions. 
17. Persons ought to attempt to preserve the cultural 
patrimony of their societies. 
f. The Fundamental Social Function of Reproduction 
Of the many utopian communities that sprung all over 
the United States in the XVIII and XIX centuries, the Shaker 
communities survived the longest. To a great extent this has 
to do with the £act that the Shakers were not, for the most 
part, unlike, for example,. the members of Brook Farm or New 
237 
Harmony, intellectu~ls with more commitment to ideals than 
practical abilities. The Shakers were able to combine a high 
deg~ee of· commitment, with no less discipline and, above all, 
with astounding inventiveness and ingenuity. These qualities 
allowed them to retain, for a long period of time, a consider-
able degree of independence. This independence and, finally, 
the whole movement were lost because of one thing: their 
refusal to indulge in the minimum of carnal contact required 
for the reproduction of the human species. If ·the Catholic 
Church has been able to survive as an. institution for so long 
it is, simply, because the interdiction to engage in sexual 
intercourse does not apply to all its members, but only to a 
selected few. 
Given their stubborness, the only alternative open to 
* the Shakers would have been to make themselves immortal. For, 
although this would have probably led them to question their 
whole view of the world, since extreme renunciation does not 
seem to make very much sense if one is not going to die, this, 
at least in principle, would have allowed them to perpetuate 
their societies. But humans are finite and their works, includ-
ing the societies they organize, can be perpetuated and pre-
served only through reproduction, i.e., by the generation of 
new human beings. 
*of course, the Shakers could also have become kid-
nappers. But although the sequestration of children and 
~omen is a common practice, no stable society can depend on 
it. At least no stable society devoted to peace and worship, 
for sequestration usually leads to war and conflict. 
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The proble~ is that reproduction is not as easy as it 
may, at first sight, seem to be. The first matter to be solved 
is to ensure the provision of an adequate amount of females. 
It is no wonder that so many a battle has been fought for the 
sake of women, nor that one of the most universal and power-
ful myths should be the one of the 'eternal femenine.' From 
the point of view of reproduction, females arei so to speak, 
more valuable than men. 
But once enough women have been secured, it is neces-
sary to establish a system for their orderly mating with men. 
America Vespucci says in one of his letters that the Indians 
he encountered in the Caribbean did not seem to have any rules 
governing their behavior in this respect. We really do not 
need the immense mass of anthropological information accumu-
lated in the last decades to prove that he was a poor observer, 
at least insofar.as this issue is concerned. For no human 
society without precise mating rules is possible. This is not 
to say that periods of promiscuity cannot occur. Examples 
of just such periods are innumerable and can be found in any 
era of human history. As a matter of fact, total promiscuity 
has been proposed more than once as the final means for the 
-
liberation of mankind. But the existence of promiscuity does 
not necessarily indicate the absence of mating rules. This 
becomes evident when one realizes that what really matters 
is not how people mate with each other, but the reason why 
they mate. Let us explai~ this. 
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Aristotle, ·as is well-known, believes that promiscuity 
is incompatible with the existence of a good state, because 
it, like ·communal property, would re$ult in the negation of 
the essence of the state, that he calls 'plurality.' For if 
everything is held in common, absolute unity will prevail, 
given that the difference between individuals is marked pri-
marily by private property. This, of course, assumes that 
women are treated as property, but, certainly, this is not a 
necessary trait of human society. Equally weak, in my opinion, 
is the argument that because certain undesirable emotions 
like 'jealousy' and 'anger' are or can be generated in connec-
tion with the relations between the sexes, norms ought to 
exist clearly regulating these relations. In the first place, 
there is no reason to believe that emotions are the cause of · 
moral norms and, hence, that emotions are prior to moral norms. 
In fact, we will see that emotions are dependent on moral 
norms and regulated by them, at least those that can be morally 
relevant. Furthermore, there are more examples that can be 
handled to show that in different societies, different emo-
tions are attached to the same kind of relations. So that 
while promiscuity is likely to anger the citizen of a certain 
state, it might well leave those of the neighboring state 
perfectly indifferent. It seems, then, that what is in ques-
tion here is not anybody's bad temper, but something else. 
In general, confusion regarding this issue arises when 
the assumption is made th~t sexual activity as such is morally 
relevant. In fact, there is no reason whatsoever to think 
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that sexual activity, conceived as a source of pleasure, has 
to be regulated for human society to exist. Sexual activity 
is morally relevant only insofar as it is related to repro-
duction, since it, reproduction, has to be regulated. And it 
has to be regulated mostly because responsibilities toward 
children need to be assigned to each member of society with 
absolute precision. The reasons for this are, .primarily, the 
demands deriving from the fundamental social function of 
instruction and training, and the fundamental social function 
of health-preservation. The rules regulating responsibilities 
toward children define the legal status of children as pros-
pective or semi-persons, for they exhibit the existence of 
institutionalized concern. for them and for their well-being. 
It is clear, on the other hand, that rules demanding 
that children reciprocate the concern shown by their lawful 
tutors are necessary, for these tutors constitute their most 
immediate link to the rest of society. 
Three norms derive from this: 
18. Persons ought to take care of children and, par-
ticularly, of those of whom they are the tutors. 
19. Children must love, respect their tutors. 
20. Persons should not attempt to reproduce outside 
the established order. 
If there is such a thing as a decadent society, the 
signs of decadence will not .be a weakening of its military or 
economic strength but, mostly, a massive refusal by its citi-
zens to procreate and rear children~ This is precisely why 
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societies that propose extreme individualism as their greatest 
value are not likely to survive for a long period, unless, 
of course, the cult of individualism is replaced by a not less 
fanatic cult of collectivism. I see in this dialectical 
process one of the real connections between capitalist indi-
vidualism and fascist collectivism. It is not surprising at 
all ~hat the technobureaucrats of both black and red fascist 
states tend to be extremely conservative in their moral views, 
loudly proclaiming the great need to preserve the reproductive 
institutions of their societies, and to take good care of the 
children, if only to send them later to die in absurd wars. 
g. The Fundamental Social Function of Morality or Conductivi-
zation 
The fundamental social function of morality, we have 
seen, is determined by the plurirelational character of humans, 
and, hence, partly materialized by those fundamental moral 
norms that realize all the fundamental social functions, that 
is, all those forms of human relations that, being necessary, 
set the limits beyond which no relations compatible with human 
social life can materialize. At the beginning of this section 
of the paper, I insinuated my belief that in spite of what 
has just been said there is a realm of human social life not 
covered by any of the fundamental social functions we have 
studied so far. This realm,· which we are now going to study, 
guarantees the specificity of morality. 
One way of arriving at the kingdom of morality is 
condu~ting a sort of methodical dqubt, since given any of the 
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fundamental moral norms we have already deduced, the question 
can always be asked, why is it that I ought to follow it, why 
is it that I ought to comply with it? Once all the questions 
have been asked, one common answer will appear as the only one 
acceptable; I ought to do so-and-so because I am a person and 
I recognize others as persons, and if I do not do so-and-so, 
a society of persons will be impossible. We have seen that 
this premise is an essential constituent of all moral reason-
ing. As a matter of fact, we can say that it constitutes the 
core of all moral consciousness. In.contrast to the basic 
rules be have considered thus far, those reflecting this 
essential demand of morality require a respect or regard for 
persons in general or, what is the same, they require that 
persons we respected for their own sake. Prior to any par-
ticular actions or abstentions, these rules require an attitude 
that is to permeate all behavior involving persons. 
Nothing, perhaps, e~hibits better the profound wisdom 
of Christian ethics than the exigency to go beyond law by 
restraining not only action but also the spirit. Goodness 
lies m~re in the general mood of the spirit, than in any of the 
actions undertaken in the name of the law. Thus, the call 
to love God above all things, for the love of God does not 
require external signs. And thus, too, the urge to love men 
with the same kind of love offered to God. Real 'caritas,' 
for the Christians, 'immediately links those that experience 
it to God. 
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Similar conceptions are to be found in all the major 
ethical religions and in the most serious systems of moral 
philosophy. This is notably the case of Confucian ethics, as 
has recently been pointed out by G. H. Mahood, who claims that 
it is proper to think of "'hsiao' as exhibiting par excellence 
thfr spontaneous and 'natural' aspect of character, for example 
in the form of amiability and in broad terms humanity, and 
(also to think of) 'li' as in its general form emphasizing 
a 'rulev ethic, the norm in accordance with which human wants 
should be accommodated." 67 The 'Analects' abound in exorta-
tions to keep these two virtues together. According to Con-
fucius, in the same manner that a good disposition alone, 
which ignores or disregards tradition, cannot lead to good-
ness, so, regard for tradition, that is not complemented by a 
good disposition of the spirit can, in the long run, lead only 
d · 1 68 to error an ev1 . 
In his own secular manner, many a major philosopher 
from Hume, through Dilthey to Ross has recognized what is 
variously called 'benevolence,' 'sympathy,' 'love,' 'gene-
rosity,.' 'regard for persons,' etc, as the central moral 
category. And to that extent, at least, the moral systems 
of these philosophers have hit the target. As did, many 
centuries before, Aristotle, who claims that the Supreme Good, 
which is the "end of political science," is "to produce a 
certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtu-
ous, and capable of performing noble actions." 69 A virtuous 
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man is one who seeks the mean, that is, one who seeks to do 
the appropriate actions, to display the appropriate amount of 
feeling in each occasion, and who does so not because he feels 
an external pressure to do so or because he expects to gain 
something in return, but because he desires what is noble or 
good ('kalos') for its own sake. 70 The sign or symptom that 
the good man, who, at the ~ametime is a good citizen, natur-
ally desires the good, lies in the happiness or enjoyment 
that virtuous behavior affords to him. Thus, finally, only 
the life of the good man can be perfectly enjoyable and har-
moniousj since only the good man can overcome the conflict 
between duty and inclination. 
But, why is it, then, that even the most barbarian 
writers of our day, those that claim that human nature is for 
the most part beastly, feel forced to recognize a minimum of 
benevolence in the disposition of man towards his fellow speci-
men? M6~tly, I suppose, be~ause even in their narrowminded-
ness they see the impossibility of accounting for human social 
existence without postulating a minimum of 'social instinct.' 
Of cour~e, to confuse benevolence with an instinct is, in 
itself, a major non-sense,. as are, as we have seen, all those 
theories of human nature that fail to record the specificity 
of social existence. At the end, it is absolutely irrelevant 
for the GTHSP whether there -is a 'natural instinct' of benevo-
lence or not, although·, en passant, I would like to remark 
that all attempts to explain both animal and human social 
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phenomena on the ba~is of social instincts seem to me to be 
rather tautologous. A little like explaining the movement of 
the heavenly bodies by imagining them propelled by ghosts or 
unknown forces. To say that men live in society because they 
possess an instinctive inclination to do so, adds nothing to 
our understanding of the forces camouflaged under the label 
of ~instincts,' In fact, recent observations 71 seem to sug-
gest that the notion of 'instinct' is useless even to explain 
the social behavior of monkeys. 
So, philosophers and barbarians alike seem to agree 
on one thing, namely, that there seems to be a sentiment that 
could roughly be called 'benevolence' or 'good disposition,' 
and that this sentiment underlies human social existence. If 
this is so, it should be possible to deduce it, that is, it 
should be possible to show that it is a condition of possi-
bility of social life. 
Suppose that humans living in society lack benevolence 
or the capacity to love their fellow men. The bonds between 
them, if any, would be those determined by interest or 'incli-
nation~_' such as the interest to protect each other against 
aggression by common enemies, and sexual desire. Now, in none 
of these cases are there any a priori reasons why a given 
individual should relate to a certain other individual rather 
than to someone else, nor are there any reasons why the alli-
ances, once established, should last beyond their immediate 
usefulness. Aristotle had these facts in mind when, in the 
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politics, he claimed that a 'polis' is something more than an 
association of convenience. He was mistaken, though in assum-
ing that·:the sexual impulse added to self-interest is enough 
to generate the family bond, as can easily be inferred from our 
discussion concerning the nature of the family. Interest as 
such, then, cannot be the cause of our permanent relationships 
with other people, nor does it provide a clear, criterion to 
discriminate between people, other than an accidental one. 
It could be argued that the feelings of friendship and attach-
ment that can develop during periods of prolonged or intense 
contact and cooperation suffice to supplement whatever inter-
est alone cannot provide. But it certainly is not difficult 
to find arguments to prove this assumption false. To begin 
with, let us consider alliances established for the sake of 
the immediate advantage of the parties involved. Once the 
purpose of the alliances has been fulfilled, it can well be 
the case that the immediate interests of the parties could 
begin to conflict with one another, given that, ex hypothesis, 
there is nothing to prevent the same situation from arising in 
relatiQn to one another, that had previously led them to unite 
·against a third party. If this were the case, the emotional 
ties that had had time to develop, would soon be dissolved to 
be replaced by their opposites. 
But let us consider,next associations for the sake of 
mutual benefit that point at a long range or mediate goal. 
Take survival, for exampl~. Given that what we have in mind 
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is the survival of each individual, and given that environ-
mental and other conditions are subject to permanent change, 
it is within the real~ of possibility that at a certain point 
in time the survival of one of the individuals will depend on 
his breaking the bond with his occasional partner. That 
faced with these circumstances he would do so, we know a pri-
ori,. since we are operating under the assumption that survival 
is, for both individuals; the supreme value. 'Friendship,' 
being a consequence, rather than a cause of the initial con-
tract, is not likely to survive the disappearance of its 
cause. There are numerous examples of this sort of thing, 
especially in capitalist societies, where the 'friendship' 
between employer and emplpyee, even one that might have 
developed over the years, rarely prevents the former from fir-
ing the latter when the real or imagined needs of the firm so 
require& Think also of the 'paternalistic' relationships 
between servants and masters, or, easier, of international 
relations, which are explicitly based on self-interest. 
One could go further, of course, and argue that friend-
ship o~, at least, 'real' friendship has the power to change 
or reshape any relationship so that all other concerns end up 
being subordinated to it. That many persons are willing to 
die for their friends can hardly be denied. The problem here 
is that it is not self-evident that the friendships capable 
of leading to the sacrifice of one's life can originate in an 
alliance of convenience. In order to clarify this whole issue, 
we have to start by asking the question, what is required for 
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someone to prefer somebodyelse's life over his own life, as a 
matter of principle? Obviously, self-interest does not gener-
ate such ·a principle, save by ignorance or mistake. Whatever 
generates such a principle must be something that takes into 
account much more than just our physical integrity and our 
survival, for nothing that postulates that as the final goal of 
our ·behavior can, without being self-defeating, endorse any 
form of unqualified self-denial. That is, anyone willing to 
sacrifice his own life for the sake-of someone else must not 
have in mind his survival as a physical entity. And at this 
point the riddle dissolves, for, clearly, it is only of per-
sons that such an extreme sacrifice can be expected and 
demanded. That self-sacrifice and self-denial is demanded of 
persons under certain circumstances is undeniable. In fact, 
just such an implicit demand is part of the relations that 
persons have to some other persons (not to all persons, though) 
in all societies. War is, 9f course, a great exception, for 
during periods of war all persons are expected to be willing 
to give their lives for the sake of society as a whole. 
In Western societies, for instance, a male is expected 
to sacrifice his life for ·the sake of his wife and children 
and the children, once they have reached a certain age, are 
expected to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of their 
parents'. Everywhere, the worst forms of cowardice are assoc-
iated with the failure to do just that when the occasion comes. 
To use Aristotle's terms, it is, then, from those that have 
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come together not for the sake of life alone, but for the sake 
of the good life, of life as persons, that extreme sacrifices 
are demanded. 
But here a new question arises. Granted that what 
has been said so far is true, it is still not clear what the 
procedure is by which persons discriminate between those 
deserving their self-sacrifice and those not deserving it. 
Or, more generally, between those with whom their interests 
can, in principle, never conflict, and those with which con-
flicts of interests can, in principle, develop. That a princi-
ple or criterion that permits this sort of discrimination is 
necessary, is undeniable, since without it, it would not only 
be impossible to distinguish between persons and non-persons, 
but between persons themselves in regard to the degree of 
responsibility and liability that is due to each in relation 
to everybody else. So, without such a criterion, it would be 
impossible to deliniate the. social space, and also, for example, 
to distribute responsibilities regarding the education and 
training of children. 
_ In fact, then, we are talking about two kinds of dif-
ferent processes. Both originate simultaneously and consti-
tute the core or substance of what, so far, we have been calling 
the primordial act of rationality. One process determines 
our incorporation into a society of persons in general, by 
allowing us to distinguish between in- and out-siders. The 
other permits us to find ~ur place in that society by setting 
up a system of liabilities and responsibilities as well as 
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rights toward certain definite persons and groups of persons. 
These two processes will be analyzed in detail in the next 
chapter. "' Here we are exclusively interested in determining the 
norms that make them possible and that guide their materializa-
tion. But before we try to formulate the laws, we should get 
clear as to their content and function in relation to the other 
fundamental norms. 
It seems relatively evident that first and foremost 
they have to command an attitude, a willingness to do and to 
refrain from doing certain things in relation to persons when-
ever and where ever the occasion arises. These things are 
all those connected to the satisfaction of needs that are pre-
requisites of social life~ To the hypothetical question, why 
should I submit to you?, these laws do not answer "because 
it is in your self-interest" or anything of that sort, but, 
simply, "because you are a person." For the bond they seek to 
generate between persons is absolutely necessary and can be 
so only if it is intimately connected to the very nature of 
personhood. So, a person does what he is supposed to do, not 
because he wants or expects to obtain some reward in return 
(not even in heaven), but solely because he wants to be what 
he is, because, so to say, he wants to persevere in his being. 
I think it is quite appropriate to call the attitude 
or inclination we are discussing, in the form it takes in rela-
tion to the first task mentioned above, 1 benevolence.' It 
being a general disposition towards persons to behave, in any 
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and all matters relating to them, according to the universal · 
moral rules. In fact, all that is required of persons is that 
they should wish other persons well (bene-velle- eunoia-
eumeneia), that they should exhibit some concern or love for 
their neighbors. Benevolence in this sense is a sign of 
1filan-thropia.' It is in this context too that we need to 
understand the dyad good/bad. The substance of goodness are 
the norms that materialize the fundamental social functions; 
its form is the obligation to abide by them in all relations 
involving persons. Good and evil are, therefore, the most 
universal terms of any language and, cert~inly, the most nec-
essary. 
We have already seen that in regard to certain persons 
and kinds of persons greater exigencies can be placed upon our 
conduct than in regard to persons in general. Benevolence, 
then, does not extenuate the meaning of 'goodness'; goodness 
of character demands, in so~e cases, what could be called 
1 love.' Christian Ethics, in its orthodox version probably 
the most demanding of all systems of ethics, does not make this 
distin~tion, since above and beyond the most intimate of our 
earthly bonds, it places the bond with God. Universal and 
unrestricted love, this is the demand of Christian Ethics; a 
demand that, although it expresses the most honorable and 
ambitious of human ideals, exceeds by far the levels of 
effort and ·dignity required for existence in society. Not 
even when the socialist r~volution has managed to create an 
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homogeneous social space covering all the corners of the earth, 
will the demands of Christianity have necessarily been met, 
because what they seek is not merely that all humans be recog-
nized as persons in their own right, but as brothers. And 
that requires the moral capacity of the holiest of saints. 
But even those of us who are no saints have to exhibit 
a certain, not negligible, amount of love and willingness to 
sacrifice our personal interests and inclinations for the sake 
of others. Three fundamental social functions demand this 
most forcefully and immediately: production, reproduction and 
training, for the greatest amount of self-sacrifice is requested 
of those adults and children whose wellbeing is the responsi-
bility of each other. What we call 'friendship,' is the result 
of the free development of a love relationship between two or 
more persons. I use the word 'free' in this context to indi-
cate that the relationship between two friends is not pre-
sanctioned by society, in the sense that necessary norms are 
in no manner involved in the pairing of two particular friends. 
That persons are capable of developing close friendships, I 
consider the most noble feature of humanity and whatever can 
be done to improve its lot will most likely depend on it. 
So, 'benevolence' makes it possible for us to behave 
like persons, both by marking the difference between persons 
and non-persons, and by defining good and bad behavior in 
relation to persons in general. Love, on the other hand, 
determines the realm of our concrete and most immediate respon-
sibilities; much more demanding than benevolence, it asks not 
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only that we refrain from doing evil, but that we actively pro-
mote, sometimes at the cost of our own well-being, the well-
being of-.those to whom it binds us. No one, therefore, can be 
said to love his neighbor, if he is willing to let him. starve 
to death under certain circumstances. 
So far, two are the most general norms of human morality 
that we have been able to determine: 
21. Persons ought to be benevolent, they ought to do 
good or follow all the norms constitutive of 
personhood, and they ought to avoid evil, i.e., 
they ought not violate the norms constitutive of 
personhood. 
22. Persons ought to love their neighbors, they should 
care for those persons and/or children whose well-
being and subsistence has been entrusted to them 
by the norms of society. 
So far we have said not a word regarding 'justice,' the 
one virtue that has most extensively been discussed by moral-
ists and politicians in the West. This last qualification is, 
oddly enough, necessary, for nowhere in the writings of Con-
fucius and Mencius, for example, have I been able to encounter 
a reference to a single virtue that could only be translated 
by the word 'justice.' A gentleman, in Confucius' sense, could, 
I suppose, be called just, but, if so, only in virtue of his 
possessing all the qualities which characterize him as a gentle-
men. For Aristotle, on the other side, fairness or justice 
entials a particular way of relating to people that can be 
distinguished from other virtuous sorts of behavior, although, 
in a general sense, 
Sa 1 • ,72 me as virtue. 
'justice,' Aristotle notes, means the 
In its particular sense justice has to 
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do with gain and loss and can be either distributive or cor-
rective. Without going into further detail, our question 
must be, ·-simply, wheth.er the type of virtue that Aristotle 
calls 'justice' is a necessary feature of persons insofar as 
they partake of the fundamental social function of morality, 
or whether this virtue is somehow or other a part of one, 
some or all of those we have already discussed. 
'Benevolence' and 'love' enable and dispose persons 
to treat other persons as such, that is, according to univer-
sal norms. In a way, this creates a willingness to give to 
each what is his due. We have already seen that a limited 
version of this principle is necessary for the materializa-
tion of the fundamental social function of production. But it 
is also clear that such a principle is the basis for the divi-
sion of labor and the exchange of services that make social 
life possible. Aristotle remarks, quite appropriately, that 
'political justice' can be ~aid to exist only between "free 
and (actually or proportionally) equal persons, living a 
common life for the purpose of satisfying their needs." 73 
Obviou~ly, non-persons have, in principle, no right to demand 
to be treated justly in this sense. In general, though, this. 
type of justice is covered by the principles of benevolence 
and love, for they establish the equality of persons, assign-
ing equal value to their basic demands and their activities 
and products. 
There is a sense, nevertheless, in which benevolence 
and love need to be complemented~ For 'personhood,' no matter 
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what the empirical criteria are according to which it is 
bestowed in each cise, is not a permanent quality, but a con-
tingent one, insofar as it is dependent upon the activity of 
the subject. That is, a lack of activity or an activity which 
does not correspond to the principles of benevolence and love 
can, in fact, result in the deprivation of the quality of 
personhood. All this follows, then, from the fact that human 
societies are not static, but dynamic entities, and that, 
therefore, their ontological consistency depends upon and is 
exhausted by the activity of their elements. 
And these elements, we have seen, are multirelational 
creatures, whose relationships are not predetermined, but have 
to be regulated through ~mechanism of norms. This mechanism, 
which is artificial, on the other hand, cannot be more perfect 
or less flexible than its creators, who can, by the very 
activity that creates and maintains it, hamper its function-
ing and even destroy it alt9gether. Two things follow from 
this. The first is that a principle of elimination is required 
to ensure that the elements that have become cancerous and 
threate_n the survival of the mechanism as a whole will be dis-
carded. The second is that enough flexibility has to be incor-
porated into such principle, so that the ratio of elimination 
of persons never exceeds the ratio of incorporation of persons 
into the society. This second principle we can call the 
'principle of lenity'; the first we can call the 'principle 
of punishment or eliminatipn.' The principle of lenity quali-
fies the principle of punishment, a feat that can be 
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accomplished in two ways: a) by establishing alternatives 
to the total de-personification of persons who engage in 
deviant behavior; b) by establishing a principle of restitution 
or compensation. A third imaginable possibility, that of 
ignoring the sins of a person, has to be discarded on the 
grounds that such a practice would be self-defeating for a 
system of law, since ignoring violations of basic rules by 
persons, that is, violations involving, ex hypothesis, damage 
to other persons and the negation of the personhood of the 
violator, would be tantamount to negating the necessary charac-
ter of basic moral rules. 
In general, the principle of lenity gives a person a 
chance to regain his personhood by doing something that, in the 
eyes of his fellow persons, ieconstructs the state of things 
that had been broken. The principles of lenity and punishment 
constitute what we could call the general principle of 'justice.' 
In the way it is presented ~ere it corresponds quite closely 
to what Aristotle calls 'rectificatory' or 'corrective' justice 
(to diorthootikon). 74 
The third principle comprising the fundamental social 
function of morality is, then, the principle of justice, that 
could be formulated as follows: 
23. Persons who violate the universal norms ought 
to be punished by their peers. 
24. Persons ought to be generous, they should exercise 
lenity in relation to other persons who violate the 
universal laws and who, accidentally, cannot fully 
comply with t~em. 
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With this we have basically completed the deduction of 
the fundamental moral norms. Much more could be said regarding 
each one-:of them, but our task here was, merely, exhibiting 
them. There is still, though, something that has to be done 
in this chapter for the sake of coherence and clarity, namely, 
we have to state explicitly what we have been assuming as known 
throughout our discussion: the relationship between norms, 
virtues and values. 
3. Norms and Virtues 
Aristotle complains somewhere about the lack of words 
in the Greek language to designate some of the virtues that he 
considers essential. At this point, however, we can say that 
Aristotle's complaint is only partly justified, for ex hypo-
thesis, no language can lack the words or, at any rate, the 
expressions to refer to any virtues or vices which are in fact 
essential. Why this is so, we are going to see in what fol-
lows. 
In a recent book entitled "The Virtues," 75 Peter 
Geach,_the author, deals primarily with the so-called theo-
logical and cardinal virtues, trying to show, in many an 
ingenious way, that these virtues are absolutely indispensable 
for anybody interested in preserving human social life as such, 
and in endowing it with a minimum degree of dignity. I am not 
going to discuss Geach'~ book in detail, although that would 
certainly be a task worth the paper and the time, nor am I 
going to deal specifically with any of the classical treatments 
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of virtues and vices from Aristotle and Theophrastus to Acqui-
nas and Hume, for although such a critical exercise is bound 
to be illuminating in itself, if ~ndertaken now, it would take 
.us away from our topic, which is the exhibi tioll' of the table 
of virtues, and the clarification of the relationship between 
them and the fundamental moral norms. 
Let us start by asking what virtues and values are, 
and whether there is a difference between them. It is not 
so difficult to detect a first difference between values and 
virtues, a difference that, although linguistical, might well 
reflect something deeper. Virtues, as Aristotle points out, 
are usually predicated of persons and their dispositions and 
actions, while values are usually thought of as goals to be 
met or ideals towards which one ought to strive. A person 
can be said to have or possess .certain values as well as cer-
tain virtues, but the senses of the words 'have' and 'possess' 
are different in each case. To have certain values is to hold 
iliem dear,:to consider that, in principle, one's actions ought 
to correspond to them. But I may hold in great esteem the value 
of truthfulness and still be a liar. This is not possible if 
I possess the virtue of truthfulness, for the only sign of pos-
session that counts in this case is the very fact that I do 
not lie. 
Also, we do not say of a person that he is 'valuable,' 
~less we are speaking in utilitarian_terms, that is, unless 
we have in mind his usefulness in regard to something or other 
2 58 a: 
that is to be accomplished. But, to say of someone that he is 
•virtuous' is a perfectly common way of talking. 
But let us leave these simple distinctions where they 
are for a little while and ask directly what the connection is 
between norms, values and-virtues. Consider one of the norms 
that we· have already deduced, for instance "do not be indif-
ferent toward the suffering of others." Obviously, this state-
ment has the form of a command, of an order or imperative. 
The immed~ate subjects of commands are, ex hypothesis, persons. 
What is commanded of them is that they adopt a certain atti-
tude, that before we called ~compassion.' Now, it seems to me 
that such an attitude or disposition can well be called a vir-
tue, its contrary being a 'vice,' in this case the vice of 
indifference. Given that all basic norms can be materialized 
only through the behavior of p~rsons, it is evident that a 
command, demanding that persons exhibit certain virtues in their 
behavior, must correspond to each of them. That is to say~ 
there are at least as many basic virtues as there are basic 
norms, and to each of these virtues corresponds a vice. A 
person's character, insofar as he is in fact a person, is 
virtuous to an extent and by definition there cannot be a 
person that is utterly vicious or corrupt, for corruption 
destroys the quality of personhood. 
Now it should be obvious why Aristotle's complaint, 
to which reference was made above, is! if taken too seriously, 
~surd. For a language, just because it is a language and is 
therefore meant as a means of communication between persons, 
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must have a ·:way of naming persons, and no language, which lacks 
a means to characterize them, can name persons. 
But what about 'values,' wh.ere, if at all, do they 
fit in this scheme? Consider again any of the norms we have 
deduced. Does it make any sense t~ claim in relation to them 
that they 'command' a person to have a value? If we take each 
norm individually I think such talk does not make sense. 
Realization of this, perhaps, is what has prompted some philo-
sophers to argue in favor of Axiological Realism. I have in 
mind philosophers like Max Scheler, Meinog and Nicolai Hart-
mann. It just seems that the behavior of persons is not 
directly connected to values so as to make their ontological 
consistency dependent on it. Values appear to have a way of 
subsisting without persons, independently of persons, after 
all, they are not directly predicated of them. 
To claim that there is a value for each virtue com-
manded by a norm, is a typical and excellent example of need-
less dupli~ation of entities. Nothing is added in any way 
whatsoever to the virtue of 'compassion' if we put it next 
to the 'value' of compassion. But 'compassion,' the virtue 
that is, is really understood only when it is seen in the 
framework of human social behavior, and concretely, when it is 
perceived as a demand stemm~ng from a condition of possibility 
of social life. Values are, ~t seems to me, the concrete 
expressions of these conditions of possibility in society. 
That is, there must be as many basic values in any society as 
there are fundamental social functions. The basic norms, then, 
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rather than ·:commanding a value, stem or derive from them. 
Hence, the table of fundamental values is identical to the 
table of fundamental social norms. 
It used to be the case that great attention was paid 
by philosophers to moral feelings or emotions, sometimes also 
called 'passions. 1 But, both if we observe the common use of 
language or the works of philosophers in which they appear, 
we will find that these words are used, almost without excep-
tion, as synonymous of the word 'virtue.' When A. Smith 
writes of "moral passions," what he means are "moral virtues," 
and this is also basically true throughout Hume's writings. 
And when we praise somebody for. being 'honest' or 'generous,' 
we praise him both for having a virtue and/or a certain type 
of feeling. Nonetheless, there are a couple of feelings that, 
not corresponding.to any virtue in particular, have been 
perceived by many philosophers since Antiquity as the basis of 
all moral behavior. I have in mind the feelings of pain and 
satisfact~on or pleasure. A substantial number of people 
attempting to explain the causes of human behavior have seen 
in the interplay between pain and pleasure the answer to all 
their questions. And ancient and modern Epicurians and Utili-
tarians alike have seen in their interplay the source of human 
morality. Let us then paus~ briefly and examine the relation-
ship between pain, pleasure a~d morality. 
That human beings are capable, of experiencing pain and 
Pleasure is undeniable. What is not so clear, though, is 
whether the assumption, uncritically accepted by many, that 
there are certain specific feelings which could be called 
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'pain' and 'pleasure,' is in fact acceptable. When I cut my 
finger I experience pain. But if I fast for a week, shall I 
be able to analyze the kind of suffering I will experience 
into the two components 'pain' and- 'hunger'? Certainly, the 
rather soft suffering that normally nourished persons seek to 
break by means of eating bread is not to be called 'pain.' 
But when the fasting is stretched long enough, and even if we 
assume that no organs have yet been affected to the point of 
becoming independent causes of 'pain,' the sensations of hun-
ger and pain tend to be intensified. And the same seems to 
apply to other kinds of suffering. In general, then, it would 
appear to be the case that the word 'pain' designates more a 
degree of suffering, than a specific kind of suffering. But, 
what does it mean to say that hum~ns can suffer? Nothing more, 
I think, than what is conveyed.by the affirmation that humans 
are vulnerable. Suffering is nothing but a sign or, if pre-
ferred, a symptom of the vulnerability of. humans. Suffering is 
the result of the malfunctioning of the human body or of the 
hustration of some of its functions. 
Pleasure or satisfaction, on the other hand, is just 
the opposite, i.e., a sign that there is nothing wrong with the 
human organism and that its relationships with the environment, 
natural and social, are smooth. Having shown this with great 
clarity is, I think, one of t~e greatest merits of W. Dilthey's 
unfortun_ately not well-known but bril,liant essay on the nature 
of rnorality. 76 What,· in the ,final analysis,allows the human 
organism to survive, Dilthey claims, is that its 'instincts' 
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(Triebe) enable it to distinguish the dangerous from the bene-
ficial elements of nature, and that whenever a balance or 
agreement is established between the environment and the 
organism, the feelings attached to each of the instincts react 
by producing a sensation of satisfaction (Lustgefuehl). If 
this were not the case, Dilthey argues, or, worse yet, if the 
opposite were the case, that is, if the proper balance that 
we spoke about were accompanied by a feeling of pain, the 
human organism would be unable; to survive. 77 
But, if this is true, have we not made a serious mis-
take by not postulating the capacity to feel pain and pleasure 
as one of the characteristics of human nature that operate 
as prerequisites for human social life, that is, that are the 
~timate basis for the generation ,of fundamental social norms? 
I do not think so, for contrary to what has been claimed many 
times in the past, and to what Dilthey himself believes, 78 
not a single moral norm can be directly derived from this 
capacity .. : The relationship of this capacity to morality is not 
a productive but a limiting one. Pain and pleasure do not 
posit any rules, they simply operate as limiting factors, 
marking the degree of acceptability of both basic and non-
basic ~oral rules. Unacceptable moral rules, i.e., those 
that ignore the vulnerabili tY of humans and impose upon them 
a great deal of suffering, w\11 provoke the signal that we 
call 'pain' or 'suffering.' The pro~ibition to cause pain 
or suffering to persons can, therefore, be said to be co-
extensive with all the basic moral rules, and insofar that 
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this is true, no specific moral law is necessary introducing a 
rule beyond that of refraining from causing harm to persons. 
Traditional discussions concerning the notion of 'sympathy' 
are deficient for the most part precisely because they have 
ignored this fact. If I refrain from doing something is not 
because I realize that others may experience the same 'feelings' 
that I am capable of experiencing but because I recognize these 
others as persons. Morality, let us recall once more, begins 
with an act of reasont not with an emotion. The screams of 
pain of slaves rarely are enough to stop their masters from 
abusing them. 
There is another important consequence to be deri~ed 
from the remark that the prohibition to cause pain is coex-
tensive with all the basic moral rules. Namely, that it is 
therein that we have to look for the explanation of the fact 
that moral feelings and virtues are perceived as being identi-
cal. The feeling of satisfaction or pleasure can take as many 
forms as there are virtues. This is what is behind the eude-
monist claim that virtue and happiness are one, for no one can 
be a person and survive as such without having his or her 
needs satisfied and, therefore, without being happy in the 
most general and proper sense of the word. On the other hand, 
there can be no happiness iµdependently of an existence as a 
person. The capacity to exp~rience emotions is utterly amor-
phous, unless it is regulated and pr~vided with an aim by 
morality. 
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But··let us now try to close this already long chapter 
by presenting the table of the fundamental or basic virtues. 
The reader will probably find that in some cases I have 
strained the English language a little bit in my attempt to 
find names for certain virtues; but, in this respect, it is 
important to keep in mind the general tendency visible in 
many a modern language to substitute nouns by complex expres-
sions. But, be that as it may, in the end it is really not 
important what name or names we decide to choose to refer to 
the different virtues. In most cases, any of the expressions 
I have selected can safely be replaced by one or several 
synonyms~ 
Furthermore, it is important to notice that some basic 
norms require for their actualization that persons possess 
more than one virtue. Such is the case, for example, of the 
rule of justice, as can easily be inferred from our discussion 
of it. Finally, it should be remembered that each of the 
virtues, ~hich are, as stated above, predicable of persons, 
correspond to characteristics impressed upon social life by 
universal moral norms. In some cases, the names of both the 
characteristic and the virtue corresponding to it are the 
same, in other cases this is not so, but in all cases it is 
important not to confuse one with the other. 
In all we have deduced 24 universal moral norms. Let 
us, then, consider each one of them. 
Norm 1 demands that persons avoid appropriating by 
force or by other means not sanctioned by society, those things 
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allocated to·: other persons. In fact then, they promote what 
we could call the virtue of 'honesty' and condemn the vice 
of 'dishonesty.' 
Norm 2, on the other hand, promotes two sets of rather 
analogous virtues, for it not only requires that we be 'moder-
ate' or 'temperate' in our demands and, thus, avoid 'greedi-
ness,' but it also recommends that we be willing to share and 
exchange with others what we possess, that is, it recommends 
that we practice 'liberality,' 'generosity' or 'altruism,' 
while avoiding the vice of 'egoism.' 
Norm 3, which condemns 'laziness,' encourages the vir-
tue of 'industriousness,' while Norm 4, urging us to cooperate 
with others and join them in the performance of common tasks, 
proposes the virtue of 'sociality~' and denounces the vice of 
'seclusion.' 
Norm 5, linked to the fundamental social function of 
defense, preaches 'courage' and opposes 1 cowardice,' and Norm 
6, closely related to 5, promotes what could be called 'alert-
ness' or 'fitness.' A good name for the corresponding vice 
seems to be 'unreadiness. ' 
Norm 7 is another one of those which point to two 
sets of qualities: the first can be called 'obedience' or 
'discipline,' the second 'faithfulness' or 'devotion.' The 
vice corresponding to the fi~st virtue is 'disobedience, 1 
that corresponding to the second, 'treacherousness.' - , 
Norm 8 encourages us,to show respect for the safety 
of others and ourselves, which is what is usually referred 
266 
to as 'prudence.' The corresponding vice being 'impru-
dence. ' 
Norm 9 demands that we feel 'compassion' and con-
demns 'apathy' or 'indifference.' 
Norm 10, also related to the social function of health-
preservation as the two preceding ones, promotes 'cleanliness' 
and discourages 'uncleanliness,' while Norm 11 demands 'rev-
erence' and condemns 'irreverence.' 
Norms 12 and 13 are more complex in their demands, 
sharing some in common, although not all. The characteristic 
imposed upon social life by ·Norm 12 could be called 'timeli-
ness' or 'seasonableness,' that is, the quality of allocating 
time in a form compatible with the materialization of all basic 
social functions. The basic virt;e corresponding to this 
quality could be called 'propriety' and the vice 'impropriety.' 
In fact, though, this virtue is manifested also as respect 
for the proper allocation of place, and hence is shared by 
Norms 12 and 13. This last one, on the other hand, requires 
also that territory be appropriated and incorporated as an 
essential component of the social fabric. The virtue related 
to this demand is what could be called 'patriotism,' the vice 
being 'aloofness.' 
Norm 14, which establishes the relationship between 
the geographical and the social spheres, encour~ges the virtue 
of 'congregativeness, 1 and condemns the vice of 'dispersive-
ness. ' 
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Norm 15, the first related to the social function of 
instruction, demands the virtue of 'instruction' and discourages 
'secretiveness.' And Norm 16 promotes the virtues of 'truth-
fulness' or 'veracity' and condemns the vices of 'falseness' 
or 'deceptiveness.' 
Norm 17, which demands respect for the cultural patri-
mony, imposes the virtue of 'enlightenment,' and rejects the 
vice of 'ignorance or 'incivility.' 
Norm 18, which requests that we care for children, 
promotes the virtue of 'responsibility' and condemns the vice 
of -'irresponsibility.' 
Norm 19 seeks to induce 'respectfulness' and to combat 
'irrespectfulness.' 
Norm 20, usually the most· difficult to follow and, 
therefore 1 not surprisingly seen by many as the most essential 
moral norm, recommends 'uprightness,' 'straightness' or 'rec-
titude,' and condemns 'promiscuity.' 
Norm 21, the first corresponding to the function of 
~rality, promotes 'benevolence' and censures 'malevolence,' 
while Norm 22 encourages 'love' and damns 'hostility.' 
Norms 23 and 24, finally, propose three sets of virtues 
and vices. The two first ones do not require much clarifica-
tion and correspond to the .two facets that have already been 
discussed. These are 'justice' and 'injustice' and 'severity' 
and 'lenity.' But, in demanding that law-violators be punished, 
Norm 23 asserts, implicitly,. the princ"iple that laws should be 
obeyed. In the coming chapter we will see the very important 
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function of·'this principle, for now let us simply state the 
names of the virtue and vice corresponding to it: 'lawfulness' 
and 'unlawfulness.' 
Having presented the table of virtues and vices, it 
is time to proceed to a brief discussion of the mechanisms 
involved in the generation of real normative codes. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUCTURE OF REAL MORAL CODES 
1. Statement of the Questions: 
The weak and superficial arguments of the defenders 
of Ethical Relativism receive their appearance of plausibil-
ity from the observable diversity of mores and customs in 
existing societies. In spite of the rather strong tendency 
towards cultural uniformity still prevalent in our age, any 
half-witted observer can detect a seemingly unending diversity 
in the beliefs and the behavior of human beings. Some anthro-
pologists have recently seen in this the strongest indication 
of the unusual creative powers of the human species, a power 
that, as W. von Humboldt remarked some time ago, enables it 
to generate an infinite diversity out of a finite set of ele-
ments. No serious theory of morals can ignore this fact, and 
our thesi$ would be of little value, if, having accounted 
for the unity of morals, it were to prove incapable of account-
ing for its phenomenal plurality. 
Two questions have to be asked in this respect, a 
how-question, and a why-question: how is it possible that 
~rality, being basically universal, can come to adopt differ-
ent and often contradictory appearances?; why is it that this 
is the case? The first question se~ms to have two dimensions, 
one is, if you please, technical. It seeks to uncover the 
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characteristic qualities of universal moral norms that permit 
them to coexist with contingent norms. The second dimension, 
on the other hand, appears initially as the truly philosophi-
cal one, and is not so easy to formulate. In fact, it seems 
to be rather contradictory for, in a sense, what we seem to 
be asking is how is it that entities reputed to be universal 
~ not, in reality, materialize as such. We detect here 
something of the old argument against realism. To escape 
it, we could simply deny that real moral norms are moral, or 
~ could postulate some obscure doctrine of participation. 
But all this is not only ab~urd in itself, but, if postulated 
here, it would directly contradict all that has been said so 
far, since it is our belief that no other moral norms exist 
in any sense whatsoever other than those instantiated by the 
actual behavior of persons. The universal moral norms have no 
existence in themselves, but being conditions of possibility 
of social behavior, it is through such behavior that they 
attain whatever degree of reality they possess. 
The solution of this aporia requires that we recall 
carefully the thesis defended in the first two parts of the 
essay. That thesis affirms that universal norms are always 
instantiated in all their universality, which is the only 
position compatible with their definition as conditions of 
possibility. What is subject to change during the process 
of materialization is not the nature of the universalrnorms, 
but their range of applicability or extension. That is to 
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say, that once they have been instantiated, these norms apply 
to all persons without exception, although as we have 
repeatedly seen, they might not apply to all human beings, 
in the most general sense of the term. Once this has been 
seen with clarity, all the problems that seemed to be assail-
/ 
ing us dissolve. And, at the end, our real philosophical 
question turns out to be identical with our technical ques-
tion: how is it that the notion of ~erso~ is limited in real 
moral codes? 
The answer to the why question is probably going to 
occupy the most substantial portion of this chapter, for it 
requires that we revise the most important factors that have 
trad~tionally been thought as 'determinants of moral ideas,' 
as M. Ossowska would have put it., In doing so, we will be 
attempting to accomplish three main goals: 1. understand 
to what extent morality is ideological, 2. establish which, 
if any, extramoral factors do in fact determine ~oral ideas 
and how, and, 3. discover whether this determination, to the 
extent that it occurs, affects all the components of person~ 
hood as a whole or. only some, or whether some determinant 
factors affect some components but not all. 
2. - The Relation between Fundamental, Contingently Funda-mental and Nonfundamental Moral Norms 
The three expressions used in the title of this part 
of the paper designate the three sorts of norms that we have 
so far identified. For the sake of order, let us simply 
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remember that what we call contingently fundamental are those 
norms that, given a certain type of social reality, happen to 
be essential for its preservation. Their ontological status 
resembles somewhat the ontological status· that, according to 
Wittgenstein, corresponds to the set of simple truths that G. 
E. Moore presented as examples of certain knowledge. If it 
appears certain to a king that the world began to exist the, 
day when he was born, it is because, without this certainty, 
the legitimacy of his kingdom would be in doubt. 
But it is perhaps necessary to be more specific than 
that. Think of the capitalist system. For it to subsist as 
such, it is indispensable that certain kinds of rules be 
enforced~ particularly those demanding respect for ''private 
property.'' But this means that for anyone perceiving social 
reality from the perspective of a capitalist system, and not 
,interested in promoting any drastic social changes, such rules 
will naturally appear to be almost as essential as those we 
have called fundamental moral norms, since, after all, they are 
in fact conditions of possibility of a society organized under 
capitalist principles. These are, so to say, conditions of 
possibility of a second order. In our previous discussions 
we have already established that these kinds of norms can never 
take absolute precede¥ce over the fundamental social norms in 
the consciousness of people. All this means is that, if pressed 
hard enough and under extreme circumstances, most people will 
Perceive the difference in nature between both sorts of norms. 
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But let us consider this with more care. Our immediate 
problem is to attempt to comprehend the effect that contingently 
fundamental norms have on universal norms. Strictly speaking, 
this effect can only be a limiting or restrictive one. By 
augmenting the number of conditions for the existence as a per-
son, the universal norms of the second order cannot but impose 
restrictions on the number of people that qualify to have 
bestowed upon them the quality of personhood. Or, to put it 
differently: If adherence to the universal moral norms were the 
only condition to attain 'personhood,' then there could not be 
any a priori reason to deny this quality to any single one of 
* the members of the human species. In fact the universal norms 
of the second order introduce prfnciples of classification and 
exclusion which are alien to human social existence in its most 
universal expression. To illustrate this, let us think of any 
past society where personhood was conceived as a privilege con-
tingent upon such criteria as place of birth, ancestry, ethnic 
group, class membership, etc. All these criteria are nothing 
else but different varieties of universal norms of the second 
order. 
Once these additional rules have been incorporated into 
the moral consciousness, they color it totally, so that the 
* It is understood that we are excluding those members 
of the species that are somehow or other incapacitated, as well 
as those who have renounced or lost their personhood. The first 
on~s because they are by definition incapable of adhering to the 
~n1versal moral norms, the second ones because their exclusion 
~s obviously nothing to do with a priori reasons but rather 
with just the opposite. , 
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range of application of the universal moral norms never exceeds 
that of the rules of the second order. This does not imply 
that there has to be an elimination or deletion of any of the 
universal rules or of the corresponding virtues, which, ex hy-
pothesis, is impossible. What occurs is that strict conditions 
are imposed on the practice of virtues. Thus, disregarding the 
safety of a non-person, someone, let us say, that belongs to the 
wrong class, will not be seen as a vicious conduct. Or, if 
there are certain rules that define property in terms broader 
than the actual possession of an object, the mere use of that 
object by a person other than the proprietor will be seen as 
an instance of dishonest behavior. 
This last example is particularly interesting, because 
it draws our attention toward an additional consequence of the 
limiting effect of norms of the second order. For the loss of 
personhood in any society where such norms exist will depend 
also, and, probably, with greater frequency, on their violation 
than on the violation of universal moral norms~ A brief glance 
at any of the prisons of this country will provide more than 
enough evidence to that effect. 
There is another, quite remarkable consequence of the 
introduction into a moral code of norms of the second order. 
Our discussion of the origin of basic virtues has proven that 
they correspond to the universal social functions. And we 
have just ·seen that their validity is not lifted by the limi-
tation of their range of applicabilityw That is, a society 
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based on more norms than solely the universal moral norms is 
not utterly vicious, and, as a matter of fact, it could be said 
l 
to be precisely the opposite, were we to utilize purely quanti-
tative criteria to measure its degree of virtuousness, since the 
introduction of norms of the second order is accompanied by 
the generation of at least an equal number of virtues. The 
character of a person in any society, with the sole exception 
of the Republic of Man, needs to be equipped with more traits 
than merely the basic·virtues. So, for instance, in a society 
where personhood is defined, among other things, by membership 
in a certain religious sect, a person might need to possess 
the virtue of 'piety' in additi6n to all those more universal 
ones. In a very strict sense, these second order qualities 
share the name of 'virtues' only by analogy. For being only 
contingently fundamental, they lack the universality of basic 
virtues. But, in fact, and in so far as they help shape and 
define the character of persons they are virtues in the general 
sense in which we are using the word. In this respect, it is 
i~ortant to keep in mind that the loss of these virtues involves 
the automatic loss of personhood. 
At this point, it is imperative that we pause for a 
while and try to clarify somethi~g that, without much discus-
sion, we asserted in the first chapter, to wit, that universal 
norms and norms of the second order are learned simultaneously. 
It is obvious that it could not be otherwise, becaus~ if it 
Were the case that the formation of the moral consciousness of 
282 
the person proceeds in two steps, i.e., first the acquisition 
of the conviction that universal rules have to be followed, and, 
afterwards, the development of a respect for secondary rules, 
the process of socialization would be, in the best of cases, 
very slow and painful, and, in the worse case, impossible. 
This is due to the fact that having once learned to extend the 
concept of personhood to all members of the human species, a 
young person would regard the process of incorporation into 
his society as a moral degradation, that is to say, he would 
by necessity perceive the values of his society as substanti-
ally inferior to those he had initially learned. But in most 
cases, the aim of socialization is the formation of conforming 
citizens, not the breeding of rebellious discontents. In fact, 
I am tempted to see in a conflict much like the one just 
described, the origins of the dissatisfaction of contemporary 
youth in those nations that are officially committed to uni-
versal virtues. Be it as it may, there is, then, a necessity 
for the coordination of the process of assimilation of uni-
versal rules with that of the assimilation of secondary rules4 
It is indisputably true, on the other hand, that the 
acceptance of particular secondary rules cannot originate 
solely in the primordial act of rationality. Asserting such a 
thesis would be tantamount t6 claiming that there are certain 
necessary criteria of sel~ction and discrimination, which is, 
in the light of our previous discussions, simply an absurdity. 
For insofar as they are not conditions of possibility of human 
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social life in general, such criteria are contingent by defi-
nition. 
But, far from being illuminating, these last remarks 
further complicate things by presenting us with the task of 
explaining how it is possible that, not being directly derived 
from the primordial act of rationality ori to say it differ-
ently, not corresponding strictly to the dictates of naturai 
reason, second order rules are, nonetheless, accepted as indi-
spensable and learned or assimilated simultaneously with the 
universal norms. The answer to the first part of the question 
requires that we recall the last set of virtues corresponding 
to the fundamental norm of justice, that of 'lawfulness' or 
'respect for law.' Consider a secondary rule that introduces 
ethnic criteria as additional qualifications of personhood. 
What we could call the 'content' or 'substance' of that rule 
can obviously not originate directly in natural reason. This 
is not the case, though, with its 'form,' i.e., with its lawful 
character. Having generated the idea of law or norm in con-
junction with the generation·of universal norms, human reason 
is free to extend this idea to other entities and thus, by 
'analogy'_ generate as many secondary or other rules as neces-
sary. In the case of secondary norms, this quality of lawful-
ness is bestowed upon them by their immediate association with 
universal rules. 
This, however, is not enough to elucidate the process 
by which concrete secondary rules are acquired. All we know 
so far is that they have a lawful character, and that their 
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content does not arise from the dictates of natural reason, 
or, to put it differently, we know that they are not innate. 
. l 
But if they are not innate, they must be 'learned.' What 
learning means in this context, what the causes are that 
prompt us to learn certain specific rules, we will, hopefully, 
discover later. At this point, let us be satisfied with an 
explanation by analogy, that seems to me rather illuminating. 
I have in mind a comparison between the process of language 
learning and the acquisiiton of moral maturity. Children, 
when they first start learning the grammatical rules of a lan-
guage, make over and over again certain fairly standard errors, 
that stem fiom their incapacity to realize that there are 
exceptions in the application of the rules they are struggling 
to assimilate. Linguistic proficiency is signaled by the 
disappearance of such systematic errors from the performance 
of the child. Mastery of the exceptional, rather than blind 
application of rules, is the work of maturity. The same is 
true, it seems, in the case of morality. Because it is 
implacably logical, blindly rational, the morality of someone 
who has not mastered the extensional limitations imposed upon 
universal laws by secondary rules, appears; to his fellow 
persons, immature and unsatisfactory. No one who lacks a 
feeling for nuances and detail can be said to have moral under-
standing in the full sense of the term. In Camus' play, it is 
the deliberate and systematic disregard of just such nuances, 
and the resulting inflexibility in the ·application of rules 
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and principles, rather than his innate cruelty, that turns 
Caligula into a tyrant. What to the simple-minded moralists 
may appear as 'corruption,' is, in many cases, the safety valve 
that makes social life possible under difficult circumstances. 
Walter Benjamin is reported to have said to some of his friends, 
who, their hearts filled with moral indignation were furiously 
complaining about the corruption of government officials during 
the first years of the Nazi regime, that it was precisely this 
corruption that had prevented the Nazis from enforcing certain 
laws that would have turned Germany into a more fearful hell. 
P. Geach makes a similar point in his book on the virtues. 
But let us leave here this most .fascinating and disregarded 
topic, which, strictly speaking, is only of marginal importance 
for our present discussion and go on to investigate the nature 
of what, for the lack of a better name, we can call 'tertiary' 
or 'nonfundamental' moral rules. 
Second order or secondary rules have two functions, 
to wit, limiting the range of applicability of universal moral 
norms, and introducing additional demands for the acquisition 
of personhood. But no matter how we force our imagination, 
and unless we are willing to falsify reality, it is doubtful 
that we can fit all the rules of a society into this last 
category. Consider, for instance, what is often referred to as 
the rules of 'professional ethics,' that is, the rules that 
apply to persons not qua persons, but qua members of a pro-
fessional or occupational group such as lawyers, physicians, 
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teachers, priests, journalists, etc. Think also of the rules 
of courtesy, etc. It is only recently that such rules have 
caught the attention of students of society, but they play an 
undeniably important role in the life of persons as do, increas-
ingly, rules included in the different particular codes that 
constitute the bulk of modern legislation. This last type of 
laws, though, can in a sense be said to derive from the rules 
of the second order, or, at least, they can be thought of as 
being partly determined by them. A secondary rule that conse-
crates private property will clearly inform all legislation 
. concerning contractual transa~tions. Moreover~ contractual 
law will assume that the contracting parties possess certain 
basic virtues such as truthfulness, for instance. But this 
does not mean that these types of laws or rules are entirely 
reducible to one or both of the other types. All it means is 
that they too apply to persons, although they are not consti-
tutive of personhood. The question remains, of course, whether 
the preservation of the quality of personhood is at least partly 
contingent on the obedience of tertiary rules. Boldly speaking, 
the answer has to be yes. For, insofar as the compliance with 
tertiary rules presupposes the possession of basic and secon-
dary virtues, systematic violation must eventually lead to a 
loss of personhood. But this bold yes needs to be qualified) 
~ince obviously not every single violation of a rule of cour-
tesy entails an automatic depersonification. In all societies 
there is a certain room for eccentricity and, what is more, 
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sometimes eccentricity is perceived as a sign of superior 
quality or excellence. It would seem, then, that there are 
degrees of tolerance in regard to the violation of tertiary 
rules. That this is possible, is another ·indication that they 
are not constitutive rules of personhood in the sense and to 
the extent that the other two types of norms are. 
Granted that there are tertiary rules, we still have to 
establish what their function is in the totality of social 
life. Is a society conceivable which does not possess tertiary 
rules? In a sense, the answer to this question can be yes, 
since by definition tertiary rules are not conditions of 
social life. But we have to be very careful, lest we want to 
allow ourselves to be imprisoned by a grave misunderstanding. 
Supposing that there are such things as pure categories of the 
understanding in the Kantian s~nse, it would make some sense 
to claim that intuitions are strictly speaking not required 
for the production of knowledge, after all, all knowledge could 
be dialectical. But what makes no sense under any circumstan-
ces is the claim that without intuitions there can be knowl-
edge of objects. Similarly, it makes no sense to try to picture 
a society without tertiary rules, because they are the natural 
outcome of a collective behavior aimed at materializing the 
fundamental moral rules under precise and definite circumstan-
ces. This last clause is of primary importance, for it defines 
the proper place of the material or, if you prefer, environmen-
tal conditions of social life. What this means will be 
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clarified in the following pages. Here it is important only 
that we make an effort to understand the expressions 'material 
conditions' and 'environment' in the most ample sense, so as 
to allow them to.refer to both cultural and natural elements. 
It follows from what we have been saying concerning 
tertiary rules, that it would be a mistake to view them as 
totally or fully arbitrary precepts. The latter has been a 
prevalent view among social scientists in the past. Lately 
things seem to be changing not exclusively but partly due to 
the influence of the structuralist school as developed in the 
field of anthropology. The new discipline of 'Semiotics' 
or 'Semiology' is also contributing to this change in perspec-
tive, which obviously constitutes i step forward in the efforts 
to develop a science of man and to come to understand the 
nature of human_ existence and of the human spirit. The dis-
missal of most of human behavior as arbitrary. betrays a 
reactionary and elitist conception of man as an 1 irrational' 
being. Although probably with many qualifications and limita-
tions, the principium reddendae rationis underlies the conduct 
of man. What a miserable and despicable creature man would be 
if more rationality were to be found in the behavior of stones 
than in his own! 
But in order to understand in detail how tertiary rules 
relate to secondary and basic rules, first we have to study 
the nature of the 'determinants' of morality, for they are, by 
definition, the elements that fix the conditions or circumstan-
ces in which a system of morality is to be actualized. 
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3. The Condition~ ~f Mor~lity 
In what follows, we will be attempting to establish 
whether moral ideas and, concretely, secondary and tertiary 
moral rules are determined by natural, cultural and other 
factors. We will try to comprehend, also, the mechanisms, if 
any, through which this determination occurs. 
Now, in the first chapter we have already explicitly 
rejected any attempt to reduce all morality to the status of 
mere ideology, ~here 'ideology' has to be understood as denot-
ing not only a distorted view of reality, but also a wholly 
dependent and conditioned entity. To the extent that it is 
right, our discussion of the nature of morality as reflected 
in the basic moral norms proves this point beyond doubt, for 
morality has not only been shown to be autonomous in relation 
to all other realms of social life, but, what is more important, 
a condition sine qua non of all action, including production. 
Morality, therefore, cannot be confined, as a whole, to the 
realm of the superstructure, to use this more or less popular 
terminology. The notion of. a utterly ideological morality is 
a contradiction in terms, and we do not need to waste more time 
* discussing such a view. Then, if there is a determination of 
moral ideas, it must have to do only with secondary and terti-
ary rules and through them, but only tangentially, with the 
Primary or basic rules. 
* Later in this paper we ~ill be concerning ourselves, 
~onetheless, with those aspects of Marxian ethics that go 
eyond this simplistic view. 
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So far we have said almost nothing concerning the 
relationship between morality and the environment, save the 
platitude that, if human social life is to materialize, an 
environment endowed with the qualities indispensable for 
the satisfaction of human needs is necessary. In fact, all 
the prerequisites of human social life without exception 
derive from the characteristics of man, none from those of 
nature. Strictly speaking, therefore, not a single condition 
of possibility of human social life can be deduced from the 
observation of nature. There is nothing in nature that 'deter-
mines' how human social life should be organized, for none of 
the qualities or lack of qualities of nature is a prerequisite 
of social life; none of these qualities is the basis for a 
deduction of a condition-of possibility of social life. This 
does not mean, nevertheless, that nature cannot 'condition' 
human social life. To say that nature 'conditions' human social 
life means, simply, that nature sets the framework in which it 
can materialize. This distinction seems to me to be crucial. 
Ignoring it leads inevitably to self-contradictory positions 
as the one mentioned above. Although not explicitly stated 
at the time, it underlies, for instance, the discussion con-
cerning the difference between the social and the geographical 
spaces. 
Much of the extreme determinism from which many Marxist 
thinkers seem unable to extricate themselves, originates, per-
haps, in a misperception of this relationship. The materiali-
zation of the function of production, which the Marxists have 
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correctly perceived as the most immediate link between nature 
and social existence, is contingent, as we have seen~ upon the 
appropriation of a 'parcel of territory, i.e., of certain 
resources. But what follows from that.·is not that production 
is necessary because nature possesses certain resources. Pro-
duction, that is, the collective action of man upon natural 
resources is necessary, because man has certain needs and these 
needs cannot be satisfied by reflective action, i.e., by the 
action of man upon his own nature. In other words, what we 
could call the 'intentional' character of human social action 
is not determined by the possession by nature of certain 
resources, but by the characteristics· of human nature as such. 
In a way, the old view of the Providencialists is perfectly 
correct, for it is a sort of miracle that nature happens to 
have those things needed by man for the satisfaction of his 
needs. 1 To use the word miracle in this context is of course 
meant merely as a way of emphasizing the relative independence 
of the conditions of human social existence in relation to 
nature. 
What does it mean to say, then, that the environment 
'conditions' morality? Simply, that social life has to be 
'accommodated' to fit the qualities of the environment, those, 
that is, that cannot be modified irrespective of the quality 
of the environment. Humans living in society must possess the 
essential virtues, what can be, so to say, 1 accommodated' is 
the mode in which these virtues will be exercised, in oth~r 
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words, the manner in which the basic virtues will be qualified 
by those deriving from secondary and tertiary norms. 
Hopefully this has helped clarify the very first 
statement of this part of the· paper. Our task, then, must be 
to clarify the way in which the environment, understood as a 
collection of both natural and cultural elements, works upon 
secondary and tertiary rules. There is, of course, no way to 
know a priori which are the environmental elements that ought 
to be taken into account, for it is impossible to offer a 
deduction of the qualities of nature. Besides, as we have 
. just established,. nature is, as such, indifferent to human 
social existence. What can be done, though, is an indirect 
deduction not of the properties that nature in fact possesses, 
but of those that it ought to possess in order to become the 
recipient of human social life. That is, given the list of 
fundamental social functions of intentional character, i.e., 
mostly the fundamental social functions of production, health-
preservation and, to a lesser extent, defense, one can determine 
the kinds of qualities of nature that would be relevant to their 
materialization. All these qualities can be. grouped under the 
heading of 'geographical factors.' The·cultural elements of 
the environment which are influential upon morality are more 
difficult to detect. We will limit ourselves to treat them 
one by one, relying on tradition and intuition to choose those 
to be analyzed. Lacking a comprehensive theory of culture 
and, moreover, lacking an in depth understanding of each of the 
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elements of culture, we cannot aspire to do more. I have found 
in M. Ossowska's book what seems to me a fairly acceptable 
listing of elements that might be thought to have a role in 
informing moral ideas. Ossowska's list must be complemented, 
though, if we want it to include two of the elements that h~ve 
become crucial in modern societies and that, therefore, cann6t 
be ignored by us. I am referring to the science of biology and 
modern technology. All in all, then, we will consider the fol-
lowing factors: geography or physical environment, economic, 
political and social structures, religion, psychology, cul-
tural traditions. 
a. Geography and Morality 
The idea that the physical environment determines or 
substantially affects the way of being of humans is, as is well-
known, rather old. It underlies all of Western medical thought 
since the time of Hippocrates and Galen, and, from Ibn Khaldun 
to Montesquieu and Plekhanov and some of the contemporary 
ecologists it has been present in historical, sociological and 
political works. Most of the time, though, the 'environmental 
thesis' is presented in a somewhat confused and vague fashion, 
mingling several related but not identical hypotheses, which 
a brief analytical exercise can separate. 
The Hippocratical version of the thesis, 2 for instance, 
includes at least four distinguishable claims, to wit, that 
some elements of the environment (water, wind, location) can 
determine 1. the health, 2. the appearance (size, form of the 
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head, bodily structure, etc.), 3. the: character.of· individual 
persons and notions and 4. that the form of government of a 
nation can also affect the character of the persons living in 
it (those people who do not govern themselves are less coura-
geous and enterprising than those who do). To simplify mat-
ters we could group claims 1. and 2. into one, i.e., that the· 
environment affects bodily processes~ The question whether 
this has anything to .do with determining moral ideas, we 
will leave for later; 4. can also be left waiting for awhile.; 
3., on the other hand, is the claim that most people seem to 
have in mind, even when they do not clearly say so, when they 
say that morality is affected by thi physical· surroundings. 
Ibn Khaldun, 3 for example, closely follows Hippocrates, whose 
theories he had assimilated by reading the works of the Arab 
physicians of his time, in postulating a sort of complex effect 
of the environment on the character of people and, finally, 
on the social and political structure of nations. The geo-
graphical position of the places where they live, plus the kinds 
of things that they eat and drink, determine directly the 
temperament of people. So, those who eat too much butter will 
not be enterprising, and hence, will not be able to construct 
a powerful nation. Those who live in very warm climates~ on 
the other hand, will have unstable and rather joyful charac-
ters, but will lack the virtues required to build a well-
organized and culturally sophisticated society. In other words, 
by determining the character of people, the physical environment 
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determines also the sorts of societies they can have. To some 
extent, it is not farfetch~d to claim that Ibn Khaldun con-
ceives the relationship between environment and character in 
dialectical terms. First, the environment determines what the 
people living in a certain area can eat and produce, and then, 
because they eat those things, they develop a certain character 
and try to organize their society in ways that will conform 
to this character. But, in doing so, they commit themselves 
to continue living in the same environment and to enhance by 
their action those same qualities thit proved to be determinant. 
Like Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu4 also believes that the 
climate and the soil are determinants of the character of men 
and, consequently, of the kinds of laws they give to themselves. 
But this determination is not conceived as an automatic and 
one-sided process by Montesquieu. For although men living 
in a certain climate are naturally inclined to adopt those 
forms of life and philosophies more closely compatible with 
the conditions created by the climate, they can, if they are 
wise enough, escape their fate by promoting through legisla-
tion conduct opposed to that forced upon them. So, the Hindus 
are not particularly wise l~gislators, because, living in a 
warm climate, they adopt a philosophy of life that encourages 
passivity, which is the same quality promoted naturally by high 
temperatures. In contrast to this, the Chinese have proven 
to be wise legislators, for, to minimize th~ effect that the 
Climatological conditions of their land could have on them, 
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they have "made their religion, philosophy; and laws all prac-
tical." They know that "the more the physical causes incline 
mankind to inaction, the more the moral causes should estrange 
them from it. " 
The- conditions of the 'soil,' i.e., whether it is 
fertile or not, play, according to Montesquieu, an important 
role in determining the sort of government that a nation will 
adopt. Fertility of .the soil is accompanied by tyranny, for 
men who live in riches, for the most part, care little about 
their form of government and, certainly, they do not care 
enough about it so as to be willing to fight for· liberty at 
the expense of their wealth. Where the soil is poorer, there 
people are more likely to be freedom-loving and independent 
minded. 
Population density is also closely related to the cli-
mate and the conditions of the soil. Temperate zones of the 
planet, which also happen to be accessible and rich, are more 
likely to be less stable and more scarcely populated, than 
poorer and more rugged areas. This is due to the fact that 
good environmental conditions encourage invasions and hence, 
war and instability. In such areas too, the ratio between the 
females and males in the population is going to lean in favor 
of the former,. which, in turn, is going to have an effect on 
legislation concerning marital relations and all things related 
to them. 
Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu illustrate with their 
claims the three main effects that geographical determinants 
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can, in principle, have: 1. conditioning of character, i.e., 
virtues; 2. conditioning of the kinds of laws and norms accepted 
by a society and 3: conditioning of the institutions established 
in a society. More rece.nt authors have, for the most part, as 
far as I have been able to establish, simply reiterated, some-
times giving more examples and illustrations, these basic ideas. 
G. Plekhanov5 has been, perhaps, in our day, the one philoso-
pher to. push the doctrine of geographical determinism to its 
most extreme consequences. He does it by reducing Marxian 
economic determinism to geographical determinism: 
When we set out to explain histnry from the material-
ist standpoint, our first difficulty, as we have seen, is 
the question of the actual causes of the development of 
social relations. We already know that the "anatomy of 
civil society" is determined by its economic structure. 
But what is the latter itself determined by? 
Marx's reply thus reduces the whole question of the 
development of the economy to that of the causes determin-
ing the development of the productive forces at the dis-
posal of society. In this, its final form, it is solved 
first and ·foremost by the reference to the nature of the 
geographic environment~6 · 
Partly conscious, I suppose, of his 'un' or anti-
dialectical oversimpltfication of Marx's doctrines, Plekhanov 
says a little later, trying to qualify his geographical reduc-
tionism, the following: 
The influence of geographic environment on social man is 
a variable magnitude. Conditioned by the properties of 
that environment, the development of the productive forces 
increases man's power over Nature, and thereby places him 
in a new relation toward the geographical environment that 
surrounds him .... Thus it is established that the char-
acter of the inhabitants of a given area can be modified 
substantially, although th~ geographical properties of that 
area remain unchanged. 7 
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This last qualification has Hegelian overtones; the only di£~ 
ference is that here the "Productive Forces" have taken the 
place of the "Spirit," and added to the "mild Ionic sky" they 
might, for all we know, help "produce the charm of the Homeric 
poems." In fact, though, Plekhanov seems to believe that the 
Ionic sky alone can produce Homers. But this is a discussion 
that we need not pursue any further at this point. As _for 
Plekhanov's simplisti~ understanding ~f historical materialism, 
our brief presentation of some of Marx's theories in the first 
chapter should be more than enough to expose it. Plekhanov is 
of interest to us here only as an example of the mode in which 
the relationship between social existence and nature is gen-
erally -conceived. And, indeed, there seems to be an element of 
truth in this conception, for obviously, if we consider a ter-
ritory inhabited by people who have not mastered the technical 
means required to engage in large scale commerce and exchange, 
we will soon realize, as Plekhanov correctly points out, that 
their productive capabilities will be absolutely determined 
by the resources made directly available to them by nature. 
So, for example, they might have to become a culture of fisher-
men. Furthermore, if the fish available in the surrounding 
bodies of water are not abundant, our fishermen are likely to 
-develop a closed society, isolated and protected from intruders 
by xenophobia and highly developed military institutions. 
Being a person and being a fisherman in such a society might 
Well be synonymous concepts, but; at any rate, the range of 
applicability of the notion of personhood will be fairly reduced. 
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So far, we seem to have granted that geography can 
operate upon social life in at least two of the three ways we 
distinguished above. In the first place, by offering a limited 
choice of usable resources, nature promotes legislation that 
both encourages fishing and makes it into the predominant 
productive activity, and also legislation that regulates the 
behavior of people in ways appropriate to and compatible with 
fishing. On the ·other hand, by presenting our fishermen with 
the realities of scarcity, Nature inclines them, firstly, to 
impose strict restrictions on the attribution of personhood, 
and, secondly, to emphasize the role of the institutions of 
defense. Note, in respect to the last point, that the claim 
is not that scarcity imposes the institution of defense as 
such, but simply that it_inclines people to assign to it a 
greater significance in the life of their cDmmunity. The 
difference is crucial, as can easily be inferred from our 
previous discussions. 
Note, too, that accordi~g·to the characterization of 
secondary and tertiary norms uffered above, th~ first case of 
geographical conditioni~g can be described as the creation 
or introduction of tertiary rules, ~hile ·the second, i.e., the 
imposition of restrictions on personhood, is nothing but the 
introduction of secondary rules. 
But there is more, for favoring certain institutions 
implies favoring the virtues that correspond to them, and, in 
a very precise sense, doing so contributes to inform the 
character of the persons of a society~ The same thing follows 
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if we consider that the introduction of tertiary and secondary 
rules is accompanied by the introduction of new virtues, 
which complement the basic virtues. The character of a person, 
at l~ast what we could call his 'collective' or 'national' 
character, is, mainly, the sum of the basic and other virtues 
required in his community. 
Before continuing, a brief commentary is needed on the 
notion of 'collective character.' It would certainly be 
absolutely ridiculous to pretend to ignore the fact that there 
are immense temperamental and personality differences between 
the individual members of a community.. But, here again the 
presence of a diversity should not prevent us from detecting 
the basic unity behind it. The ~otion of 'collective' or 
'national character, 1 like the notion of 'human nature,' is 
not an arbitrary invention, but a presupposition for social 
existence. It merely indicates that all people living in the 
same society must, to a certain extent, cherish·the·same vir-
tues and respect the same values. The greater the uniformity 
of feeling in this regard, the greater will be the degree of 
homogeneity in a society. Later we will have a chance to come 
hack to this issue, but for now it is important to keep in mind 
that whatever the differences between persons, there is a 
certain degree of unanimity that is necessarily required of 
them. 
So, we have accepted as fundamentally true the three 
claims of Ibn Khalduh and Montesquieu with which we chose to 
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to concern ourselves. But it is time that we ask ourselves 
whether we are going to agree also with Montesquieu's thesis 
that the determination of laws and character by the environ-
ment is not auto~atic. In other words, we want to know the 
extent to which a group of people can choose to ignore the 
demands placed upon them by Nature. 
The history of ideas is plagued with recommendations 
to try to find happine~s by systematically pursuing detachment 
from nature. So pervasive and insistent is this idea that 
Hegel thought he ought to include it as a fund~mental moment 
in the history of the Spirit. Hindu philosophical. thought 
is impossible to understand apart from this idea and even the 
political realities of modein India, according to certain 
perceptive observers, are doomed to remain an impenetrable 
mystery unless seen through the lenses of the Gandhian ideal 
of detachment. Some have equated detachment from nature with 
submissiveness and cowardice, some, on the contrary, have thought 
of it as the only means to preserve th~ inherent dignity and 
liberty of man. Spinoza is, perhaps, the strongest and most 
coherent advocate of this last view in the West. 
Surprising as it may at first appear, I think that it 
can safely be said that in the last centuries there has been 
in the West'a remarkable decline in the traditional interest 
in speculation on the proper relationship between man and 
nature. This is, no doubt, due in part to the widespread 
acceptance of. the conviction that nature is an 1 object' that is 
to be tamed and conquered and utilized as a mere tool. It is 
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only in extraordinary circumstances that nature is viewed as 
possessing a 'soul' of its oi.m and,· thus, as capable of posing 
a threat of sorts. For the most part, nature or, the 'it,' 
as Martin Buber talls it, is conceived as a mere container 
and, at most, as a passive provider and only rarely is it 
thought of as an independent source of goals and purposes. 
The still prevailing modern Western.ideology will have us 
believe that man can,' freely and capriciously, choose his own 
goals and, increasingly, ignore the demands of nature. It is 
only very recently that some of the most lucid mirids are 
beginning to realize that there might be a limit to the caprice 
of man, and, louder and louder, we h~ar talk about the 'limits 
of growth,' and the 'limits of development' and the 'myth 
of progress.' These concerns have· only begun to be presented 
in some sort of systematic manner., E. F .. · Schumacher's recent 
book8 being a good example of that. 
Schumacher argues that nature, which has traditionally 
been treated as 'income' rather than as 'capital' by economists, 
must start to be perceived as the latter if there is to be 
any chance to escape the catastrophic collapse of civiliz~tion. 
In real terms, this would mean that nature will no longer be 
regarded as 'expendable,' and hence, provisions would have to 
be taken to avoid exhausting its finite resources or drastically 
altering the natural balance of its elements. So, instead of 
the Baconian 'control' of nature, Schumacher advocates a 
respect for nature. Altho~gh ·in both cases the ·investigation 
of its laws and principles is encouraged, in the first case 
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the knowledge obtained was to be used for the exploitation of 
nature, in the etymological sense of taking advantage of it, 
while in Schumacher's eyes, all knowledge of nature has to be 
transformed into ,an effort to preserve it, i.e., to help it 
persevere. 
This change in perspective, seems to me, is far fro~ 
being accidental, rathet it shows that the demands of nature 
cannot forever be igndred. The appearance that th~y can be 
ignored stems from the fact that they do not_ generate moral 
rules, i.e., that they are not the source of absolute obliga-
tion, a privilege reserved exclusively to human nature. That 
this is the case, is exhibited by the fact that even in the 
presence of the worst natural catastrophies, such as the 
danger of starvation, etc. moral dilemmas do still arise. So, 
to use a classical example, if ten people are in a boat and 
they establish beyond reasonable doubt that their food and 
water supply will suffice to maintain only five of them alive, 
the answer to the questions whether it is correct that five 
should be allowed to die and, if so, who these five should be, 
cannot be found by scrutinizi~g nature. This is due to the 
fact that our behavior towards nature is never Jmoral' as such, 
although ·it can have moral implications. In regard to nature 
it is best, therefore, to follow Montesquieu and use the words 
I • wise' and 'unwise.' Wasti~g the resources of the earth might 
be termed an 'unwise' or 'stupid 1 thing to do, but, in itself, 
such behavior does not imply immorality of any sort. The term 
I• immoral' can be introduced only when other person are, 
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directly or indirectly, affected by a certain attitude. Or, 
to put it differehtly, until people start dying because of the 
pollution of the air, recommendations to limit pollution will 
h~Ve to be done in terms of 'prudence' rather than in strict 
moral terms. To summarize, then, indifference towards nature 
is possible only as long as it does not cause damage to other 
persons. 
But this still fails to provide an adequate answer to 
our question as to the reason why the requirements of nature 
cannot forever be ignored. Let us again have recourse to our 
imagination and suppose that the earth is endowed with infi-
nite resources. In the first place, it is clear that even 
then nature could not be totally ignored, due to the intentional 
character of some of the fundamental social functions. If at 
all, it would have to be ignored in the sense that bothers 
the ecologists, that is, in the form of a legislative disre-
gard for nature and the preservation of the ecological balance 
of th~ planet. Now, if we assume not only that natural 
resources are inexhaustible, but also that the earth's surface 
is interminable and that the ecological balance cannot be 
given a final blow no matter whit, thiri this partial disregard 
of nature would, in principle, continue for as long as man 
resides on this planet. But,· as a matter of fact, these are 
not the conditions under which ·social life has to be material-
ized, and therefore, apart from the transcendental reasons 
that we have considered above, there are empirical reasons 
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requiring the appropriation and the defense of territory. 
These reasons, a~ is notorious, have been analyzed ad infinitum 
by anthropologists and so~ial biologists and they have a pri-
mary role in the,political life of nations .. Wars and other 
phenomena such as colonialism and imperialism are partially 
accounted for by regardi~g them as an international struggle 
for natural resources, and to a great extent, intertribal 
feuds are the result of efforts by all the parties involved to 
preserve a 'Lebensraum' big enough to allow them to migrate 
periodically from one part of their teiritory to ~nother, in 
order to avoid the exhaustion of the terrain and the excessive 
pollution of a particular area. This is true especially in 
areas l.ike the Amazon jungle, where nature is particularly sen-
sitive and fragile. 
It is fairly obvious that because of the factual limita-
tions of nature, a political entity comprising all humans as 
persons is not compatible with even its partial disregard~ And 
it is also clear that as long as such an entity does not exist, 
nothing but a period of increasingly serious conflicts among the 
various nations and groups of nations can be expected. But 
although we cannot now go into a lengthy discuss·ion of these 
issues, let us finish this part of the paper by analyzing how 
the idea of a universal state.· or nation relates to our account 
of secondary and tertiary rulei. 
In the first place, let us inquire whether the incor-
poration of the entire surface of the earth as its territory 
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would make a state universal in an absolute sense. The answer 
is '.clearly, no!~ Nominally, of course, such a state would be 
entitled to the qualifier 'universal,' in fact, though, the 
possession of all the territory available on earth is compati-
ble with the existence of limiting or secondary rules, that is, 
with rules that restrict th~ attribution of the attribute of 
personhood to a few. Moreover, if these few had the power to 
do so, and were unwilling to restrain their use of .the earth's 
resources, they could easily do so, by simply r~garding the 
lives of the many non-persons as dispensable. In our time 
something quite similar is occurring. For if we see the indus-
trialized nations begin to consider the need to control their 
exploitation of nature, it is certainly not because of their 
concern for the people in other parts of the world, a concern 
that they satisfy with periodical statements of concern, but 
only because they themselves are starting to feel the effetts 
of their carelessness. In conclusion theri, the territorial 
unification of the earth, is, by itself, not enough to bring 
about the unification of mankind understood as its uniform 
personification. 
It seems to me also that it follows from what we have 
been saying that the assumption, popular among socialist think-
ers of all kinds, but particularly among Marxists, that abun-
dance of resources is enough to generate the brotherhood of man, 
is false. In fact, we can even go a step furthei and claim 
that Marx 1 s more prudent statement that abundance is a condition 
sine qua non for the establish~ent of an egalitarian society 
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is also false. Both versions of the belief ignore the trans-
cendental character of personhood, for if personhood is really 
transcendental, then it follows that, in principle, men could 
decide to establish an egalitarian society even under condi-
tions of relative scarcity. All they would need to do is intro-
duce tertiary rules that insured that their consumption remained 
at subsistence levels. Naturally, they would also need to 
emphasize certain of the basic virtues. In other words, it is, 
in principle, not impossible that a humanity fully committed 
to the ideal of equality could choose extinction, rather than 
admit the introduction of inequalities. That is, if the physi-
cal environment operates as a determinant force in relation to 
human ·social behavior, it is due not to any kind of absolute 
or logical necessity, but merely due to practical or contin-
gent necessity. Or, to put it differently, it is not neces-
sary in any absolute sense that basic norms be qualified, it is 
only possible, and, so to say, common that this be the case. 
b. Morality and Technology 
In our age we can hardly deal with any issue without 
making some reference to technology and its impact on our ways 
of living. 9 Spengler believes that this concern, more than 
anything else, is what characterizes and distinguishes the 
present historical period, which, he estimates, started in the 
past century with the development of machine-technics, the 
Pillar supporting Western Faustian Culture. It was to be expected 
therefore, that opposing ideological camps would develop in the 
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inevitable debate concerni~g the moral character of technology. 
Spengler mentions Marx and Lenin and, in general, the Material-
ists of the XIX and the fi~st part of the XX centuries as the 
"half-educated" advocates of technology. Many others, I sup-
pose, could be added to that group, in fact, most Socialists 
were firm believers in the liberating powers of machine-
technics. As is well known, Marx ridiculed the English workers 
who turned their rage against the machines. Marx's criticism 
is due only in part to the £act that in so doing, the workers 
failed to recognize the 'real' cause of their exploitation. 
To a great extent, this criticism reveals Marx's belief that 
machine-technology, the second basic component of the modern 
productive forces, the first one being socialized labor, is in 
itself good~ After all~ it is the ~achine which is the one 
tool that is going to generate the weilth and abundance without 
which socialism would be impossible. The detractors of tech-
nology, wh~m we could for lack of another name, call 'Spiritual-
ists,' see in tools and machines the incarnations of evil, 
destructive forces, that somehriw or other, threaten the 1 fine 
nature of man.' They warn us that the machines are slowly 
usurping our place in th~ universe, that they are dehumanizing 
our lives. In the popular fantasy, such fears generate rebel-
·lious computers, that lacking all other sentiments, mysteriously 
develop a will to power and take over the world, ensiaving man. 
~ong other things, what makes this paradoxical fantasy so 
interesting, is that it exhibits the ·1 real' image of techriology 
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proper of our age, Le., _as fntimately related to power, as a 
form of power. The fantasy loses its paradoxical appearance as 
soon as we understand that what people fear is not technology 
as such, but power and, mostly, the danger of this power get-
ting out of hand, totally escapi~g their capacity to control 
and check it. But these are other matters. 
As Spengler also points out, most people who talk about 
technology have in mind tools and machines, artifacts of all 
sorts, which can be used to solve certain practical tasks. 
This is, so to say, the crude image of technology. There is a 
second, more ethereal concept of technology, which can be 
called Aristotelian-Spenglerian concept. Here technology 
appears as an art in the_ general sense of the word, as 'tethn~' 
or, as Spengler calls it, as a 'strategy for living. 1 What is 
emphasized in this second view are not the tools and the rules 
for their manipulation, but, first and foremost, the ·knowledge 
possessed by the artist and, afterwards, the conviction that such 
knowledge is adequate to meet certain of the many challenges 
posed by nature. The failure to distinguish these two radically 
different ways of understanding technology have proven to be 
a source of confusion in th~ discussions concerning the impact 
of technology on human society and human consciousness. Here 
we are going to try to avoid this mistake. 
Among relatively recerit authdrs (now we have not time 
and no need to trace the history of the idea), who maintain a 
deterministic thesis concerning the effect of technology on 
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human existence, the most .interesti~g is, undoubtedly, Marshall 
McLuhan. Clearly, his conception of _technology corresponds to 
what we have called the 'crude image.,. Technology, for him,. 
is the collection of tools· or 1 media 1 which, '1being extensions 
of ourselves," have the power to "shape and control the· scale 
and form of human association and action."lO The statement 
that media are extensions of ourselves is to be understood quite 
literally. The wheel, for instance, is for McLuhan nothing but 
an extension of our legs, an image equivalent to our rotating 
legs. The second part of thi phrase, on the other hand, also 
has to be understood quite literally. Nationalism, McLuhan 
thinks, is a direct consequence of the invention of the print-
ing pr~ss and of the operation of this apparatus on human con-
sciousness. Although his explanation of this thesis leaves 
much to be desired, basically it can be reduced to the claim 
that the: 
Political unification of populations by means of 
vernacular and language groupings was unthinkable before 
printing turned each veinacular into an extensive mass 
medium. The tribe, and extended form of a family of blood 
relatives, is exploded by print, and is replaced by an 
association of men homogeneously trained to be individuals. 11 
Let us overlook now the absurd insinuation that the feudal 
society, out of which the national states developed, had struc-
tural similarities with tribal societies. What is important, 
as far as we are concerned, is to understand-how McLuhan pic-
tures the mechanisms of thi proce~s of determination that he 
thinks he illustrates with his eiample of the relationship 
between nationalism and the technic of printing from moveable 
tyPe. 
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For McLuhan this determination has nothing to do with 
the content of the media as such, which in this particular 
case would be the books that were printed. To stress this 
point, he refer~ to the fact that more than 50% of the books 
printed in the two centuries following Gutenberg's discovery 
were medieval works. McLuhin thinks that the widespread thesis 
that tools as such are neutral, and only the usei to which they 
are put are of any moral significance, is nonsensical and 
betrays a lack of understanding of thi n~ture of tools. The 
content of a medium, he insists, is always some other medium, 
e.g., the content of print is the written words, and the con-
tent of the latter is speech, etc. The primary impact of a 
new medium is, therefore, not to be.found "at the level of 
opinions and concepts," but rathe·r "in the change of scale or 
pace or pattern that it introduces into human affairs." So, 
the railway does not introduce the concept of transportation, 
but it significantly alters the pace of transportation. When 
this occurs, i.e., when one of our senses is extended by the 
introduction of a new medium, of necessity a new "ratio or 
equilibriumH has to be established "among the other organs and 
extensions of our body" and, obviously, the same obtains for 
their respective extensions, should any exist. 
Now, all this process of shuffling and reshuffling takes 
Place at an unconscious level and, it will have the force of the 
inevitable. What the exact force of this last claim is supposed 
to be, is unclear to me. For, at times, McLuhan seems to be 
saying that knowledge or awareness of the operation and the 
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effects of media, will allow us to have some control over them 
and, furthermore, that ceitain social forces, such as religious 
convictions or class interests, can sometimes pose some resis-
tance to the determination of social life by media. On the 
other hand, referring to the reticence of certain Oriental 
societies to assimilate Western machine-technology he says 
the following: 
The spiritual and cultural reservations that the oriental peoples may have toward our technology will avail them not at all. The effects of technology alter some 
rat~os or Pff~erns of perception steadily and without any resistance. 
Essentially, then, and whatever its deficiencies, the 
thesis that McLuhan wants to defend is that technological 
innovations can determine the way of life and the image of the 
world of the people that adopt them. As far as I know, there is 
only one Marxist thinker that has maintained an equally radical 
thesis. 13 I am referring to Franz Borkenau, who, in a coupl~ 
of controversial writings, tried to show how the whole of 
bourgeois spiritual life is nothing but a mirror image of the 
techniques of production employed in the different stages of 
the evolution of capitalism. 
This variety of extreme technological reductionism must 
not be confused with the much milder claim, rather common among 
historians, that technological inventions have played an impor-
tant or even determinant role on many occasions. Two excellent 
* The underlining is mine. 
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examples of just such a position are to be found in H. Pirenne's 
discussion of the impact of agricultural technology upon the 
14 socio-political structure of Europe in the Middle Ages and 
in Lynn White's magnificent classic on the .evolution of Medie-
15 val technology. To assert that stirrups help win battles 
against numerically superior forces, has nothing in common 
with the claim that battles are fought because the intensive 
use of the radio or of certain other artifacts unconciously 
predisposes men to fight one another. That historians have 
many times underestimated the role of technology, conceived 
as White and Pirenne conceive it, is simply an indication of 
the methodological imperfections of their discipline; that 
very few, so far, have accepted technological reductionism is, 
on the other hand, a sign of prudence on their part. 
In its most serious versions, the Marxist conception 
of the relation between technological change and social change 
corresponds to this last category. For the 'claim is that modern 
technology, when applied to the process of production, will 
create the conditions necessary for a humanization of human 
labor, that it will generate the proper environment for its 
realization, but not necessarily and automatically produce 
such humanization. Operating modern machinery is, in itself, 
hot more 'humane' than carrying a heavy load of wood, although 
it can be made to be so under the proper circumstances. 
But let us now try to see, in more detail, how machines 
could in fact affect morality. Again it is self-evident that 
314 
they can have no direct effect whatsoever on the fundamental 
moral norms, since no matter what the means and tools are 
that are employed for their materialization, they, being 
conditions of possibility of social life, will remain basically 
unperturbed. Affirming the contrary, presupposes the false 
assumption that the manipulation of nature itself is or can be 
the source of basic moral norms, but, as we have seen numerous 
times, basic norms are the conditions that make possible such 
~anipulation within a social context. 
At this point, McLuhan could, of course, argue that 
given that media are extensions of our organs, they can, after 
having passed a certain threshold~ create or generate new 
needs. Such a claim would have to be granted if any of the 
artifacts so far fabricated by man had, in fact, substantially 
altered his organism and, most importantly, if such artifacts 
had canceled his multirelational character. In other words, 
only when technical inventions of one type of another cause· 
a mutation of sorts in the human organism, such as to render it 
invulnerable or unirelational, for instance, only then will 
McLuhan's imaginary argument be acceptable. This possibility 
cannot be discarded and, moreover, is, in some sense, fairly 
Plausible, if we take into account many of the techniques now 
available that could be used to turn our world into a Huxleyan 
universe. But, evidently, any such techniques would not be 
simple 'extensions' of the organism; rather, they would be 
either the organs or the causes of an entirely new organism. 
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The moral problems that arise in this connection are, 
certainly, among the most serious of our time. Its gravity 
has only begun to be understood in the context of the discus-
sion of issues ,covering medical and biological manipulation of 
the organism. In general, though, the main reason why they so 
deeply disturb people is that they sense that. what is endangered 
are- not only this or that particular moral code, but the very 
essense of human morality. We can expect, therefore, that a 
great opposition will develop in the future ot the unrestricted 
use of technological innovations. As a matter of fact, it is 
quite probable that new concepts will have to be developed 
in the area of penal law to account for 'scientific crimes.' 
But, what seems absolutely inevitable to me is the collapse 
of the modern notion of the absolute right to engage in 
scientific research and experimentation. Such a notion is 
compatible with a level of scientific and technological devel-
opment which is underdeveloped enough to remain substantially 
harmless in respect to its effects on human life. It is, 
hence, a notion that corresponds to the heroic times of modern 
science, to the period when scientists and inventors, like 
small children, could be allowed to run free and, even, to be 
naughty once in a while. Mature science, like mature men, 
·needs to be controlled and regulated, for its behavior is 
potentially harmful. And this we can expect to start happen-
ing soon. 
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Our question, then, must be whether a 'change of pace' 
caused by the introduction of new means of doing things does 
have an effect on morals.· This much, I think, has to be 
granted. Consi~er the changes brought about in this century by 
the introduction of such means of communication as the tele-
graph, the radio and television. Once adopted, they become a 
fact with which individuals, classes and government alike have 
to deal politically and morally. Given their potentiality to 
cover the entire surface of the earth, no nation can afford 
to simply ignore the existence of these media, without putting 
itself in dangerous strategical disadvantage. The same is more 
obviously true for other inventions such as atomic weapons. No 
nation ·can fail to take them into account in its calculation 
when determining the course of its international politics, 
for the only conceivable way of effectively liquidating their 
potential effects is by means of an all-inclusive international 
agreement for their destruction. The same, I think, can be 
said, considering the different levels of generality that are 
possible from the communal to the international level, of all 
inventions. Their effects can be cancelled by an act of will, 
be it individual or collective, providing, though, that this 
act of will can effectively be enforced. This is, really, not 
a rare occurrence, as even a superficial survey can show, for, 
now-a-days, there are many groups of people who, for one reason 
or the other, refuse to adopt the use of certain artifacts. 
But once an artifact is adopted, its use has to be legislated 
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or regulated. In the case of artifacts that can be used for 
military purposes, the reasons are self-evident. Not only will 
it be necessary to enforce in any occasions involving their use 
all the basic rules relating to the functions of defense, but 
the actual manipulation of these artifacts will demand that 
new tertiary rules be created. In relation to the use of 
radio, for instance, it might become necessary to establish a 
system of licensing for both political and merely practical 
reasons and also, in order to preserve the customary distinc-
tions between private and public life, it might prove to be 
prudent to establish rules concerning the kinds of information 
about persons that can be disseminated with its help. 
There are, then, two fundamental ways in which new 
inventions can affect social life, one, by forcing legislation 
directed to make their use compatible with the status quo. 
We, the ruling class of nation A, decide both to preserve our 
national identity, i.e., all the secondary rules that separate 
us from the rest of humanity, and to adopt the use of modern 
means of communication, transportation and warfare. Such dual 
decisions will require, first, that we try to neutralize any 
possible 'universalizing' or 'cosmopolitan' repercussions that 
the utilization of those means might have, and, secondly, that 
we introduce abundant tertiary legislation, in the form just 
described, to avoid disturbing alterations of the pace of life 
in our society. The second fundamental way in which society 
and, thus; morality can be affected by technology has to do not 
With the preservation of the status quo, but with precisely the 
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opposite: the promotion of social change. This issue has been 
widely discussed by social scientists in the last decades, but 
obviously we cannot at this point examine all or, even, some of 
the views that have been expressed. Here we will treat this· 
matter in very g~neral terms. 
An interesting and revealing case to be considered in 
this context is the effect of the introduction of firearms into 
the art of warfare. Although, as has more than once adequately 
been remarked, the principles as such upon which the fabrication 
of most firearms are based are not new, their impact, measured 
in quantitative terms, is so great, that many of the secondary 
virtues required to fight traditional wars are automatically 
rendered obsolete. An enemy armed with a machine gun cannot 
be confronted in the same manner as one armed with a sword or 
a spear ought to be. Sending the cavalry against tanks does 
not make the commander a great strategist, but, at best, a fool, 
and, most likely, a murderer. 
Modern war does not only require different virtues, 
but also new skills, which, in real terms, means that the train-
ing provided to soldiers must have different goals and orien-
tations. Recent history provides more examples than necessary 
to illustrate the point that in modern war adequate technical 
Skills can take the place of millions of men. One of the most 
lucid strategists of our time says somewhere that if the 
dictum that power originates in the barrel of the gun were 
literally true, corporals and not generals would be in command. 
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It seems, then, that technical means, as such, because 
of the way in which they enlarge our possibilities of action, 
as McLuhan points out, and because they de~and new forms of 
training, can have an effect on secondary and tertiary virtues 
and rules. In £~ct, the deprovincialization, so to say, of 
humanity that has taken place in :·.the centuries since the begin-
ning of the European expansion is unthinkable without the means 
of transportation that the technical Renaissance of the Middle 
Ages and the early Modernity made available to those courageous 
enough to use them. Without adequate ships and compasses, the 
Europeans, cut off from the Eastern and Southern coasts of the 
Mediterranean, would have starved or gone back into barbarism, 
rather than build empires. On the other hand, if, for many 
centuries, the universal ideals of Christianity were nothing 
but a vague and empty piece of rhetoric, it was partly because 
the lack of information about non-European peoples helped 
perpetuate a provincial mentality among the Europeans. It 
is certainly not impossible or unusual, as we have repeatedly 
seen, but it is much more difficult and it demands much more 
ideological sophistication, to attempt to deny personhood to 
those that we are daily on television, than to those about 
whom we know nothing more than what is reported to us by illi-
terate adventurers. The Martians will loose their horns when 
they appear on television talking about potatoes and stomach 
aches. On the other hand, they might well develop tails, if 
for some reason, we decide that we need to discriminate against 
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them. Technical means alone can surely not create a homogeneous 
social space throughout the earth or the universe, but the con-
cept will forever remain an illusion, were we to lack the 
proper means of transportation whenever we manage to develop 
the proper dispositions needed for its materialization. 
Why this is the case, is something that can be under-
stood only if one approaches this issue from the standpoint of 
the ethereal conception of technology. Insofar that it is 
indeed a 'strategy for living,' a series of programmed and 
ordered behaviors bound together by a precise aim that help 
us cope with the demands of nature, technology bridges the gap 
within the social and the real spaces, between morality and 
reality. Perhaps, nobody has seen that with more clarity 
than Heidegger, 16 for technology, conceived as a strategy 
for living, is both an 'instrumentum,' and a form of putting 
demands on nature and exhibiting it. As an 'instrumentum' it 
brings together the goals of man and the means to realize them 
under given circumstances, but, in the process of doing so, 
it helps uncover both the gifts, the demands, the limitations 
and the pitfalls of nature and those of man. This is what the 
Japanese seem to be painfully discovering. Having adopted 
Western technology, the Western strategy for survival in the 
present world in order to preserve their own strategy, they 
are disensembling the latter bit by bit. Modern technology 
has uncovered for them new facets of reality and, in so doing, 
has simultaneously brought to light the inadequacy of their 
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world-view to cope with them. This is the most important 
sense in which technology determines morality, i.e., by making 
it impossible to choose a goal while at the same time refusing 
to accept the means to realize it, or vice versa. Once the 
woods on the other side of the river have been selected for the 
picnic, the means will have to be devised to cross the river; 
and, in most cases, once the river has been crossed, the picnic 
will have to take place in the woods. 
c. Morality and Socio-Economic Factors 
So far, we have analyzed the effects on morality of the 
physical environment and of techno~ogy, now we have to consider 
the relationship between morals and the set of factors that are 
best identified as socio-economic and political. This analysis 
is, perhaps, of a greater philosophical significance not only 
for intrinsic reasons, but also because of extrinsic or his-
torical reasons. Since the appearance of Marxism, the impor-
tance of these elements as determinants of social life has 
been stressed to the point of almost obscuring all concern for 
all other elements. This tendency is not completely arbitrary, 
especially if one considers some of the facts about social life 
that have been uncovered by the most sophisticated representa-
tives of socio-economic determinism. 
In its least developed versions, this type of deter-
minism tends to emphasize the role of population density in 
the shaping of social relations, i.e., it is Malthusian or, 
nee-Malthusian in spirit. Such Malthusian theses tend to make 
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one or both of two fundamental claims: 1. that high popula-
tion density tends to disrupt the equilibrium between food and 
energy supplies and the social demand for them, thereby imposing 
·constraints on social life that, if taken to an extreme, could 
destroy its foundations; 2. that high population density as 
such, and independently from its effects on the physical envi-
ronment, creates obstacles for the smooth development of social 
institutions. Apart from the new prophets of doom and the 
numerous advocates of population control, the clearest tradi-
tional formulation of the first thesis is to be found in some 
of the writings of T. H. Huxley. Overpopulation constitutes, 
for Huxley, the worst menace to civilized life, since by 
exhausting the limited food supply available on earth it will 
eventually force man to'turn against man, thus taking the 
species as a whole back to barbarism, back to the natural state, 
i.e., that state in which the struggle for survival leaves no 
room for the concerns of moral consciousness. 
Josue de Castro's now classical works on the nature and 
causes of hunger have, as is well-known, completely deprived 
Malthusianism of all appearance of scientific validity. Castro 
has clearly pointed out the mistakes in the basic assumptions 
of the Malthusians: 
Malthus' theory lacked a scientific basis. His first 
error was to consider the growth of population as an inde-
pendent variable, isolated from other social 'phenomena, 
whereas in fact such increase is strictly dependent on 
political and economic factors. His notion of a natural 
law governing the growth of population was challenged by 
Marx, who pointed out that what really occurs are historical 
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tendencies or cycles which change from one period, to another 
in accordance with changing social organizations.~17 
More interesting than the controversy concerning neo-
Malthusianism itself, is the inquiry into the motivations of 
their defenders, which range from class, through national to 
** racial interests. But, be it as it may, the first neo-
Malthusian thesis is absolutely irrelevant from:the standpoint 
of Ethical Theory, save in the limited sense in which it might 
be interesting to view such thesis as a manifestation of a 
characteristic feature of Western morality in the XX century. 
The second neo-Malthusian claim is to be found in a 
variety of forms and shapes throughout the history of Western 
thought from Plato and Aristotle to the XIX century Utopian 
socialists. Fourier, for instance, as Aristotle before him, 
feels that an ideal human society, one in which the principles 
of justice that he advocates can be realized, must have a 
* It is, perhaps, important to notice that nee-Malthusian 
theories are not only based on false assumptions, but also on 
distorted and inadequate empirical data. For, as. is now well 
known, presently less than 10% of the· potentially arable land 
on the planet is being cultivated. According to United Nations 
calculations, only 2 billion of the 16 billion acres of agricul-
turally usable land are actually used. These calculations 
are notoriously conservative in their estimates of the poten-
tially usable land, for, if de Castro is to be believed, they 
do not include tropical forests nor rugged and mountainous 
terrain. 
** This last one is the thesis defended by the Brazilian 
sociologist, Darcy Ribeiro, who sees in neo-Malthusianism an 
expression of the fear of the "white races" to be outnumbered 
~y the "colored" races, in a period when the latter are becom-
ing increasingly militant in their demands to reshape the 
Political and economical order of the world and, hence, to put 
an end to the supremacy of the "white races." 
324 
limited population so as to maximize the chances of each indi-
vidual to partake in all the most decisive political debates 
and events. Both authors see also a definite advantage in the 
existence of a certain degree of familiarity among the members 
of a community, an idea that has strongly appealed to many a 
contemporary psychologist concerned with the erradication of 
'anonymity' from our societies. Such 'anonymity' or 'deper-
sonalization' is reputed to be the cause of the collapse of 
social institutions and social discipline, as well as the cause 
of severe psychic disturbances. 
There is undoubtedly some truth to these speculations, 
but from the point of view of the 'theory of universal norms 
they are senseless, for they ignore the fact that human relation-
ships are 'juridical' in nature. We have seen that the actual 
familiarity with the person to whom I am related is not a 
necessary condition for the existence of a social relationship 
between them and me. I can know my enemies very well on all 
conceivable levels, or I can have developed a great deal of 
familiarity with my slaves, but these facts alone do not create 
a juridical bond between us comparable to the bond between 
persons. In oth~r words, the number pf persons existing in a 
society does not necessarily affect the moral quality of that 
society. The universal moral norms, insofar as they are uni-
versal, apply equally to two or two billion men. 
But although not fundamentally, population density can 
have some influence on secondary and tertiary norms if combined 
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with the proper conditions. Consider again the case of hunger. 
Once we have understood with de Castro that it is a man-made 
product, let us also accept, for the sake of argument, his 
claim that when it is widespread, it operates as the most 
immediate cause of overpopulation. Now, the phenomenon of 
overpopulation itself cannot be denied, for whatever its 
unexplored and unexploited potentialities might be, if we con-
sider a given nation at a given time, the disproportion between 
its agricultural output destined for human nourishment and the 
dietary needs of its population can be easily calculated.· 
When such a disproportion exists the moral structure of the 
society in question cannot fail to be affected given the vul-
nerable character of humans. These effects are likely to be 
felt at first at the level of tertiary rules. For instance, 
changes in eating habits and in the notion of hospitality can 
occur or, even, a redefinition of the concept of health might 
take place. It is quite probable also that the working schedule 
of large portions of the population might be modified or, 
inclusively, that the notion of 'rest' or 'leisure' be subjected 
to a re-evaluation. These two last examples show how behavior 
directly determined by primary rules can be affected. But in 
very extreme cases, and short from the total dissolution of the 
society in question and its revolutionary reconstruction, major 
shifts in the range of applicability of the notion of person-
hood would occur. These shifts are not always explicit and can 
be camouflaged in various ways, especially where the ruling 
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groups have an active interest in denying that any serious 
disruption of the social order is taking place. 
As an illustration of just such a process, consider the 
increase of repression in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist 
era. The historian P. Medvedev has correctly pointed out that 
any attempt to explain away the horrors of the time by making 
vague references to Stalin's mental health or lack of it are 
absolutely unsatisfactory and do not qualify as serious his-
torical explanations. Much more accurate are, of course, the 
explanations that take into account the absolutistic and 
totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. But it seems to me 
that there are more mundane facts that should not have been 
forgotten. 18 A Berle remarks, almost en passant, in his book 
on the structure of power in the U.S.A., that a comparison of 
the number of unemployed persons in the U.S. during the period 
of the great recession to that of prisoners in Stalin's con-
centration camps during the same period, will show a striking 
similarity. What Berle is insinuating, of course, is that the 
introduction of labor camps was, partially at least, a means 
of dealing with unemployment in a nation where, in principle, 
all citizens are guaranteed a right to a gainful occupation. 
Here, then, we would have a case where political and economic 
considerations come together and make it necessary for the 
ruling groups of a nation to invent mechanisms of depersonali-
zation to be applied against millions of individuals. The 
crude accusations of .'anti-state activities,' sabotage, etc. 
have as a primary function the furnishing of ideological 
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pretexts for the disqualification of persons. The crudeness 
of the accusations is to a certain extent explainable in terms 
of the urgency of the situation. The brutality of the proce-
dures, on the other hand, is explainable only within the logic 
of legitimizati9n of power underlying the Bolshevik regime. 
Let me clarify this. 
The question is, why did Stalin opt for the institu-
tionalization of lying and defamation and for the brutality of 
the labor camps instead of simply re-introducing the N.E.P., 
for instance, or for making some concessions to the Kulaks 
to avoid a drop in agricultural production and, hence, the 
danger of mass starvation? The answer is, because this would 
have deprived him of the arguments that legitimized his power, 
since, after all, he was reigning in the name of socialism. 
Hence, he had to act against the Kulaks, but, in so doing, he 
disrupted the economy and brought the population to the edge 
of starvation. But, again, socialist principles guarantee all 
persons a decent nourishment and these principles cannot be 
ostensibly violated, since they are the secondary rules upon 
which the order of the whole society and the power of its rulers 
are supposed to be based. Those that starve, cannot starve 
because of socialism, they have to starve because they are 
against socialism, and if there is starvation, it has to be 
caused not by the action of socialist, but by the actions and 
plots of the antirevolutionary elements. At this point, the 
circle is closed and if there are not enough anti-revolutionaries, 
enough will have to be created. 
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I have dealt with this illustration extensively because 
it exhibits the circumstances under which the numerical pres-
sure of the population can become a factor in the determination 
of the morality of a nation. As is the case with technology, 
population becomes a factor mostly when it clashes with the 
rather artificial demands of the status quo, which is primarily 
defined by the secondary rules which determine the social 
stratification and, hence, the system of privileges and the 
power structure.of a society. But, at this point, two main 
questions arise: the one concerning the relation between 
political interests and morals and the one concerning the 
relation between secondary rules and socio-economic structure. 
The sketchy explanation offered above is based on the 
assumption, that we have not yet stated explicitly, that 
ideological factors are involved in the determination of the 
secondary rules of a society. Actually~ I am firmly convinced 
that this is the case and that the role of secondary rules in 
human societies is, mainly, that of institutionalizing and 
legitimizing the power structure. I will now try to explain 
how it is that secondary rules are generated and, hopefully, 
this explanation will help us answer the two questions pro-
posed in the last paragraph. 
The idea that political interests determine moral 
beliefs is rather old. It constitutes the kernel of the poli-
tical theory of the French 'philosophes' who count, in the 
eyes of most historians of ideas, as the immediate forerunners 
of the modern~theory of ideology. For both Destutt de Tracy 
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and D'Alambert th~ truth, which is obtainable by means of the 
Lockeari method of a.nalysis, i.e., the reduction of ideas to its 
ultimate components, is po·litically relevant and has revolu-
tionary potential insofar as it can liberate us from super-
stition and false belief. Superstition and false belief, on 
the other hand, originate in the conscious or unconscious dis-
tortion of reality as well as from the refusal to engage in 
serious inquiry by the members of the ruling classes. Ignorance 
proves advantageous to tyrants because it prevents those 
exploited by them from discovering the true nature of the 
doctrines used to give their claim to power the semblance of 
legitimacy. By exposing falsehood and superstition, the sci-
ence of ideas exposes illegitimacy. 
Traces of this idea are to be found in the doctrines of 
Saint-Simon. The claim to power of a ruling class becomes 
illegitimate, when this class has become parasitical. And this 
occurs as soon as the class begins lagging behind the advances 
of science. The basic contradiction for Saint-Simon, the one 
that causes revolutions, is·the contradiction between the real 
state of scientific and technological progress and the real 
capacity of the ruling classes to cope with this knowledge 
and to apply it productively. When a class falls behind, 
·when knowledge has overcome it, it has to resort to falsehood 
and lies to retain its privileges. Conservatism or the commit-
ment to the past appears here as a commitment to falsehood. 
For the philosophes and for Saint-Simon, the systems 
of law and mdrality that arise in periods during which 
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superstition and illegitimacy dominate the political life, are 
themselves illegitimate insofar ai they encourage types of 
conduct that are in direct opposition to the natural virtues 
and inclinations of mankind. The life of the illegitimate 
ruler is utterly immoral, and instead of being an agent of 
progress, he becomes an agent of vice and corruption. Here 
we have the image of the anti-Midas, a Midas who multiplies 
leprosy instead of gold. 
By the middle of the last century this thesis had been 
taken to its logical extreme by the Anarchists, for whom not 
only illegitimate power, but all power is corrupt and immoral. 
Later, Prince Kropotkin offered a mature formulation of this 
thesi~. According to him, there is an inverse relation between 
moral progress, defined as the refinement of all forms of free 
cooperation among humans, and the decline of all varieties of 
political constraint, particularly th6se forms associated with 
the operations of the modern state. 
The opposite claim, i.e., the claim that the state is 
intrinsically a moralizing force, has also been very popular in 
the West. It is, in varying degrees, the view of St. Thomas 
and of Hobbes. In some ways, Aquinas and the 'philosophes' 
are very close in their accounts of the relationship between 
·political power and morality, although the doctor Angelicus 
is much more subtle. For him, the temporal power can be a 
promoter of virtue and of the good life as long as its mandates 
are compatible with both the demands of natural and ecclesi-
I 
astical or religious law, i.e., with the demands of reason and 
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·* revelation. Going a ways bey6nd this relatively mild claim, 
Hobbes places the dates of birth of morality and the state in 
the same time coordinates·. By definition, there is no immoral 
state, since the state-is identical with organized social life 
which, in turri, is the natural seat of morality. We are all 
aware of the extremes to which some modern tyrants have been 
taken by their adherence to this thesis. I am firmly con-
vinced that if one digs deep enough, one will find this or 
similar beliefs underlying any and all forms of tyranny and 
absolutism. All men that aspire to establish a sort of Par-
menidean oneness in the realm of politics will have to rely 
on the motto of Louis XIV.· The advocates of political democracy 
have always known that and, therefore, they have correctly 
insisted in avoiding the treacherous identification of society 
with the state. 
* It is crucial to keep in mind that Aquinas finds these three types of law different from. one another, what he advocates is the harmonization, not the identification of all types of law. In this respect, his thesis fits well into the characteristic pattern of the Roman Church, that has been critized more than once by adherents of the Oriental Church for not promoting the unification of church and state. Although I am aware of the controversial character of this thesis, I am convinced that a dispassionate reappraisal of European history wiil show that . one of the factors that made the development of political democ-racy in the West possible, was, precisely, the traditional rivalry between the spiritual and the temporal powers. Even if the pro-·per socio-economic conditions are present, political democracy cannot develop there where 'foi' and 'loi' are one and the same. The separation between Church and state contributed to the preservation of the image of the state as an alien entity and, hence, to the permanent awareness of the autonomy of social life. In real terms, this means, simply, that people remain at least . partially conscious of the fact that social life is the result of their own action. Loss of this consciousness does, of course, not cancel the autonomy of social life, but makes the idea of democratic rule inconceivable. 
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There is not much, really, that we need to say in rela-
tion to this extreme.thesis, save that the G.T.H.S.P. shows 
that the form in which the institutions of a society are 
administered is of no importance from the standpoint of the 
essence of these institutions. What gives the basic social 
institutions their moral character is their deep function, 
that is, their function as conditions of possibility of 
social life. The form of their materialization is a contingent 
fact, and, thus, cannot be the basis for the deduction of their 
moral character. By 'form of materialization' I mean in this 
context the way in which the basic or constitutive rules are 
qualified in each case by s~condary and tertiary rules. 
· In general, I have found that all these discussions 
concerning the function of politics are unnecessarily compli-
cated by a failure to distinguish between the two meanings of 
the word 'politics.' This distinction is partially insinuated 
in many of the works of socialist writers who are concerned 
with the theory of the state. Both Marxists and Libertarians 
tend to distinguish between politics as the repressive exer-
cise of power by some men over other men, from politics as the 
'administration of things.t The first sort of 'politics' 
will have banished from the perfect socialist society, from the 
classless society, all that will be left is the 'democratic 
administration of things.' The G.T.H.S.P. teaches us that 
this distinction points in the right direction. For, indeed, 
there are no fundamental social functions that require for 
their instantiation the establishment of hierarchical power 
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relationships among men. Whatever causes these hierarchies 
of power to appear.is .a contingent element of social existence. 
On the other hand, we have seen that one of the fundamental 
social norms requires that measures be taken to enforce all 
fundamental norms. Whether this is accomplished through 
specialized mechanisms or by the collective action of the 
population as a whole is immaterial. To an extent, we have 
already dealt with this problem in our discussion of the 
relationship between morality and law. We established at that 
point that there need not exist a particular. institution 
charged with enforcing morality as such, so that, if such an 
institution does in fact Sxist in a given society, the causes 
for its existence are by definition explainable in ter~s of 
some peculiar characteristics of that society. 
One of Marx's most important contributions to social 
theory has been the discovery that politics, in the first 
sense we have given to the word, is ultimately related to the 
socio-economic structure of those societies where it exists. 
In class societies the administration of morality becomes 
specialized and it is taken over by those groups that have 
monopolized political power. This is necessarily so because 
what the ruling classes· seek to enforce are not the universal 
moral norms simpliciter, but the universal moral norms as 
qualified or limited by those secondary rules which justify 
their privileges and their claim to power. Marx has force-
fully made this point by arguing that, i11 class societies, the 
Prevalent morality is always the morality of the ruling class. 
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The impact-of this discovery had a numbing effect on 
Marx hims~lf and, to a great extent, continues to have the 
same effect on his followers. This accounts, partly at least, 
for the fact that Marxists have been utterly incapable of 
d 1 . h d h . f 1· 19 eve oping a co erent an compre ens1ve account o mora ity. 
Lenin, for instance, maintains a very confusing position in 
regard to the existing universal moral norms. On the one hand, 
he seems to believe that there are in fact such norms, for he 
lists as one of the conditions for the realization of commu-
nism that "people should become accustomed to observing the 
fundamental rules of social intercourse, 1120 but, by the way he 
formulates this thesis, he implies that compliance with these 
norms was continuously imposed upon people in all previous 
societies, hence in fact denying that they are fundamental, 
i.e., conditions of possibility of social life. What Lenin 
fails to see is that the bourgeoisie did not seek to impose 
social life as such upon people, but, merely, a way of living 
that life, i.e., certain secondary rules. Given that man is 
capable of committing suicide there is no amount of terror or 
repression that can impose upon large numbers of men the obli-
gation to live in society for a prolonged period of time, this 
obligation, as we have seen, is natural and depends upon the 
exercise of reason, not of force. All that can be imposed is 
a form of life, a set of particular arrangements, and this is 
exactly what the ruling classes attempt to do when they assume 
the task of administering mcirality. We see, then, that power 
335 
is not inherently-related to morality, but only contingently 
so, since repression and the creation of specialized organisms 
for the administration of human social behavior are necessary 
only for the enforcement of limitations upon the universality 
of fundamental norms, and not for the enforcement of these 
* norms themselves. 
If we accept G. Lukacs' definition of 'ideology' as a 
'unilateral' conception of reality, we can characterize secon-
dary norms as ideological, at least those that originate in 
the interests of a given class, for, if our conclusions in 
the two previous sections are correct, we have to admit that 
, 
there are certain secondary rules imposed not by the will of 
a class, but by geographical and technological factors. But, 
how does a class come to recognize which are the secondary rules 
that correspond to its interest? That some sort of process 
* Ruling classes are usually aware of the fact that 
force alone cannot maintain a moral code in force, therein 
the importance attached to 'keeping appearances.' Ruling 
classes which justify their power by appealing to Providence, 
will have to act as believers. The king who resorts to the 
doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, will have to go to 
Church-and participate in all appropriate rituals, in the 
same way that Stalin had to make an appearance in Red Square 
during 'the celebration of the anniversary of the revolution. 
In Lima, Peru there is an extraordinary example of this fact 
e~ery October, during the festivity of the 'Senor de las 
Milagros.' A procession takes place for three or four con-
·secutive days, that passes several times by the presidential 
palace. Each time, the President is expected to come out to 
the balcony facing the main square and kneel before the 'Image 
of the Lord.' This ceremony resembles the ceremony of inaugu-
ration during which presidents and ministers are also expected 
to kneel before the 'Image of the Lord' and pledge loyalty to 
the constitution. -
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of recognition, that can be conscious or unconscious, is nec-
essary, cannot be doubted, for without it the coherent exercise 
of power is impossible. We must therefore agree with L. Gold-
mann and claim that any definitiori of social class must 
include, apart from the standard socio-economic criteria, some 
f t h . f' 1 . . ,20 re·.erence o t e notion o c ass consciousness. The ignor-
ance of this fact, whether deliberate or not, leads towards 
socio-economic reductionism. Insofar as Marx maintains such a 
position, it is because he underestimates the role of conscious-
ness in social behavior. It is ndt surprising, therefore, that 
he attempts to qualify his reductionist claims every time he 
is dealing with political events. He does so by postulating 
something like the doctrin·e of "relative autonomy." ·Initially 
Napoleon III might have been motivated to make himself Emperor 
by his wish to avoid paying his debts, but his wishes and, most 
importantly, his actions acquire, as soon as they start to have 
an effect on reality, a different meaning, a political meaning. 
Goldmann makes a similar point from a different angle. Law 
is fundamentally determined by the socio-economic forces operat-
ing in a society. But once the different laws have been enacted, 
their execution is entrusted to individuals who have a certain 
freedom of movement, who are called upon to use their judge-
ment and who have preferences~ This freedom of movement of the 
different individuals entrusted with carrying out a certain func-
tion is what guarantees, in Goldmann's eyes, the "relative 
autonomy of the phenomena of the superstructure." 
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These explanations tell only part of the story. The 
other part has to do with the need to generate tertiary rules 
to take care of the concrete demands created by the enactment 
of certain secondary rules and by the creation of new social 
mechanisms. Such mechanisms, once in operation, have the same 
effect as the introduction of new machinery, they themselves 
become sources of law, of tertiary regulations. Such is the 
origin of the professional codes of ethics, of the bureaucratic 
rules governing all actions of state employees, etc. 
But this still leaves us in the dark as to the process 
of birth of secondary rules. We know that to a certain extent 
they must be an expression of the awareness by certain classes 
of their interests as classes. But does this mean that the 
legislative members of the ruling class know, in the strong 
sense of the word, exactly what their interests are? This is 
a highly implausible thesis. In part because he is aware of 
that, Goldmann proposes that we distinguish between the possi-
ble and the real consciousness of a given class~ and between 
possible consciousness or world-view (vision du monde) and 
ideology. Ideology, as distinct from world-view is roughly 
equivalent to Mannheim's concept of "ideology,n i.e., the set 
of beliefs promoted by a class in order to oppose change and 
preserve the status quo, ideologies are, thus, essentially 
conservative. Goldmann's notion of "poss.ible consciousness" 
also resembles Mannheim's notion of "utopia." It is the 
'project' that~ class has for the arrangement or rearrangement 
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of a given society, its image of the ideal world. The real 
consciousness, on 'the other hand, is the image that a class 
has of itself at a given period. But these distinctions do 
not suffice to explain the process of formation of social 
consciousness, in fact, they presuppose it. 
At this point one might feel tempted to postulate the 
existence of a sort of Durkheimian "collective consciousness," 
but this would not take us too far either, for, again, we would 
have to explain how this consciousness comes to be. In respect 
to that, we can agree with one more of.Goldmann's remarks, to 
wit, that there is no such thing as a consciousness--above and 
independent from the individual consciousness ("conscience 
supra-individuelle"), but that whatever else class or collec-
tive consciousness might be, it must be the result of the 
interrelation of a number of individual consciousnesses. 22 
But this truth that Goldmann presents as a sort of axiom must, 
in turn, be explicated. 
Now, in a way we have seen already how 'collective' 
consciousness is generated from a collection of individual 
consciousnesses. All the universal rules express the collec-
tive moral consciousness of a society and what gives them con-
. sistency is not some mysterious supra-individual entity, but 
their acceptance by each and everyone of the persons conforming 
a society, an acceptance which is constantly exhibited by the 
behavior of these persons. Furthermore, if all these persons 
accept the fundamental norms it is because each one of them 
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has on his own come to realize their necessary nature. That 
is to say, the acceptance and assimilation of fundamental norms 
is not the result of~ 'collective' or 'global' act of ration-
ality, but rather it is the result of-countless individual 
primary acts of rationality. Similarly, the 'collective will' 
that asserts itself and seeks to enforce these norms is not a 
single sui generis and independent entity, but the sum of all 
the individual wills of the persons of a society. 
But in some ways, explaining how the fundamental norms 
are generated was a relatively easy task, if compared with that 
of accounting for the gener~tion of· ideological secondary norms. 
Ex hypothesis, the first process has to be simple and also 
simple to represent. It 'consists merely in becoming aware of 
the prerequisites of social life and in deducing whatever con-
sequences follow from them. No mistakes can be made, for human 
nature shows itself to the eyes of reason clear and neat. The 
generation of the ideological secondary rules cannot be an act 
of reason in the purest sense of the words, for what we perceive 
through them, as we have pointed out several times, is not 
human nature as such, but human nature with qualifications and 
limitations. If it is an act of reason that which allows us to 
deduce and assimilate ideological secondary rules, it must be 
an impure act of reason, an act of reason distorted by the influ-
ence of extraneous elements. Which, naturally, brings us to the 
next question, what are, and where do these elements or~ginate? 
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One thing, at least, we can say about these elements 
at this point: insofar as they are not part of human nature, 
and insofar as they· are ideological, and not determined either 
by geography, technology, or any other such elements, they are 
man-made, they are artificial. And, therefore, so must be, in 
essence, the mechanisms utilized for its propagation. Such 
mechanisms must be somehow or other incorporated into the 
function of instruction and must be distinguishable in princi-
ple from all those others necessary for the propagation of 
tertiary rules, in other words, ideological propaganda must 
be an integral part of the process of education in class 
societies. 
·But it could be argued that we have so far failed to 
distinguish clearly between ideological and nonideological 
secondary norms, for, qua secondary norms, both kinds are 
limitative and both need to be introduced by artificial means. 
This is perfectly true, and the distinction cannot be made in 
those terms. At the end, it seems to me, they can bd distin-
guished primarily in relation to their source or origin. But 
note also that, although they can be and, usually, they are the 
sources of limitative rules, neither technology nor geography 
must necessarily be so, for an infinitely rich nature or a 
sufficiently advanced technology need not interfere with the 
uninhabited materialization of universal norms. Ideological 
or class related secondary norms, on the other hand, are 
necessarily !imitative. And even if the sorts of geographical 
and technological conditions mentioned above were given, they 
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could not help become, seen through the perspective of ideo-
logical secondary rules, the sources of equally limitative 
rules. This seems to indicate that ideological second~ry rules 
have a certain preeminence over all other kinds of secondary 
rules. What this means is that secondary rules not necessarily 
required by the geographical environment can nonetheless be 
introduced as tools of class domination. 
Even if we grant all this, nevertheless, we cannot as 
yet claim to have provided an exhaustive answer to the question, 
how is it that class interests are recognized? In fact, we 
have made our task more di~ficult_by claiming that the rule of 
a class over a given society can subsist even when neither the 
geographical nor the technological conditions of that society 
encourage or inspire that rule. For, having taken this position, 
we can no longer argue that the discovery of 'objective' con-
ditions necessarily leads to the formation of a ruling class 
and to the establishment and the perpetuation of its rule over 
the rest of society. We seem to be assuming what some Marxists 
would call a 'voluntarist' position, a sort of 'conspiratorial' 
view of history ac~ording to which social classes form not 
merely or solely as the result of 'objective' conditions, but 
rather as the result of the conscious determination of a group 
of individuals to unite and to 'take over' the state or the 
organs of power of a society. As a matter of fact, I take 
this view to be partially, but only partially accurate, and I 
think that Goldmann and all those that, like him, deny the 
existence of an independent 'collective consciousness' must also 
Partially subscribe to it. 
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The sense ·in which this view is not totally accurate 
has been stressed by the Marxists and, in fact, by Marx him-
self. The proletariat develops as a class because there are 
large numbers of persons forced into the condition of wage 
laborers, it is awareness of the commonness of their condition 
that will result in the development of class consciousness, a 
process that, in the long run, is inevitable. This awareness 
will develop in the day-to-day struggle for survival, which will 
expose unity as the most efficient weapon at the disposal of the 
proletariat. But what most Marxists do not emphasize enough 
is the fact that this increase in awareness is not a unique 
event that affects all workers in the same way at the same 
time. In the final analysis it is a collection of individual 
events. The role of the socio-economic conditions is only 
passive. They simply prepare the stage, they open new possi-
bilities, while at the same time closing others, but they do 
not force these possibilities upon people, they do not make 
history. This is, I suppose, the real meaning of the often 
quoted phrase "man is the agent of history," whose most inter-
esting implication is that nothing is forced upon man by any-
thing other than his own consciousness, as in the case of the 
universal moral norms, or by other men exercising power over 
him. 
Social and historical processes are, in this restricted 
sense, the advancement cf consciousness, the progressive recog-
nition of po~sibilities of action by individuals and groups of 
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individuals and their attempts to materialize them. The 
existence of social ~onflicts in society is an indication of 
this, as is the fact that they always end up taking the form 
of a struggle for power. In the terms of the GTHSP, this 
struggle for power is nothing more than the struggle to impose 
certain ideological secondary rules~ A dominant class mater-
ializes as such through and by the imposition of a definite 
set of ideological secondary rules over the whole of society. 
Its existence is thus wholly dependent on the continuous 
enforcement of these rules. This is why, going back to Gold-
mann's distinctions, we can ~ay that in order for a class to 
survive in a .position of power, it is absolutely indispensable 
that it ensure that there be a certain correspondence between 
its possible and its real consciousness. The art of politics 
consists, precisely, in keeping alive this minimum of corres-
pondence. This, in turn, requires that the possibilities and 
the conditions of social behavior be recognized and, when 
necessary and possible, skillfully manipulated. 
Obviously, the possibilities that must be taken into 
account for political action include, in addition to those 
opened by technical, geographical and economic conditions, 
those determined by cultural factors and, most importantly, 
also the degree of awareness or class consciousness developed 
by the rival classes. Violence becomes a tool.of politics 
when class consciousness is well-developed and the different 
classes are thus aware of their interests~ Conditions in these 
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cases are similar to those underlying international wars. That 
international wars are more frequent and more likely to occur 
than civil wars and social revolutions is only in part d~e to 
the fact that in class societies there is a monopoly of power. 
In a more immediate and direct way, this fact is explainable 
in terms of the degree of awareness, in the population con-. 
sidered as a whole~ of the nature of the secondary rules 
defining their nationality. Those rules contain no pretenses 
of universality, and are thus clearly exclusivist and discrimi-
natory in character. Ideological secondary rules, on the other 
hand, owe their acceptance mainly to their appearance of uni-
versality, for ~nee they are recogniz~d as implements of class 
domination, they are likely to be disputed and rejected. 
Ideological rules, therefore, can be said to be 'ideological' 
in the two senses given to the word in Marxist literature: 
in the Lukacsean sense of onesidedness, and in the Marxian 
sense of deceitful or distorted representation of reality. 
In- order to promote the interests of a class unilaterally, such 
rules have to adopt an appearance of universality, they have 
to pose as fundamentally necessary rules~ This explains why 
the powers that be have always attempted to recruit philosophers 
as official apologists; they, after all, are supposed to be 
experts in the manipulation of necessity. Only boorish poli-
ticians despite philosophy, and, understandably, such appear 
mostly in times of revolutionary convulsion or when the period 
of decadence of a class is already well under way and force, 
rather than arguments, is needed to preserve the status quo. 
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d. Cultural, Psychological, Biological and Religious 
Factors and Morality 
The brief and rather hasty inquiries of the three last 
sections have led us to conclude that although material ele-
ments such as· geography and technology can be the source of 
secondary and tertiary rules, their effects upon moral legisla-
tion.are usually mediated by the socio-economic and political 
conditions of. society or, to be more specific, by the ideo-
logical secondary rules that fix and define those conditions. 
We have also concluded that the process that leads to the 
solidification of a set of arrangements in a given society 
depends greatly on the ability of the individuals conforming 
that· society to recognize the possibilities of action open to 
them, and to coordinate efforts once the time has come to act 
in function of these possibilities. 
But it is obvious that unless we think of an imaginary 
primordial society, we will have to take into account the fact 
that both the processes of recognition and the actions of 
individuals never occur in a void. They always take place 
against a cultural and historical background. This background 
is twofold in character, and can be seen either from the per-
spective of the society as a whole, or from the perspective of 
its impact on a single individual. For although we can con-
ceive an individual who is enlightened to the extreme of being 
perfectly aware of all factors that have somehow or other 
affected his personal development, and the development of his 
) 
society, and who can, consequently, 'deny' his past, as the 
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Existentialists would say, such is certainly not the norm and 
it is doubtful whether in real life we can find an exception that 
meets that ideal. We could provisionally affirm, therefore, 
that the relationship between the cultural environment and the 
behavior of persons is, in general, similar to that between the 
material factors and the behavior of persons. But, right away, 
we can see a major difference, for, clearly, we have to include 
under the same heading "cultural environment" the ideological 
secondary rules in force in each society, as well as the 
tertiary rules, i.e., elements that, by definition, exercise 
not only, as material factors do, a passive influence, but a 
direct and active one. This is undoubtedly something that we 
ought to keep in mind, since it seems to be a universal charac-
teristic of cultural factors. There is, really, nothing mys-
terious about this, for insofar as cultural factors are indeed 
cultural, they are artificial or man-made, and, hence, its 
preservation depends directly upon an uninterrupted flow of 
human effort and dedication. We have already seen that some of 
the basic virtues and norms are meant to ensure that these 
efforts do not cease. 
What we want to understand now is the way in which 
cultural factors, other than the norms themselves, affect the 
process of generation of these norms. One thing is self-
evident, namely, that the amount of information concerning 
nature and technology accumulated, preserved and transmitted 
by a society has a definite role to play as an aid in the process 
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of recognition of possibilities of action. This role is usually 
perceived by the ruling classes, which explains their attempts 
to control the mechinisms of training and information. The 
political control of the educational processes can sometimes 
·lead to its hierarchization, and, hence, to the transformation 
of the possession of information into a tool of power. 
But even if we do not think of the political uses of 
information and knowledge, their effect on the shaping of 
tertiary rules is fairly obvious. There can be no code of 
medical ethics, before there is a seience of medicine and before 
there are established tecµniques for the treatment of physical 
ailments. 
The word 'culture, 1 though, means more than just 
'stored information' concerning nature and technology. It 
refers also to the traditions and beliefs inherited from past 
generations, to the aspirations and frustrations that have 
become part of what is usually known as the 'national character' 
of a people, to artistic and other sorts of achievements and, 
last but not least, to religious beliefs and traditions. In 
relation to all these elements we have to ask, first, whether 
* it is possible that they be the source of secondary rules. 
In order to be able to answer this question we have to make 
several distinctions. To start we ought to differentiate 
* We do not ask whether they can be the source of primary norms, because such a question is self-contradictory. Insofar 
as these cultural. elements are cultural elements, their existence Presuppose~ the existence of social life, and, by definition, of the conditions of possibility of social life3 
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between cultural· elements with material components and cultural 
elements with no material components. Those like architecture, 
which have material.components, can exercise an influence 
either as material components, as elements of the physical 
environment, or as· 'spiritual' elements. This last possibility 
is the only one that is of interest in connection with our 
diseussion of cultural factors. But even among spiritual 
objects we can make some distinctions, for certainly we do not 
behave in the same manner towards decorative pottery as we do 
towards the memory of a victory or a defeat of our nation in 
a war against its neighbbrs. The cultural works produced by the 
kinds of activities that are normally referred to as the 'fine 
arts' are not primarily meant to affect our behavior in regard 
to other persons, if at all, such objects are merely meant as 
'symptoms' or 'symbols' of certain sorts of behavior in relation 
to other people. Other cultural facts such as historic records, 
tradition, etc., are immediately linked to our action, they are 
meant to inform our action, to direct it or to help direct it 
in one way or another. What is not clear is whether they are 
simple reinforcements of already existing social rules, or 
whether in some cases they can become the source and origin of 
new social rules. 
In order to determine that, let us consider a simple 
example. There are some persons in a society who advocate 
its merger with the neighboring one. To defend themselves 
against the possible objections by their opponents~ they have 
completed a careful study of all the socio ··economical and 
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political consequences of the merger, and their study has shown 
not only that no harm will result from it, but that, on the 
contrary, it will be. beneficial. The opponents concede all 
tpat, but argue that its cultural consequences would b? disas-
trous, that the cultural identity of their nation would be lost. 
We are assuming, of course, that there is no compelling reason 
to materialize the merger, i.e., that both societies could in 
principle continue existing independently from each other. 
If such is the case, I do not see any reason a priori why the 
people in both societies could not decide against the merger 
because of their concerns.to preserve their respective cultural 
identities. In fact, there are numerous examples in universal 
history of cases in which mutually convenient alliances of two 
societies against a third, more powerful one, have been. rejected 
on the grounds of an old animosity. Colonialists of all sorts 
are always very aware of this fact and they try to exploit it 
systematically whenever they can. Many a tribe has opted for 
annihilation instead of consenting to the abandonment of an 
ancient tradition. As I said above, I am convinced that 
'causal' or 'rational' explanations can be found to account for 
these types of conduct. What I have in mind are explanations of 
the sort that M. Harris 22 has proposed to explain certain 
apparently "weird" behaviors such as. cow-love, for instance. 
But what I do not see are the grounds for the conviction that 
Harris shares with most extreme 'materialists' that all behav-
ior is exp~ainable by means of a reduction to material causes 
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Extreme materialism neglects taking into account at 
least two important facts: 1. that humans do not have to opt 
invariably for life in society; the notion of 'collective' or 
'social' suicide makes as much sense as the notibn of 'indivi-
dual' suicide, and 2. that once cultural institutions have been 
in existence for a period of time they become part of the 
environment, so to say, and have to be taken into account 
before any new legislation is introduced. This has to be done 
in the same way and for basically the same reasons that material 
conditions have to be taken into account. As a matter of fact, 
the case in favor of cultural objects might be stronger. Cul-
tural objects appears to be dispensable only to those people 
who have a mystical conception of their nature. For, to the 
extent that cultural objects imply relations between persons, 
they are no less real, from the standpoint of social life, 
than material objects. In this respect, and although I disa-
gree with many of his explanations of concrete facts, I do not 
consider Max Weber's thesis that the spirit of Protentantism 
contributed substantially to the development of capitalism in 
certain nations, as necessarily incorrect. There is no reason 
to deny that, in principle, cultural factors can operate as 
causes of material happenings. I am willing to grant, though, 
that given the nature of cultural objects and, concretely~ the 
fact that they can often become the tools of political manipu-
lation, the li~eliho~d of this happening is rather small, 
especially when the processes in question involve major changes 
in the order of society. Cultural elements, then, are more 
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likely to have a retardatory or conservative influence than a 
revolutionary one, but this last alternative can by no means 
be excluded a priori. 
And, certainly, the influence of cultural el~ments on 
the shaping of tertiary rules cannot be ignored. Once a tech-
nique is adopted by a society, for instance, there are, as we 
have seen, certain tertiary rules that that society will have 
to adopt at the same time. When Japan incorporated machine-
technology into the process of production, the Japanese had 
to learn to produce in certain ways.. But even in that case 
enough flexibility was 1-eft to allow them to impregnate the 
process of production with their own cultural traditions. On 
top and within the characteristic relationships of the mode .of 
production demanded by machine-technology, they managed to 
infiltrate some of their particular traditions and values. In 
fact, at this point we can perhaps understand better the dis-
tinctiori made above between the 'crude' and the 'aethereal' 
conceptions of technology. The latter implies a whole attitude 
towards reality, and not only the automatic manipulation of 
tools. This attitude is determined by cultural as well as by 
political factors, and if the Japanese ever lose their own way 
of doing things, it will not be mainly because of the machines, 
but as a result of the desertion or abandonment of their tra-
ditions. But perhaps the influence of cultural factors on 
tertiary rules can· best be seen if one observes the professional 
codes of 2onduct adopted by members of the same profession in 
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different countties. Physicians in India, China and the USA 
have nothing in eommon in respect to the way in which they 
relat~ to their patients. Some will whistle while peiforming 
operations that would make others cry. 
It seems to me that when social sciences and people in 
general talk about 'customs,' what they have in mind are those 
patterns of behavior that result from the influence of cultural 
factors on social life. It should be clear now why customs are 
generally thought to have a retardatory effect on human social 
life. To the extent that they give rise to customs, cultural 
factors tend to promote the preservation of the status quo by 
way of reinforcing the rules already in existence. Customs are 
usually a source of credibility~ But what is unacceptable is 
the claim that has been made more than once by jurists, social. 
scientists and even philosophers, that customs as such can be 
the source of law. This assertion is based on a misunderstand-
ing of either the nature of customs or the nature of law. In 
relation to the first, it adopts a much too broad perspective 
thdt encompasses under one concept both the idea of tertiary 
I, 
rules and the peculiarities or variations in. the forms of their 
execution. In respect to the latter, i.e., to the notion of 
law, such view relies on the narrow conception that law is 
written or codified law. Now, if what is meant by postulating 
that custom is a source of law is, simply, that customs can 
color our way of life, we are confronted with a very trivial 
r 
and irrelevant assertion. If, on the other hand, what is meant 
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is that 'custom'· causes secondary and tertiary rules, then the 
fact 'is forgotten· that custom, conceived as a series of patterns 
of behavior determined by culture, is in itself lawful conduct, 
conduct determined by law. Thus, customs, in the last s~nse, 
are nothing but tertiary or secondary rules peculiar to a given 
society. To escape confusion it is best to use the word 'cus-
tom' in the first of these two senses. 
Our discussion in the preceeding sections led us to the 
conclusion that the formation of social consciousness. is the 
result of the concourse, of the flocking together of individual 
minds each of which has been taken to the same point through 
different paths. The' question of what determines the evolu-
tion of an individual consciousness, although not directly 
relevant to the general theory of morality, is crucial for the 
understanding of the genesis and the worki~gs of actual moral 
systems. From the perspective of ethical theory, this question 
and the one concerning the formation of the moral character of 
the individual, are one and the same. For, what is asked in 
both cases is, how does the individual acquire the virtues and 
vices that define his character and that determine his conduct? 
It might seem~ at first, that these questions need not be 
raised by ethical theory, since, in a way, one can know a 
priori many of the character traits that a person's behavior 
must exhibit, to wit, all those necessary and contingent virtues 
that will mak~ his 'life as a person possible in a given society. 
But this knowledge alone does not provide us with any under-
standing of the way in which the different social, cultural 
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and environmental forces of a society affect an individual 
and h~lp shape hfs personality. 
The study.a£ these phenomena must be the task of at 
least three disciplines:· sociology,. psychology and biology. 
I speak of three disciplines with great reluctance more to 
avoid controversy, than to communicate what I really believe, 
for my belief is that all those disciplines occupied with the 
empirical study of man, currently distinguished from one 
another, can be brought together to form a single empirical 
science of man, a veritable anthropology. But these are dif-
ferent matters, and for now I will do better by accepting what 
I * is generally accepted. Given the way these disciplines are 
presently structured, psychology can play an especially important 
part in helping us understand the evolution of moral personality. 
Traditionally, this discipline has approached the problem from 
innumerable different angles and in different degrees it has 
dealt with it in the theory of motivation, in the theory of 
personality, in child psychology, in ·clinical psychol~gy, etc., 
etc. Not until the publication of Piaget's famous study 23 
had there been a systematic attempt to deal specifically and 
* I would like to point out, nonetheless·, that the spec-ialists of those and other 'human' sciences themselves, seem to be feeling the necessity to integrate their various disciplines as a condition to advance in the comprehension of human pheno-mena. The appearance of such disciplines as 'socio-biology, 1 'social psychology,' socio-linguistics, 1 psycho-linguistics,' etc., and the ~tte~pts by Piaget and others .to create inter-disciplinary centers of research, can be seen as symptoms of this growing awareness. 
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in depth with t~e problem of the acquisition of morality. 
Since then, seveial other studies· have been done, particularly 
important are the -ones by Kohlberg mentioned before. Most 
psychologists deal with the issues concerning morality only 
tangentially, almost accidentally and, as far as I have been 
able _to see, all of them have failed to recognize the real 
nature of morality as the ultimate foundation of the human 
spirit. 
Apart from this major fault, .the relative failure of 
psychology to shed more light on the evolutionary or develop-
mental processes underlying the moral maturation of individuals, 
is due, I think, to two other factors: 1. th~ reductivistic 
tendency of much of psychological theory and, 2. the insistence 
in choosing as objects of study the individual in relative iso~ 
lation from his social context. The Psychoanalytical School, 
which is one of the few schools of psychdlogical thought to have 
emphasized the role of the social body in the formation of the 
human psyche, is, at the same time, one of the worst examples 
of reductionism, due to its attempts to identify a few all-
powerful psychic motor forces. 
But we need not and cannot (both for lack of time and 
information) concern ourselves in detail with the different 
tendencies of psychological thought. What we need to do is, 
With relative disregard for what has been done, try to determine 
what could be atco~plished by the psychological study of morals. 
Let us first consider what cannot be done4 The most important 
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thing that cannot be done, and that once in a while people have 
attempted to do,' is deduce basic moral norms from the psychic 
constitution of the human mind. This is so, first, because we 
cannot even start talking about the human mind until we place 
it in the context of social life. The human mind, whatever 
is really human about it, is constituted together with social 
life. Of course, there are some psychologists who think they 
ought to concern themselves not with the mind, but rather with 
the brain. These tendencies, that are best characterized by 
calling the~ neo-phrenological schools, are becoming rather 
popular. Their major weakness, apart from the philosophical 
problems generated by their identification of mind and brain, 
is that they fail to take into account the artificial nature of 
social life. That is~ even if there were such things as innate 
tendencies of the human brain, not all of them would or could 
necessarily become sources of law, in fact, the contrary might 
well be the case, for the realities of social life might require 
that some be repressed. The discovery of this fact is one of 
the most important contributions of Freud to psychology in gen-
eral. He knew that the 'natural' and the social states of man 
are different and, in some cases, even opposed, and deduced 
from that the necessity to postulate the existence of mecha-
nisms of control and adjustment to serve as a bridge between 
these two states. Even if. we disagree with the details of his 
theory, we ~ave to· grant that his basic intuitioris were funda-
mentally correct. 
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The same criticism just presented: can be made, mutatis 
mutandis, against the 'socio-biologists. 1 24 O. Wilson's claim 
that 'ethics' ought to be handed over to the biologists, indi-
cates that he has no idea of what ethics is all about. 
What psychology, and to the extent that it is concerned 
with the same issues, biology can do is help explain.the origin 
of what we can call the 'habits' of individuals, i.e., their 
real patterns of behavior. Only a better understanding of the 
habits of individuals will allow us to understand such important 
and basic social phenomena as the formation of social conscious-
ness, the generation of relations of friendship and animosity 
among persons, the development of attachments and allegiances 
' to ideals, etc. For although basic moral norms cannot be 
deduced from the psychic and biological characteristics of man, 
it is quite possible that some secondary rules and, certainly, 
many tertiary rules, can be traced down to these characteristics. 
The study of the relation between habits and customs should 
also be very profitable in this context. 
To end this section, let us briefly turn our attention 
to the one aspect of human culture that has been the most influ-
ential in the history of the species .. That aspect is religion. 
Any attempt on my part to discuss in detail the effects of 
religion on social life at this point, would be a sign of 
presumptuous idiocy.. For no other topic has been more studied 
and analyzed, and nothing requires more effort, knowledge and 
seriousness than the study of religion, both because of its 
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multifaceted character and because of the nature of its object. 
Here, therefore, I will limit myself to making a few distinc-
tions and, hopefully,· a couple of clarifica tory remarks. 
There is hardly anything more characteristic of the way 
in which the human mind operates, than its tendency to walk to 
the end any and all the paths open to it. This tenacity, or, 
if you will, this obstinacy has been present in the way reli-
gion has been approached since the times· of the Protestant 
Reformation. Once Luther had uncovered the political uses to 
which religion can be put, it was only a matter of waiting until 
the time arrived when God and religion were dismissed as 'merely' 
political. At this point, and coming from where I come from, I 
would be the last to deny that religion can become a tool of 
politics; but it seems to me that it would be an equally grave 
mistake, if not worse, not to attempt to explore the other vis-
ible facets of religious experience. After all, there is not 
a single example in the recorded history of mankind of a force 
more creative, of a power greater than religious convictions. 
Why this is so is something that needs to be explained and 
understood. Most of the greatest philosophers have felt this 
need, and so have the most serious sociologists from Durkheim 
and Weber to Berger. The former realized that the moral 
behavior of man is intimately connected to religious beliefs 
and that, hence, one cannot fully be explained if the other is 
disregarded~ The latter knew that social behavior, insofar 
as it is perceived as meaningful by their agents, is also closely 
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related to religious convictions. Now we know that, at the 
end, moral and social behavior are one and the same thing, 
hence, we know that we cannot disregard the study of_ religion. 
It seems to me that, in general, religious convictions 
can relate in three ways to morality: 1. by providing an 
ultimate goal to moral action and, hence, by providing it at 
the same time with an ultimate and transcendental justification; 
2 .. by functioning, insofar as they are elements of the spiri-
tual environment, as sources of secondary, ideological secon-
dary and tertiary rules; and 3. by helping to reenforce the 
mechanisms of materialization of fundamental moral rules. 
I am not going to occupy myself with 2. I would like to remark, 
simple, that the political function of religion ought to be 
studied in this context. But enough has been said already about 
these matters and, save for some new detail, nothing substan-
tially different could be said at this point. 
On the other hand, most religious writers who have 
been interested in the relationship between morals and reli-
gion, have predominantly identified 1. as the most important 
role of religion in regard to morals, this role we can baptize 
with the name of 'synthetic role or function of religion-' 
It is synthetic in the sense that it brings together the con-
cepts of 'obligation,' 'aspiration' and 'meaningfulness,' inso-
far as it proposes God as the end of action, as an ideal. 
In~ very suggestive paper, M. Ginsberg has described 
with great accuracy the functions of ideals in moral behavior: 
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... Hence, as it seems to me, the riotion of an 'ideal' 
is central in moral experience. For in the notion of an 
ideal there is a fusion of the conception of something 
that "would" satisfy us if attained and the conception of 
something that "should" or "ought" to satisfy us. In 
other words in moral experience appeal and constraint, 
pressure and aspiration are in various degrees intermingled. 
The ideal stands before us as something desirable though 
not necessarily de~ired, as something which makes demands 
on us and which may involve abnegation of desire b~5 which in the end would be not repressive but liberative. 
Assuming this definition of ideal, let us ask what the advan-
tages are of proposing God as an ideal. In the first place, 
as most religious writers have always known, God renders our 
obligations absolute, ineluctable, thus eliminating all ques-
tions concerning the necessity of moral norms. But God is also 
the truest source of happiness, for he alone offers a guarantee 
of permanence. Hence, insofar as we are rational beings, inso-
far as we come to realize what we really need and want, we 
cannot but desire God, our unification with God. Only after 
this has been accomplished, and not before, will our purpose 
in life have been fulfilled, our existence will have attained 
a meaning. 
We have ~een that reason alone, in the form of the 
primordial act of rationality, is incapable of rendering our 
obligations absolutely necessary; we have also seen that reason 
alone is incapable of giving our lives an absolute, transcen-
dental meaning or sense of purpose. In oth~r words, reason is 
impotent when confronted with the question of suicide. Only 
God can affirm without qualifications the worth of life. 
Religious as well as non-religious thinkers hive invariably 
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been aware of this fact. H. Kelsens for instance, thinks that 
without the help of God there is no way of establishing reli-
able criteria to overcome moral relativism, and he opts for it. 
Two of the most brilliant religious writers of our time, 
Simone Weil and Paul Tillich agree with Kelsen's statement of 
the problem, but opt for God. S. Weil writes the following 
concerning the nature of our obligations towards other human 
beings: 
This obligation is not based upon any de facto situation, 
not upon jurisprudence, custom, social structure, relative 
state of forces, historical heritage, or presumed historical 
orientati6n; for no de facto situation is able to create 
an obligation. 
This obligation is an eternal one. It is coextensive with 
the eternal destiny of human beings. Only human beings 
have an eternal destiny ... 
This obligation is an unconditional one. If it is ·founded 
on something, that something, whatever it is, does not form 
part of our world. In our world it is not founded on any-
thing at all. It is the one and the only obligation in 
connection with human affairs that is not subject to any 
condition.26 
The point could not be made clearer or more forcefully. 
Nothing in the world can justify our obligations in an absolute 
manner, only God can do so. 
For Tillich 27 the 'moral imperative' is valid for us 
only insofar as it corresponds to the will of God. But the 
will of God is not a force alien to us, it is our 'essential 
being.' In other words, there is a perfect correspondence, 
a perfect harmony between the will of God and our own nature. 
So, to the extent that the moral imperative represents the will 
of God, it helps unfold our essence, it leads us towards self-
realization. 
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We can easily see, then, why religion has, so far, 
proven to be irreplaceable. Even the greatest of human ideals, 
as Schopenhauer knew all too well, are exhaustible. God is 
the only id~al that, when realized, will not let us. down, so 
to speak. 
On the other hand, 'c'· represents an equally important 
function of religion. Here we are interested in religion as 
the realm of the sacred, of the holy. The notion of 'sacred-
ness' or 'sanctity' plays an essential role in the life of 
primitive societies. The hypothesis that I want to propose 
here is that there is, in general, in primitive as well as in 
other societies~ a correspondence between the holy and the 
necessary, between those persons, things and places endowed 
with the quality of sanctity, and their·roles as privileged 
carriers or agents of the materialization of primary and 
28 secondary norms. 
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Conclusions 
Although it is fairly obvious that the treatment of 
most of the issues dealt with in this dissertation has been 
brief and schematic, it is perhaps time to arbitrarily stop 
our speculations and attempt to summarize what has been said 
so far. In order to simplify the task, I will take one chapter 
after the other, indicating what each of them is supposed to 
have accomplished. 
The first chapter is, in many ways, the one that has 
suffered the most due to the sketchy character of the paper. 
But the point of including a presentation of the skeleton of 
the GTHSP in this essay is not to develop such a theory at any 
J 
length. Rather, all I have attempted to do is to introduce 
both the proper framework for the study of morality and certain 
terms, which, in my opinion, must constitute the basic vocabu-
lary for any fruitful discourse on morality. 
The claim that the GTHSP is the proper framework for 
the study of morality follows from the conception of morality 
as a condition of possibility of human social behavior. That 
is, morality is conceived in this context as a constituent 
of human social action and, as such, as a necessary element 
of it. The initial historical excursus shows that the path 
that leads towards the recognition of this fact was opened 
for the first time by Marx's conception of human activity as 
physical and productive activity, and by the more recent 
attempts to posit human needs, or the dynamic attributes of 
human nature, as its most basic and permanent moving force. 
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Such needs, we saw, can be conceived as a sort of 'hypokei-
menon' or substr~te: they underlie human nature, but they do 
not define it in its specificity, for human nature, insofar 
as it is the subject matter of the GTHSP, is not bioiogical 
but juridical in character. This juridical form of being is 
what we have called 'personhood,' which is nothing but human 
existence in its concreteness, as it manifests itself in a 
social setting, i.e., in the framework of a complex net of 
inter-personal relations. What distinguishes human social 
existence from other sorts of social existence is precisely 
its juridical character, that is, the fact that it is sustained 
by a skeleton of norms or rules which, in turn, are not natural 
or given, bu~ have to be produced and continuously enforced 
by their own subjects, who become persons in the process of 
doing so. On the other hand, the personification of the sub-
jects of these norms is possible because they are multirela-
tional entities, i.e., entities which, not being programmed 
to establish among themselves any particular sort of relations, 
can and have to choose the types of relations they want to 
establish among themselves. 
To say that humans 'choose' the way they want to live 
does not imply the idea of arbitrary selection. What this 
means is, merely, that, through an inagural or primary act of 
rationality, they recognize the need to subject their behavior 
vis-a-vis other hunans to the norms directly deriving from the 
dynamic qualities of human nature in order to establish a 
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working society. The particular forms in which these norms 
can be instantiated and thu~, the particular characters of the 
societies that can be created are not predetermined. 
When materialized through the behavior of persons, 
these norms define sets of-basic or fundamental social insti-
tutions, the ultimate task of which is to guarantee the survi-
val of the individual persons as such and of the society as a 
whole. The realm marked by these institutions is what we have 
called the 'social space.' 
Now, although the list of the defining, dynamic charac-
teristics of human nature can be obtained only rhapsodically, 
given the contingent nature of man's biological constitution, 
the fundame~tal social functions can be deduced, i.e., shown 
·to be necessary and universal. To do so, one has to exhibit 
them as conditions of possibility of social life, one has to 
show that they fulfill the prerequisites for human social 
existence determined by the set of dynamic qualities or needs. 
In this manner six fundamental functions can be deduced, 
including that of conductivization or morality which encompasses 
all the others and gives them their typical human character.· 
This last function is the topic of study of the second 
chapter. First some preliminary issues are resolved that are 
both historically and intrinsically important. The first such 
issue is the relation between morality and law. The thesis 
I want to defend in this respect is that morali.ty and law 
do not represent two different realms of social life, that they 
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do not seek to satisfy different kinds of social needs, but 
that, to the extent that law appears as different from morality 
or, even, as opposed to it, it is a symptom or sign of the 
accidental ,need to enforce morality by force in certain types 
of societies. In other words, at a fundamental level, the 
bifurcation between law and morality does not exhibit a basic 
trait of morality in general, but merely a trait of certain 
societies. At a more superficial level, namely, at the level 
at which law. appears as a technical or administrative regulation, 
it is nothing more than a tertiary rule, a norm instrumental 
in the materialization of some institution or other. Such rules 
or laws help accommodate the demands of morality to those of 
reality. No~, the claim that law, although not identical with 
morality can nevertheless have 'moral implications' is to be 
rejected in the light of what has been said before. For such 
claim not only implies that there is a fundamental distinction 
between law and morality, but, furthermore, forgets that mor-
ality is not a mere appendix of personhood but rather its 
essential constituent. All acts of persons are moral acts, 
since personhood is a quality of humans which attaches itself 
to them only insofar as they act morally, i.e., according to 
universal and necessary rules, and to rules deriving from 
them. 
The next preliminary issue is the one concerning the 
passage from 'is' to 'ought.~' As I see it, the problems 
being debated in this connection are that of explicating the 
real and possible relations between nature and morality, and 
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that of determining the nature and the sources of moral obliga-
tio~. In regard to the fir~t question, I find myself in agree-
ment with Hume, Kant and other philosophers who claim that no 
morally binding rule can be deduced by means of an examination 
of nature, although, certainly, many an instrumental or hypo-
thetical rule can so be derived. In other words, in spite of 
the fact that 'practical necessitation,' to use van Wright's 
term, is determined by nature and its circumstances, no moral 
necessitation is directly determined by them. The notion of 
'obligation' can legitimately be introduced in the course of 
moral discourse by reference to that of 'personhood.' Persons 
are, then, both the source and the object of obligation. 
That is, the only fact the recognition of which generates a 
moral obligation is personhood. Once the quality of person-
hood has been detected by a person in some given entity, this 
person has automatically an obligation to relate to that entity 
according, to the fundamental rules. In other words, moral 
obligation is nothing but the requirement, implicit in the 
notion of person, that persons preserve their personhood by 
contributing to the preservation of the personhood of other 
persons. Obligation, then, denotes a kind. of internal or, 
better, umbilical connection between persons, which makes them 
all dependent on one another. 
But once these preliminary issues have been settled, 
it is indispensable to deduce the fundamental norms which 
regulate the relations between persons. The deduction of these 
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norms proceeds much in the same way as the deduction of the 
fundamental social functions, which it presupposes. The 
deduction of the fundamental social functions does not exhibit 
them in their specificity; it merely exposes their role in the 
satisfaction of one or more of the prerequisites for human 
social life. The deduction of the fundamental norms, on the 
other hand, if successful, will exhibit these functions in their 
concrete or determinate form, since, by definition, the funda-
mental norms are the instruments for the materialization of the 
basic social functions. The strategy for the deduction of the 
fundamental norms therefore must be to present each of them as 
an indispensable vehicle for the materialization of at least 
bne of the fundamental social functions. By following this 
procedure 24 norms can be deduced, including four correspond-
ing to the function of conductivization or morality proper. 
These four norms not only are the most general, but apart 
from securing the coherent integration of all other norms into 
a workable system, they also provide human social behavior 
with its specific character. 
The last part of this chapter shows how virtues relate 
to each of these norms. Virtues are in fact nothing more 
than the instantiation of fundamental norms in each person's 
character. To predicate a virtue of a person is tantamount 
to attributing him certain disposition to act according to one 
or more of the fundamental norms. The table of basic virtues, 
therefore, and that of the fundamental norms correspond to each 
other. 
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The tasks commended to the third chapter are that of 
explaining the possibility of real moral codes and· their pro-
cess of generation, and that of accounting for the mechanisms 
involved in their generation. The first task requires the 
dissolution of one of the most serious aporias of traditional 
moral philosophy, namely, that of explaining how it is possi-
ble to assert at the same time that there are certain univer-
sal moral ·norms and that the moral code of each society is 
different from that of any other society in a non-trivial man-
ner. The.appearance that this double assertion involves a 
contradiction has led philosophical speculation in two oppos-
ing directions. Some philosophers, like Kant and Scheler, 
I 
for instance, have sought to escape the aporia by affirming 
universality at the expense of multiplicity and, thus, by mak-
ing the validity of moral norms be absolutely independent from 
the circumstances in which individual men and societies exist. 
Other philosophers, and most notably those generally known 
as Relativists, have emphasized multiplicity at the expense 
of universality, hence denying the existence of necessary and 
universal moral norms. Approached from the perspective of the 
GTHSP, this aporia appears as the result of a failure to 
appreciate the kinds of limitations imposed upon universal moral 
norms in real societies. All such limitations affect only the 
range of applicability, the extension of the fundamental norms, 
never their character. Fundamental norms are conditions of 
possibility of social life. This means that no human society 
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is possible in which these norms are not followed. But there 
is nothing in the concept of· 'condition of possibility' that 
entails the idea that fundamental norms ought to be· applied to 
all entities potentially capable of becoming persons, i.e., 
social agents. Although, of course, there is nothing contra-
dictory in the idea that they ought to apply to all such 
entites. As a matter of fact, a good case could perhaps be 
made for the claim that a force pushing in this direction under-
lies much of. human history. Now, the norms that set the 
limits for the range of applicability of the universal moral 
norms are those that we have called ideological secondary 
rules. These rules are necessary only in respect to a given 
social order, but not universally. 
There is clearly a sense in which universal and neces-
sary norms apply to all persons or, at least, to most persons, 
for,. today, most human beings are persons in some society or 
other. But this claim is highly misleading, since, before 
there is a single, equalitarian society constituted by all 
living human beings, persons, to the extent that their person-
hood is qualified by secondary rules, will be different in 
different societies. Actually it is only recently that per-
sons living in different societies have ceased to regard each 
other is absolutely non-persons. The incipient development 
of International Law bears witness to this fact, brutally 
emphasized every time an international war breaks out. 
Now, the inquiries required for the solution of the 
second task show that not all secondary rules and, certainly, 
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not all tertiary or instrumental .rules are totally arbitrary 
or capricious. Some of them are conditioned by a diverse set 
of external factors both natural and cultural, such as geo-
graphy, poptllation density, religious beliefs, etc. All or any 
of these factors can incline persons to be more or less flex-
ible in the way they constitute their societies. They can even 
determine the constitution of some of their institutions by 
imposing technical demands upon them. But, what none of these 
factors can d6 is deprive man of his liberum arbitrium, of his 
ability to fr~ely mark the course of his life, for the faculty 
that enables him to do so is inherent in his nature. 
'This is, then, summarily put, what has been done in 
this paper. Many questions remain unanswered and undoubtedly 
there are many problems with the argumentation. But one thing, 
at least, I am fully convinced is true: that morality is the 
most human of affairs and that it can be understood in the 
framework of a general theory of human nature. There is no 
l 
need to go beyond man to understand his behavior, as there is 
no need to go beyond nature to understand its mechanisms. In 
the end, though, no theory of human praxis is acceptable which 
does not lead to the conclusion that all human wisdom can 
essentially be summarized by the old motto: "Suum cuique 
tribue, Neminem laede, Imo omnes, quantum pates, juva." This 
paper has some worth only to the extent that it provides jus-
tification and support for it. 
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rence and Wishart, 1969). 
6Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
7 ' Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
·Ssmall is Beautiful. Economics as if Pea le Mattered 
(New York: Harper an 
9o. ,Spengler, Man and Technics. A Contribution to the 
Philosophy of Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1932) p. 3. 
10M. McLuhan, Understanding Media, The Extensions of Man 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) pp. 7-9. 
11 Ibid., p. 177. 
12 Ibid .. , p. 12. 
13Franz Borkenau, "Zur Soziologie des mechanistischen 
Weltbildes," Zeitschrift fuer Sozialforschung, Vol. 1 (1932) 
pp. 311- 3 3 5. 
~ 14H. Pirenne, Histoire economique et sociale du Moyen 
Age (Paris: PUF., 1969). 
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' 15Lynn White, Medieval Technology and Social Change 
(London: Oxford University Pr~ss, 1976). 
16 cF.· particularly Die Frage nach der Technik, in, 
Vortraege und Aufsaetze (Tuebingen: Verlag Guenther Neske, 
19 5 4) pp. 13- 4 5 . 
17 / Josue de Castro, The Geography of Hunger (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1952) p. 15. 
18Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Power without Property (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959). 
19 r will not attempt here a detailed criticism of the 
efforts undertaken by self-proclaimed Marxists to deal with 
the subject of morality. I simply want to make a couple of 
general remarks. First a bibliographical remark. So far, I 
have found three books that are quite valuable both to help 
one put the discussion of Marxist ethics in the proper perspec-
tive and to get an overview of its historical development. 
These books are: M. Rubel, Pages choisies de Karl Marx pour 
une ~thique socialiste (Paris: Librairie Marcel Riviere, 1948), 
particularly illuminating is Rubel's introduction, "Introduction 
a l'ethique marxienne"; E. Kamenka, Marxism and Ethics (London: 
MacMillan, 1969), especial attention should be paid to Kamenka's 
treatment of Marx's own moral ideas. With remarkable elegance 
and clarity, Kamenka shows that communism is an ethical ideal 
for Marx. The third book provides a clear and comprehensive 
exposition of the evolution of ethical theory in communist 
circles: R. DeGeorge, Soviet Ethics and Morality (Ann Arbor: 
The Uni vers1i ty of Michigan Press, 1969) . 
Marxists works on ethics can be divided into two 
classes. The first class is represented by books such as K. 
Kautsky's Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassun 
(Stuttgart: Verlag van . H. ietz, 190 , were t e emp asis 
is on actually describing the morality of a class and on show-
ing how it works as an organ of political power. Although 
perhaps they are not Marxist in the strict sense of the word, 
M. Ossowska's studies on the 'Nobility' and the 'Bourgeois' 
ethos would correspond to this class. And, if we stretched 
our imagination a little bit, H. Marcuse's Eros and Civiliza-
tion and The One-Dimensional Man could be included undertnfs 
heading. Potentially, this is the most fruitful line of analy-
sis. The second class of Marxist books on morality includes 
L. Tro·tsky' s Their Morals and Ours (New York, Pioneer Press: 
1942) and M. Hor.Kheimer's article "Materialismus and Moral," 
Zeitschrift fuer Sozialforschung. Jahrgang II (1933) pp. 161-
195. 
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Lenin's numerous but rather marginal comments on moral-
ity can, I suppose, also be cbunted as part of this last group. 
My feeling is that all:the"Se works shciuld not be taken too seriously, 
not more seriously than any other sort of vulgar Relativism. 
All these authors commit a fallacy of overreaction. Interested 
in denouncing the hyppocritical behavior of those who oppose 
revolutionary action in the name of 'eternal moral principles,' 
they end up proclaiming all morality as relativistic and 
dispensable. This not only encages them in a contradiction, 
for as Kamenka points out, "such ethical relativism, ... , 
seems at best difficult to reconcile with belief in the objec-
tive moral superiority of socialism, in the scientific basis 
(i.e., justification) of proletarian or Communist morality, 
or in moral progress (a conception that seems to imply under-
lying or meta-criteria logically independent of the actual 
historical moralities judged in terms of these criteria)" 
Kamenka, pp. 44-45. This contradiction becomes particularly 
visible in Lenin and Trotsky, who argue, at the same time, that 
good is to be defined each time as whatever is good or conveni-
ent for the party under given circumstances, and that there 
are certain objective moral standards that prove the superiority 
of communism,. thus implying that there are independent, uni-
versal criteria. for the determination of moral goodness. 
De George's book describes some of the attempts of 
Soviet writers to deal with these problems and, mainly, to 
escape the charge of relativism. De George points out two 
recent 'additions' to Marxist ethical theory that are meant to 
accomplish precisely that: one, the thesis that morality is 
'relatively independent,' and, two, the recognition that there 
are certain moral rules common to all societies, that will 
constitute the basis for a universal morality once the commu-
nist society has been realized. As far as I can tell from 
De George's e-xposi.tion, these common rules are not thought of 
as conditions of possibility and are thus conceived more as 
general than as truly universal norms. 
201enin, State and Revolution in Essential Works of 
Marxism (New York~ Bantam Books, 1971) pp. 102-198. 
21 Lucien Goldmann, Sciences humaines et philosophie 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952) Goldmann 
suggests the following strategy for the definition of the 
notion of 'social class': "Pour terminer ce paragraphe, 
ajoutons seulement une remarque: Nous crayons que la classe 
sociale se definit par: a) la fonction dnas la production; 
b) Les relations avec les membres de autres classes, etc) 
La conscience possible qui est une vision du monde." (pp. 111-
112) see also pp. 101-103. 
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22 L. Goldmann, 
"Pour le materialism dialectique, il n'y a pas de 
conscience supra-individuelle. La conscience collective, 
conscience de classe par example, n'est que l'ensemble des 
consciences individuelles et de leurs tendences telles qu'elles 
resultent de l'influence mutuelle des hommes les unes sur les 
autres et de Ieurs actions sur la nature, p. 130. 
23M. Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches; the Riddles 
of Culture (New York; Random House, 1974). 
24J. Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (Glencoe, 
Ill.; The Free Press, 1948). 
25 For an exposition of the main theses of the 'Socio-
Biologists" cf. David P. Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior 
(New York, Elsevier, 1977) A much more measured treatment of 
most of the same issues can be found in Paul Chauchard's book-
let Societes animales, societe humaine (Paris: Presses Uni-
versita1res de France, 1970). · 
~ 2 6M . . G . b "B . N d d M 1 Id 1 " orris ins erg, asic ee s an ora ea s, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. XLIX (1948-49) 
pp. l 9 s -214. 
2 7 S. Weil, The Need for Ro·ots (New York: Harper and 
Row, 19 71) p . 5 . 
28 cf). P. Tillich, Das Religioese Fundament des Moralis-
chen Handelns in Gesammelte Werke, Band III (Stuttgart: 
Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959) particularly pp. 15-83. 
29w. Brede Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, Lec-
tures in the Phenomenology of Relirion. Trans. John B. Carman. 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971 . 
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